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ABSTRACT
In this thesis. Towards B Hermeneutical Foundation for UbersJism. , want to formulate
a theory of liberalism which has a strong theoretical foundation by drawing on hermeneutics
to stress pluralism and I'embodied" experience. At the same time, I hold that narratives are
constrained by objective reality. In both the Greek and modern Enlightenments. there was an
apparent paradox, that of objectivity and pluralism. and my thesis attempts to resolve it. In the
first chapter. Irrhe Greek Enlightenment. Hermeneutics and a New Foundation for Uberalism."
I use Diltheys idealistic hermeneutics to examine the Greek Enlightenment, arguing that it
was essentially a revolution of ideas. Dilthey examined this process of narrative
deconstruction! reconstruction to point out the inherent plurality of interpretations of reality. In
the second chapter, "Rights. History and Nationhood: Towards a Transhistorical
Understanding of Liberalism,l' I wish to show the idealistic limitations of Dilthey's brand of
hermeneutics by arguing that certain interpretations of the Good, such as those found in
traditional aboriginal narratives, point to a need material support for the communities
concemed. While Kymlicka's (1992) arguments for group rights are persuasive. I limit the
case for group rights to nations. The final chapter. Irrhe Limits of Reason: Towards an Open-
Ended Conception of Rationality," deals with the limits of Enlightenment rationality, both in the
human and natural sciences. I argue for a fusion of horizons between the natural sciences
and other narratives to move beyond the intersubjective limitations of liberalism (pluralism)
and instrumental rationality (objectivity) and towards a new environmental ethic.
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ikic ka-acimot
oma kiskinowahamitowikamik masinahikanisihk. e-isl-ltwIstamske-nlstotBt
tskotssclksn otlsl-pskitln-mAmitoneyiciksnlK{ ninohti-osltAn e-mlrwaclhtahk ochl kA-lsl-
itwistamaki-nistotit ka-sohke-p'ikiskwit e-wikame-wipamat ekwa klspakaw nakacltawln.
peyakwSw. nitapwitin acimowina i-kipahwlkot n'ikantapYIewln. nlsowak greek ikwa anohcike
e-isi-klwan-ositit mamitoneyickanahihk. ka-ayawak ki-nokosiw papltosiwln. nikan-tapwiwin
ikwa kA-w8kame-wipamat. ekwa nikiskinowahamotowikamik maslnahikanls e-kocihta-
oyistaslkot. nistam matinamakanihk. "greek i-isi-kilwan-ositit mimltoneyicikan. e-isi-
itwestamaki-nistotit ikwa oskaytakotasclkan otisl-pakitin-mamitoneyiclkaniw.·· nitapaclhten ki-
isi-itwestamake.nistot8t omimitoneyickanihk odiltheyiwa e-nanakataweyimiyak greek e-Isi-
kiLwan-os1tit mimitoniyickan. e.pikiskweyan osam piko ka-sohke-miskotinpanit
omirnitoniyicikana. niso matinamakanihk. "tipeyimisawina. akine-acimikowina. ikwa
ayisiyiniwakiwin: e-isi-akam-akine-acimikoW!na nisitotamowin otisi-pakitin-mimitoniyicikaniw."
ninohte-kiskinowapatahiwaan mamitoniyicikani-kipahwikana ka-isl-itwestamake-nistotil
odiltheyiwa. e.pikiskweyin pakl ki-isl-itwestamakecik omwasln. tapiskoc aniki-aclmowina
Ininewak. klskinowapatahiwewewak kwitamawina i-wiyasi-sitonihlmit ka-wici-pimatislclyit.
Kymllcka (1992) tapwe e.ki-sohke.pikiskwehikot ka-mamawicik tlpeyimlsawina. mina maka ni-
isi-klpahwen tapiskoc ayisiyiniwak. nislo matinamakanihk. kipshwina okwayaski-
mamitoneyiclksn: e-isl-pskitini-kwsyaski-mamitoneyicikanit, e-sapo-wapamikot kipahwina &isi-
kitwan-ositat mamitoneyickan. nisowak ka-isiyiniwaki-kiskeyimetihk ekwa ka-aski-
kiskeyimetihk. ni-sohke.pikiskweten ka-aski-kiskeyimEtihk ikwa kotakowak acimowina piko e-
nisocik osam e-ke-acipayicik isiyiniwaki-kipahwina (e-wikame-wapamat) ikwa mina ki-
apacihi-kwayaski-mamitoneyickanit (nikan-tapwiYiin) ikwa e-isipayit oSkayaski-miyo-itatisiwin.
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1INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, I formulate a theory of liberalism which borrows aspects from
communitarlan perspectives In order to correct the classical liberal notion of an over-arching
universalistic perspective. Individuals experience the world not as detached entities. Rather,
they experience the world with attachments and commitments. In communitarlan
perspectives, it is argued that individuals have attachments, such as language and culture,
which cannot be discarded if we are to have an adequate view of people and their
circumstances. I argue throughout this thesis that human understanding is a historical
process which must take into account lilived'i and lJembodiedlJ experience.
Unlike many communitarians and feminists, one can challenge aspects of traditions by
questioning commitments and attachments. Many critics question the prospect of salvaging
anything from liberalism if we are to take into account lived and embodied experience. If one
follows this line, we also lose the liben!tpoftlblliry ·dtfttvtftbllity. The point of taking
!
communitarian perspedives seriously is to respect the thickness of the individual's
experience, but this must be qualified. While the individual may belong to culture X. he or she
may question aspeds of this culture. My theory of liberalism attempts to respect the
Interpretative location of individuals, but at the same time allows an individual to change and
question the interpretative horizon.
John Rawls has been the dominant 'JOice of liberalism in the Anglo-American tradition
for the last twenty-five years. While I am generally sympathetic to the principles underlying
Rawls' theory of justice, I nonetheress approach the notto" of the self and the Good from a
different perspective than he does. Rawls envisions the self in universal tenns and the self
unfortunately has no context (or ''thickness'' to use the term which is common in the literature
2concemlng the communltarlan-liberal debate). The self in Rawls is abstracted to the point
where It Is no longer recognizable.
I use a hermeneutical perspective as a way of giving the self a measure of content and
thickness. Traditionally. hermeneutics has seen the self as embodied and as a part of cultural
and societal interpretative frameworks. Hermeneutics arose as a response to the positivism
found in nineteenth German philosophy. Instead of being universal and global. reason is
concei'Vec:l of by hermeneuticists in historical terms.
A hermeneutical perspective also attempts to bridge the gap between theory and
practice. KnOWledge and understanding are not seen as isolated from historical practices. but
rather as artifacts of partiCUlar societal interpretative frameworks which occur in time. All
systems of understanding are limited, and it is through a conversation between different
interpretative horizons that one can arrive at reason transhistorically. central to this thesis Is
the notion that different narratives are commensurable with one another. Post-colonial and
feminist scholarship challenge the mainstream discourse which. in the climate of modernity,
includes both instrumental rationality and also the notion of universal citizenship. Both of
these are ultimately prodUcts of the poles of the Enlightenment: the notion of instrumental
rationality (the positive pole of Enlightenment) and the notion of the universal citizenship (the
negative pole of Enlightenment). A hermeneutical view allows one to deconstruct the extreme
tendencies of the two poles of Enlightenment. By doing this, one can reconstruct notions of
normativityand it is in this reconstructed discourse that marginalized voices can be heard.
Through this process, the notion of rationality can be expanded.
In this thesis, I take two notions to be the quintessence of liberalism: 1) the autonomy
of the individual, and 2) the ability of the individual to revise his or her life projects. The two
notions logically imply each other. If one is to revise life projects. then it seems that an
3Individual must be autonomous. Coercion cannot produce truly free changes in life projects.
Free rational agency implies that the self is an end. Likewise. if one is to be genuinely free,
then it seems that one can change life projects. The wrsion of hermeneutics adwcated here
is important in dewloping a theory of liberalism because the self is placed in a historical
context. My position avoids being communitarian because in my view the self engages in a
transhistorical conversation with other selws. thereby having the possibility of transcending
historical circumstances.
In the first chapter, liThe Greek Enlightenment. Hermeneutics and a New Foundation
for Liberalism, II I engage in a hermeneutical analysis of the Greek Enlightenment. In The
Introduction to the Human Sciences. Dilthey stresses the finite nature of human
understanding: 1I0ur understanding of life is only a constant approximation; that life reveals
quite different sides to us according to the point of view from which we consider its course in
time, is due to the nature of both understanding and life" (Dilthey 1961: 109). Historical,
interpretative horizons2 ground our understanding of objectiw reality which Dilthey calls Life.
Diltheyand Collingwood argue for commensurability between narratives through what they
both call historical reenactment. I attempt to use Dilthey's hermeneutics to construct a
theoretical foundation for liberalism in two ways: 1) to demonstrate the inherently limited
nature of all narratives, and 2} to demonstrate the commensurability between narratiws. Later,
I wish to draw the comparison between the closure of horizons which we find in the natural
positive sciences with the closure of horizons found in communitarianism. With Diltheys
hermeneutics. we can construct a "hicker-' picture of liberalism rather than the "hinner"
conception of liberalism of the Anglo-American tradition.
Dilthey demonstrates how the gradual rise of naturalism. the positive pole of
Enlightenment. ushered in the slow and gradual deconstruction of the traditional narrative of
4the Greeks. The naturalism of the presocratics brought about a change in Ideas, rather than
the material conditions surrounding them. The naturalistic explanations they gave represent
the positive pole of Enlightenment which is characterized by necessity and determinism.
Plato's Republic, in contrast to the dialedical pUll of the sophists, also represents the positive
pole of Enlightenment, reconstructing the fragmented elements of the traditional narrative.
Heidegger (1975) uses Heracleitus to argue for a finite notion of understanding and
truth. By stressing the limited nature of narratives, there is always a sense of openness in
interpretative horizons. The negative pole of Enlightenment, which includes the ideas of
freedom and pluralism. Is celebrated both by Heidegger and Heracleitus. Both argue for a
perpetually opened nature of narratives which can always be amended. The sophistic
movement, which is part of the negative pole of Enlightenment. distinguishes between human
law (nomoS] and natural"law (physiSj. The difference between the two is demonstrated in the
existence of "conceptual holes.H There is an inherent difference between objective reality and
all descriptions and interpretations, (as well as manners of describing and interpreting). of
objective reality. Liberalism accommodates the pluralism of interpretations in a society and
there is through it an openness in interpretative horizons.
The thought of Aristotle represents a partial resolution of the paradox of the Greek
Enlightenment. While mathematics figures centrally in the foundations of Platonic thought,
biology grounds Aristotle·s work. Implied in this is a strong version of essentialism, fixing
natures to various entities. In his political thought. Aristotle did not have one picture (as Plato
did) of the Good, but rather held that the Good was contextual and varied. However. each
political context had one rational solution. It is in this sense that Aristotle can be considered a
conceptual monist. In each community. there is one dominant narrative which Aristotle, at
least in the Nicomschean Ethics, tries to link to objective. scientific laws. Aristotle splits the
5theoretical sciences from pradical sciences In the same way as hermeneutics differentiates
between the modes of rationality found in the natural sciences from those that are found in
the human sciences. The acknowledgement of the existence of conceptual holes helps to
resolve the tension between physis and nomos in Greek philosophical thought. The sophists,
in response to a rig id closure of interpretative horizons, perhaps stress nomos, societal
construction. at the expense of physis (objective reality).
I Wish, in the last part of this Chapter, to examine the manner in which modem
communitarians, Beiner (1993) and Macintyre (1988), use Aristotle to legitimate and give
authority to their positions. For Aristotle, as with the communltarians I cite above, there is only
one rational solution, or rational--narrative," for each political situation. Aristotle, along with
contemporary communitarians, stresses the embodiment of experience. This. however, can
be more descriptive than critical and fails to challenge the dominant narrative. Beiner, like
MacintYre, is uncomfortable with the "relativism'· of our age and argues for a closure of the
interpretative horizon. Communitarianism, both ancient and modem, does not acknowledge
the ability or desirability of an individual to ·'hink outside" an interpretative horizon. In the
second chapter, I shall discuss the need to acknowledge historical and embodied experience,
stressing the belief in rights as essential in order for genuine pluralism to exist.
In the second chapter. "Rights, History and Nationhood: Towards an Transhistorical
Understanding of Liberalism," I link the arguments of the first chapter to group rights. Many In
the hermeneutical camp ignore the relationship between narratives and objective reality.
Materiality constrains interpretations; Habermas, like myself, challenges the idealistic
limitations of the hermeneutical tradition by stressing the materiality of different interpretations
of the Good (and of reality). In contrast, Gadamer's idealistic hermeneutics stresses
languages instead of the material conditions of interpretation. I explore the relationship
6between political narratives and the narrative of the natural sciences in more detail in chapter
three.
In the ontology of Anglo-American liberalism. wealth and justice have often been
dispensed along individual and not group lines. The problem of deep cultural pluralism is
thus avoided as there is a tacit assumption of congruence between theory and practice.
Anglo-American liberalism takes for granted that the difference in interpretations of the Good
occur at the individual level and not on the cultural plane. A strong theory! practice split
results which downplays the depth of the differences between political narratives. As a Cree
person living in a society dominated by Anglo culture, I have noticed a theory! practice
dichotomy in liberal theory which is found in Rawls (1971) and also in the liberalism of Pierre
Elliot Trudeau as found in the White Paper.
Will Kymlicka. like Habermas and myself, argues for a theory! practice fusion.
Kymlicka (1992) stresses the importance of our embeddedness In cultures and historical
communities and looks directly at the canadian political landscape. Kymlicka widens the
scope of understanding the Good life by raising questions in terms of groups instead of just
between "universalll citizens. I think that there is a danger in a universal sense of citizenship.
which stems from the positive pole of Enlightenment. The notion of self reaches a point
wherein it has no context. With the stress on practice. the self becomes more thick or
embodied. Similarly. the story of liberalism also becomes thick and filled, instead of only
dwelling on negative liberties and universal selves devoid of content. In this way, pluralism
becomes deeper and more significant with no closure of interpretative horizons but rather an
openness.
We are not ahistorical beings without attachments and interests (or "contingencies" to
use RawJl' term). We are, as communitarians and Hegelian liberals (like Rorty) suggest.
7situated in certain historical conditions and within interpretatiw horizons from whence our
thinking begins. Kymlicka extends the foundations of liberalism fumished by Dilthey in the first
chapter by saying that: 1) there has to be an appreciation of the existence of conceptual
holes (and the pluralism of interpretations of objedive reality). and 2) there has to be an
appreciation of the value of lived experience.
I want to use hermeneutics to buttress Kymlicka·s argument for the pluralism of
interpretations of the Good life in Canada. By using the henneneutics of Gadamer and
Habennas. I will critically examine the pluralism and the political life of canada.
Henneneutics. which Habennas called critical sociology. is the doubting of the status quo
which is itself an act of liberalism (e.g. thinking outside a matrix of interpretation). It is
reflexive because this thinking outside involws liberalism itself. It is my project to make
liberalism relevant in contemporary terms and in the wake of sewre political challenges. I do
this within history. and not outside of it. While Kymlicka argues persuasiwly for group rights. I
think that this stance must be abandoned in favour of nstion-tBlk.
Aboriginal people must demand nationhood to obtain control of their destiny. They
were once sovereign nations free from European domination. Also. the lived experience of
aboriginal people demonstrates the inner contradictions of Rawlsian liberalism which stresses
a theoretical ontology of individual rights. While I stress the importance of cultural
membership. I do not want to fall into the same nationalistic trap that Walzer does by claiming
that each nation should be culturally homogenous. I call Walzer·s hyper-nationalism a politics
of Oherness. Instead of collectives of people dividing from each other and fonning nations.
within Canada we could have a confederation of nations which support each other both
ideologically and materially. I shall talk more about the ideological exchange in chapter 3.
Rorty (1992) claims that liberalism is the most appropriate (rational) political narrative
8of our age. but that it lacks normativity outside of Its historical location. Rorty. like the post
1980 Rawls. relatlvizes the validity of liberalism in a specific historical location, giving It more
of a Hegelian than a Kantlan spin. Rorty's narrative makes no pretension of being
universalistic. but instead stresses the contingency of liberalism which he sees as "antithetical
to Enlightenment rationalism" (Rorty 1992: 57). This ultimately becomes incommensurability
talk because it completely dismisses the existence of metanarratives. I, along with Kymlicka
(1992), hold that there is a commensurability between paradigms and narratives, and that
liberalism Is a metanarrative.
Aboriginal people could argue against the transhistorical validity of liberalism. saying
it is only an artifact of European civilization and cannot consequently be applied to aboriginal
people. Aboriginal people would then be in the situation of accepting "traditional way~1 which
(at least for the Cree) have traditionally excluded women from political power. Ideas of
liberalism can be borrowed and applied within their borders. When aboriginal women demand
that aboriginal men begin to treat them equally. it is not that they are being tainted with white
liberalism. but rather that they share the universal demand for equality and respect. It does
not make any sense for aboriginal men to utter soliloquies about justice between canada and
their nations, if women have a second class role in Cree political structures. Furthermore. we
should strive towards having an openness of interpretative horizons, always keeping the
possibility of future revisions open, instead of falling into the communitarian trap of having a
closure of horizons.
While Sandel (1982) rightly attacks the thinness of Rawls' theory. his own theory of
the self is too thick and has too little room for revisability. ThUS, the notion of "embodiment"
has to be tempered. I argue for a version of liberalism which claims to be universal, but which
also takes into account lived and embodied experience. In this way there is an attempt to
reconcile the apparent paradox of Enlightenment: that of objectivity and pluralism. Or put
another way, the positive pole of Enlightenment, that of necessity, is linked and intertwined
with the negative pole of Enlightenment: that of self-creation and freedom.
The intent of this chapter is to show agreement with Rawls in that as human beings we
do indeed have the ability to separate ourselves from our ends and to revise our projeds.
Revision is always a function of collective narratives3 which are always incongruent with
metanarratives4 {e.g. with "conceptual holes'~. I hold strongly that liberalism is s
metan8ITStive. but that it is and always must be, a fundion of embodied and historical
experience. We can always attempt to revise and improve the moral narratives of our societies
by using both the human and natural sciences. This affirms a sort of Diltheyean "cognitive
dualisms" but a link can be established between the objedive aspirations of the natural
sciences and the more pluralistic aims of the human sciences.
The third chapter, ''The Limits of Reason: Towards an Open-ended Conception 01
Rationality,.. addresses the notion of adequacy (e.g. how well the narrative maps on to
objective reality). While the Greek Enlightenment was a revolution of ideas, an important part
of the modern Enlightenment was a rewlution of means of produdion. The s'successes" of the
natural sciences force one to confront the issue of objedive reality and the relationship
between narratives and metanarratives. The successes of the natural sciences have to be
taken seriously. but some elements from other narratives (including aboriginal. Heideggerian
and feminist philosophies) have to be used to augment the narrative of the natural sciences. I
explore the foundations of reason in both liberalism and the natural sciences and propose an
open-ended conception of rationality.
Francis Bacon was the first to celebrate the relationship between scientific knowledge
and power. Descartes uses the power of scientific knowledge to deconstrud the medieval
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narrative with his "scientific methodology" (Schouls 1989, Susan Bordo 1987). The critical
examination of the traditional narrative Is the essence of liberalism which is the ability to think
outside a system of thought. Descartes, as well as Bacon, argued for an instrumental
conception of rationality which portrayed various entities Qncluding the planet) as objects for
instrumental manipulation. creating a strong sense of Otherness. Charles Taylor, like
Descartes. argues for a "conceptual monism" with the sciences having a hegemony in
determining notions of adequacy. I want to define what I mean by positivism. I will use the
definition furnished by Habermas that with positivism "[k]nowledge is implicitly defined by the
achievements of science" (Habermas 1981: 67). I also characterize positivism as a closure of
horizons.
Positivism so defined (at least within my thesis) has connotations of truth and. in tum.
of power. Charles Taylor in his essay "Rationality" argues strongly for scientific instrumental
rationality. I link communitarianism (inclUding Taylors) to instrumental rationality: there is a
sense of closure in both. While there Is something to Taylors attack on Winch's theoretical
defense of Azande magic, It does not follow that his straw man example (Azande magic) is
representative of all"attunement" philosophies. His attack on attunement shows the
intersubjedive limitations of Enlightenment rationality. I think that this limitation can be
overcome by incorporating elements of aboriginal philosophy into the metanarrative. Taylor
sees instrumental rationality as the final arbitrator of ideological disputes.
Feminist critiques of instrumental rationality underline the importance of recognizing
the difference between "objective reality" and mere societal reconstruction (Hekman 1986).
The apparent paradox in Enlightenment thought, that of objectivity and pluralism, is brought
to light. The feminist critique is pertinent because women are in a good position to engage in
a "hermeneutics of suspicion" as a result of their exclusion from Enlightenment narratives for
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so long. The emphasis on societal construdlon over objective reality demonstrates that
feminist philosophies draw from the negative pole of Enlightenment: that of self-creatlon and
freedom. The negative pole of Enlightenment is endemic in some strains of hermeneutical
(post-modern) thought and threatens to destroy all talk of objectivity and metanarratlves.
Ecofeminists such as Bordo (1987) try to balance societal construction with objective
reality in that they link the exploitation of the earth with the exploitation of women. All attempts
to deal with the apparent antinomies of Enlightenment thought, however, balance concerns
between objectivity and pluralism. Feminists such as Bordo point out that the apparent
tension (dualism) between the ..Otherness" of the physical earth and the human mind (based
on the Cartesian model) has, incidently, the same narrative pattem as the Otherness between
women and men. By pointing out the limitations of instrumental rationality, we can extend
both Justice and the notion of an end to include the environment. This involves the feminist-
hermeneutical stress on embodied experience. I differ from Bordo in one important reaped. I
do not see this mode of telling narratives as an Inherently "emlnlnell process. There are,
however, several in the henneneutical school who argue for an embodied understanding.
among them Habermas with his IIdiscurslve ethlcs,1I and Gadamer with his notion of "uslon of
interpretative horizons.II
Because of the environmental crisis, the need to engage In the cmi.cal examination of
instrumental rationality is very great. In turn. I would argue that dOUbt, the ability to constantly
reassess the norms of our society in light of new evidence and experience, is the hallmark of
liberalism. Heidegger, like many ecofeminists, engages in the quintessential adivity of critical
examination and attempts to think outside a system of thought and location and history. This
"stepping outside" implies reflection and critical analysis. Our present location in history
presently is in an age dominated by technology and instrumental rationality. Heidegger. like
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Horkhelmer and Adomo (1972). stresses the dark side of Enlightenment which is often
overlooked. He. like Gadamer. uses art to mow towards an open-ended conception of
rationality. Heldeggers critique of instrumental rationality can also spill over into the political
arm of Enlightenment thought, namely liberalism.
The limits of reason are also evident in liberalism. In Kant's first critique. the stress on
causation reflects the Impad "objective," "universal" science had on the human sciences.
Rawls. like Kant. also talks about objedlve and unlwrsallaws In political and moral theory. In
both cases. these narratives. attempt to be universal. but serve only intersubjedive Interests
~.e. serving only human interests). We could see Rawls' original position In more
hermeneutical tenns. with people sharing their "embodied" experiences (conceptions of the
Good) with one another and dewloplng a metanarrative by incorporating together elements
from different narratives. A liberal such as myself can incorporate the Ideas of
communltarianism In an attempt to forge a consensus and an overlapping metanarrative. My
hermeneutical model of liberalism does not abandon notions of objectivity and necessity. but
rather attempts to fill them with content. vis-a-vis lived and embodied experience.
The aboriginal philosophy of attunement is found in the architedure and writings of
Douglas Cardinal (CsrclinaI19n). However. we must be careful not to romanticize the
aboriginal land ethic. as Annie Booth and Harvey M. Jacobs (1990) have done in their work.
Also. we must acknowledge the "conceptual holes" between aboriginal philosophy (theory)
and aboriginal pradice. For example, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations openly
supports uranium mining and the Meadow Lake Tribal Council advocates the storage of
nuclear waste on their territories. The thrust of the philosophy is that we should seek to live in
harmony with the land instead of trying to dominate it. Given the environmental crisis. we can
"use" (Gadamers term) the narrative of natural sciences with that of the aboriginal land ethic.
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By rethinking the limits of rationality, as found in liberalism and Instrumental rationality, we
can move towards a new environmental ethic.
I shall attempt to reconsider the foundations of liberalism (with the last chapter
drawing from the narrative of science). Also, I shall try to integrate the strong points of the
communitarian position into my narrative while moderating the conception of the self which is
too thick to keep the possibility of revisability open. For example, there is always a need for
theoretical detachment and for the ability to think outside of an interpretative system which
must be grounded in history. I shall argue for cognitive pluralism. in which the natural and
human sciences are able to supplement each other. I have drawn heavily from the
hermeneutical tradition to do this. I know that many in the hermeneutical (and the post-
modem) tradition will disagree with my results. Many in this tradition (especially those
following Gadamer. Rorty. Derrida and Foucault) will deny the existence of objedlve reality
and metanarratives. I think that the notion of objectivity, however, is necessary if liberalism is
to have any nonnative punch as a moral narrative. The appeal to objectivity also helps to
resolve the paradox of Enlightenment: the tension between objectivity and pluralism. My own
narrative, Towards s Hermeneuticsl Foundation for Liberalism. takes. like Habennas.
the findings of the natural sciences seriously. but at the same time struggles to extend the
boundaries of rationality.
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ENDNOTES:
1. The term hermeneutics refers to a highly influential German school of thought which
emerged in Germany In the nineteenth century. The pioneer of modern hermeneutics was
Wilhelm Dilthey who tried to wrestle with the problems of modernity. but at the same time
sought to provide a corrective to the extreme positivistic tendencies of the Enlightenment.
central to the hermeneutical movement Is the assumption that the process of interpreting
reality is never complete. but rather it Is an ongoing process. Furthermore. SUbjects always
have preunderstandlngs or biases which influence the manner in which they interpret reality.
A link is made between theoretical knowledge and the lived or embodied experience of
individuals. The movement has attempted to provide a theoretical grounding for the human
sciences. Also. hermeneutics has been highly influential in feminist scholarship and emerging
post-colonial scholarship.
2. The term Interpretative horizon is a key hermeneutical concept which imparts the notion
that individuals interpret reality as a function of their (the sUbject's) historical circumstances.
The knOWledge of reality always occurs through time and space. There are two related
connotations of the term horizon. First, the word horizon implies the limit and extent of an
interpretation of reality. In colloquial English. we speak of a person's horizons to refer to their
future O.e. the limits of the possibilities of their life). Second. the word horizon Imparts the
notion of open-endedness and non-closure. As historical beings. the phenomenological
possibilltles of reality are always changing and shifting. The constant throughaut this
Heracleltean flux is the interpretative process Itself. By using the interpretative process as a
means of establishing normativity. hermeneutics provides limitations and constraints on the
way in which human beings can talk about reality. While the understanding of reality is always
shifting. we interpret reality in the horizon of our historicity.
3. The term narrative denotes an interpretation of reality. The term narrative denotes the
process of telling a story. A narrative can occur on the personal level. For example. we can
talk about the autobiography of John Jones. A narrative can also denote a manner of telling
stories. For example. we can talk about the narrative of the natural sciences in contrast to the
narrative of the human sciences. The final sense of the term narrative is the cultural or
historical manner in which groups of individuals interpret history. For example. we could talk
about the narrative of Indian philosophy. All of these notions of narrative imply the notion of a
dynamic Weltsnshauung (world view).
4. The term metanarrative denotes a second-level understanding of reality. In contemporary
English. the term "meta" has been used to imply a second level principle. For example. we
speak of metalanguage or we speak of metaethics. While it is one thing for a narrative or
interpretation of reality to exist. it is entirely another thing for an interpretation to adequately
describe reality. In this thesis. I argue that the process of determining the adequacy of an
interpretation of reality is by means of comparing one narrative to another. Another important
basis for determining the adequacy of interpretation is through the implementation of scientific
methodology and rationality. The second element of the test of adequacy is important
because of the "successes" of the modern sciences. Clearly. the modem sciences describe.
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(at least In part) the physicality of the universe In an accurate manner.
5. I have coined the term conceptual hole which appears throughout this thesis. It bears
comparison to Heidegger's "ontological difference." In my nomenclature. the term denotes the
I'hole" (or difference) between any Interpretative horizon and reality. Important to this term 18
the assumption that all narratives are finite and dynamic.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT,
HERMENEUTICS AND A NEW FOUNDATION FOR
LIBERALISM
I shall use a henneneutical perspectiw in approaching the historical development of
the thought of the Greek Enlightenment. Peter Gay also refers to the Greek Enlightenment
(Gay 1977: 72-126). The history of mankind is like a fabric rich with intelligible patterns. The
historical nature of Dilthey's work enables us to see the patterns of history in a partiCUlarly
illuminating way. Viewing the progression of these pattems enables us to perceiw
contemporary pattems and locations from an enhanced perspectiw. Dilthey was aware of this
interchange between different historical periods: "Every age refers back to the preceding one.
for the forces developed in the latter continue to be active in it; at the same time it already
contains the striving and creative activities which prepare for the succeeding age" (Dilthey
1962: 156). By using hermeneutics, I intend to examine the gradual displacement of the
traditional Greek narrative and the movement towards freedom which culminated in what may
be called Greek liberalism (Havelock 1957), the sophistic movement. Through an examination
of the Greek Enlightenment. we can see the historical roots of problematic notions of political
philosophy and in tum attempt to resolve the antinomies of Enlightenment.
Enlightenment embraces two polarities: the positive pole of Enlightenment (the
objectivity which the Enlightenment claims) and the negative pole of Enlightenment (the
diwrsity which the Enlightenment also claims). I was inspired in a general manner to make
this distinction by Horkenheimer and Adorno (1976). There is a constant dialectical
relationship between these two poles. The positive pole of Enlightenment is the dialectical
force which pushes towards a closure of interpretative horizon. I use the term positive
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because of the connotations of thickness associated with this word, bearing comparison also
to the communitarian stress on liwd and thick notions of the self and experience. This
dialectical force has pretensions of objectivity. In the Greek Enlightenment, the positive pole
of Enlightenment first found manifestation in Ionian naturalism. In the modern Enlightenment,
it was embodied in the natural sciences.
The negative pole of Enlightenment, in both Greek and modern liberalism, arose
because certain historical possibilities presented themselves during each Enlightenment.
Liberalism arose to fill the vacuum created by the dismantling of the traditional narratiw. In
the most radical fonns of liberalism, in both the modem and Greek Enlightenments. there was
a creation of conceptual holes in the older narrative. Originally, Ionian naturalism was part of
the negative pole in the dialectic of Enlightenment, but once the traditional narrative had been
successfully deconstructed, the emerging narrative functioned in the same manner as the
preenllghtenment narrative. Both narratiws seek to be the basis for detennining the adequacy
of interpretation. Greek naturalism thus moved the dialectic of Enlightenment closer to the
positive pole.
The narrative of liberalism in both Enlightenments was not thick, but was rather thin.
and hence functioned as a mechanism through which the traditional narrative could be
questioned. In order for liberalism to be plausible, liberalism must be revamped. Liberalism
must include objective notions of constraint in an attempt to resolve the paradox of
Enlightenment. Diltheyean henneneutics expresses the inherent paradox of Enlightenment:
the conflict between objectivity and pluralism. Dilthey believed that there were two separate
domains of inquiry: 1) the object domain of the natural sciences, and 2) the object domain of
human studies. Thus, there were two paradigms of inquiry. Dilthey has also been labelled a
cognitive dualist because of the alleged unresolved tension in his work between the object
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domain of the natural sciences and the object domain of the human studies. The historical
roots of this appellation can be traced back to Wilhelm Wundt of the last century who called
him a "logical duallst'l (Ermarth 1978: 105).
The human sciences. Dilthey argued, could not be governed and regulated in the
same manner as the natural sciences. A different perspective. hermeneutics, is essential to
analyze the objects of the human studies. Scientific thinking, Dilthey said. "has become
detached with our practical contact with the external world'l (Dilthey 1962: 78). Positivism is
the attempt to give science the priority of interpretation (at least according to Dilthey). Dilthey
defines positivism as lithe preference for a method which interprets mental and historical
reality from the standpoint of the study of the natural-extemal world" (Dilthey 1914-1977 v. 15:
331. d. Ermarth 1978: 18). Diltheys project attempts to provide a foundation for the human
studies by tempering the extreme tendencies of the positive pole of Enlightenment (especially
positivism) and with hermeneutics. Dilthey's historical approach attempts to mend the
I'growing separation between life and scientific knowledge" (Dilthey 1914-1977. v.5: 145. d.
Ermarth 1978: 19).
The positive pole of, Enlightenment, as represented in Ionian naturalism and the natural
sciences, creates conceptual holes within the traditional narrative. There is always an
incomplete correspondence between any narrative and reality. The newer narrative brings the
shortcomings of the older narrative to light. Certain aspects of an objective phenomenon are
neither captured nor omitted. The contingent nature of any narrative is that it cannot describe
all of the phenomenological possibilities of reality. Gadamer, for example, speaks of the
historical development of textual interpretation. The textual possibilities of interpretation are
never exhausted because the position of the interpreter is always shifting. Because of different
and changing ideological starting points (preunderstandingSJ, the text is understood with very
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cHfferent focus. I hold. along with others in the hermeneutical tradition such as Dilthey.
Gadamer. and Heldegger. that the phenomenal possibilities of objects are recognized through
time. My analysis of the dialectic of Enlightenment attempts to shed light on this process.
It is through the constant attempt to rethink traditions and communal narratives that
we struggle against the fragility of our human existence. Dilthey's hermeneutical method
attempts to awid substantialism and the closure of interpretative horizons of previous ages.
to awld metaphysics. In general. metaphysics and dogmas assume that a narrative Is
complete and self-sufficient Dilthey notes how the traditional foundation of metaphysics had
been changed by science: II••• metaphysics loses its position as the foundation for interpreting
reality in the special sciences" (Dilthey 1988: 291). Liberalism. at its best. is undogmatic and
always open to revision. I intend to revise liberalism by stressing the constraints that science
puts upon narratives.
The possibilitles of human existence are too wide to be captured in any dogma or in
any particular narrative. To do justice to the pluralism and variety of interpretative horizons we
must recognize the inherent "approximate" nature of human experience. In my view. a
hermeneutical conversation allows different narratives to change as a fundion of each other.
Revision is always possible and inwlves the thinking outside of a system of thought. The
narrative is approximate. but the metanarrative or the colledion of possibilities (what Dilthey
calls "objedive mindl~. is always growing. Theodore Plantinga writes: lilt is precisely because
it is impossible to grasp the whole, because life is many-sided and endlessly manifold, that
each and every metaphysical system is bound to fail" (plantinga 1980: 82). Dilthey,
furthermore, stresses the approximate nature of understanding: "Our understanding of life is
only a constant approximation; that life reveals quite different sides to us according to the
point of v.ew from which we consider its course in time. is due to the nature of both
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undemanding and life" (Dilthey 1962: 109). Dilthey stresses the Important link between life
and history: "History must teach what life Is" (Dllthey 1962: 74). History Is the unfolding of the
possibilities of life. This is the process by which human beings understand their location in
time and space. It Is a process as opposed to a substantial metaphysical entity (quiddltas).
Life as it occurs through history Is constantly unfolding. Ermarth writes: "Although life
is transitory and always changing, It is also characterized by relatively stable coherences and
structures which can be elucidated by analysis" (Ermarth 1978: 117). ThUS, history Is
Intelligible. We can make sense of it and It is something which is knowable. Life Is a process,
··a 'becoming', rather than static 'being', but it develops in patterns and coherenceti· (Ermarth
1978: 117). Thus, while there exists a Heracleitean flux. there is also a substrate. In
Heracleitus, the substrate is fire; in hermeneutics, it is the process of interpretation. Life does
not unfold at random but rather is governed by universal principles. Dllthey's position
Incorporates elements of the positive pole of Enlightenment. While there is ongoing creation
and generation of meaning, a pattem also emerges.
It Is through universal principles that experience, and more SPecifically historical
experience, is possible. In the Diltheyean brand of hermeneutics, it is posited that our
understanding of reality is grounded in historical narrative. Bulhof writes: IILife styles and
cultures are lived interpretations of this self-disclosing reality· (Bulhof 1980: 1). Cultures are
systems of knowledge which ground our location in reality. Our cultures and historical
locations provide a thick (or lived) sense of our experience. Any given interpretative horizon is
finite and does not exhaust all of the possibilities of life. Interpretative frameworks are finite
and frame human experience. Bulhof writes that Dilthey sees '·cultures as lived interpretations
of reality· (Bulhof 1980: 4-5). Plantinga writes: "Cultural life as conceived of by Dilthey is an
endless cycle of experience, expression, and understanding, a dialogue In which the many
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members of the human community can and should participate" (Plantinga 1980: 107). Stress
on "embodied experience" brings forth the notion of "insider's perspective" (Bulhof 1980: 4),
focusing on thickness and practice. This goes with Diltheys notion of the function of the
human sciences.
The stress on lived experience moves towards a holistic approach for political science.
Holbom writes: "Living experience is an act that takes place in the individual and is
. determined by the totality of human faculties" (Holborn 1950:1). A holistic approach allows for
a multifaceted way of understanding phenomena. Lived experience grounds reason and
explanation in a location in both time and space. A holistic Perspective of a theory/ practice
fusion has been increasingly used by groups who have been marginalized, such as blacks.
women and aboriginal people to point out the contradictions between political theory and
political practice. This will be deve10pec:I further in chapter two. Hermeneutical perspectives
"are ultimately based upon the individual's intimate and practical understanding of what it
means to be a human being in the world" (.Ermarth 1978: 108). Given this. fundamental
experiences, such as rage and ang•• sorrow and pain, can and must be. Imported into the
ontology of political philosophy. Political theory is limited and must be supplemented. as
Rorty (1992) suggests, by other modes of expression (vehicles of meaning) such as literature
and art. I shall argue that these mediums are profoundly important for politics.
A transcendence, a thinking outside of given systems of thought, occurs in many ways
from our ongoing hermeneutical conversation. Dilthey writes: "Understanding arises ... from
the interests of pradicallife where People are dependent on communicating with each other"
(Dilthey 1962: 122). A thinkina0utside of s~stems of understanding is found throughout
history, and it occurs through a dialogue with people embedded (both diachronically and
synchronically) in diff",a.tw'ilative hQriZQllS.,.l'tla,..wm Verstehen (Understanding) is
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central to Dlltheys hermeneutical project. Dilthey writes: "Understanding Is the rediscovery of
the I in the Thou ..." (Dllthey 1962: 67). We recognize ourselves in the Other; the Other is no
longer an alien, but rather an extension of ourselves. Dilthey writes that '~his sameness of the
mind in the I and Thou and In every sUbjed of a community, in every system of culture and
finally, in the totality of mind and universal history, makes the working together of the different
processes In the human sciences possible" (Dllthey 1962: 67-68). Dilthey believes that the
conversation with Others Is an ongoing and unending process.
The ongoing hermeneutical conversation envisioned by Dilthey implies a human
nature which makes different experiences commensurable with one another. Dllthey relates
lithe nature of Understanding" to 'he substratum of a general human nature" (Dilthey 1990:
112). It is by means of a universal narrative (a metanarrative), which is constantly being fed
from a myriad of tributaries, that hermeneutics can awid any trite charges of relativism. The
process of Understanding, which remains constant, validates the fact that our interpretations
of reality are constantly shifting. Thus, the content of the interpretation changes, but the
process of interpretation remains constant and universal. The overarching strudure of
interpretation allows different interpretative horizons to intersed and interact with one another.
An ongoing hermeneutical conversation forces us to rethink the meaning of liberalism.
The ongoing process of defining the meaning of liberalism embodies one of the
Enlightenment ideals of an open-ended interpretative horizon. Enlightenment thought and
practice, inspired by the dialectical force of naturalism and science, creates "conceptual
holes" into the traditional narrative. At once this is an act of liberation from the dogma and
drUdgery of the older narrative. The quintessence of liberalism, the ability to revise and to
rethink traditions, achieves an openness of interpretative horizons. I am arguing against the
Rortian notion that different narratives merely replace each other through time. All thinking is
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always a function of our historicity and what has come before us. The process that the
historical Enlightenments Introduce. however. allows one to rethink our historicity and location
within time In a new and Invigorating manner. Liberalism. at Its best. is a dialogue between
different people. wherein we attempt to see ourselves in each other. Furthennore. dialogue
with others allows us to rethink our own traditions. Hermeneutics presents the methodology of
an open-ended conception of rationality. of an ongoing dialogue and dialectic of truth. The
possibility of revision represents the promise of liberalism at Its best.
In our age. liberalism has almost become synonymous with democracy. Historically.
the flowering and emergence of liberalism has meant a corresponding rise in democratic
regimes. Josiah Ober writes: IIAmong democracy's virtues is revisability- the potential of the
political regime to rethink and to reform itself while remaining committed to its core values of
justicel equality. dignity, and freedoml' (Ober 1994: 149). In light of new "embodiments." we
have to constantly attempt to resolve and reconcile tensions (this is the continuing paradox of
Enlightenment). I wish to register one important point. In some cases there can be the
existence of democracy without liberalism. One need 0 nly think of the election of the Nazis by
the German people. Also. there may be a sort of liberalism without a democratic power
structure. The example of the economic liberalism (without accompanying democracy) of
Hong Kong was brought to my attention by Peter Loptson.At any rate. there is certainly a
considerable overlap between the notions of democracy and liberalism. The liberal
democratic state perhaps best represents the dream of uniting these two notions. It is
important though that we do not make the mistake of completely equating these two ideas.
The notion of narrative is important to this thesis and also to Dilthey's analysis of the
Greek Enlightenment. The dominant traditional narrative of the Greeks was the Homeric
poems. This was a closed horizon of interpretation which did not involve critical examination.
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There were no conceptual holes. The narrative was considered to be a coherent whole and
not in need of any amendment in the future. It was considered to be in the Rortian sense. a
"final vocabulary." The communitarian camp holds that the pluralism of liberal culture must be
avoided and a retum to traditional values Is adwcated. The Homeric narrative served this
function and gave the Greek people a basis for a coherent and stable definition of the Good
life.
The Homeric poems were the closed interpretative horizon of the (early) Greek period.
The poems themselves are documents celebrating aristocratic virtues and record a particular
division of social space. Dllthey holds that the fundion of these myths was to "serve a need
which goes beyond religious consciousness. that of linking together phenomena of nature
and of society and of providing a first kind of explanation of them" (Dilthey 1988: 162). The
myths framed and "pictured" reality.
The emerging naturalism of the presocratics in the Greek Enlightenment (I will talk
about the modem Enlightenment later) challenged the interpretative horizon of the older age.
The Homeric poems were the traditional narrative which preexisted in Greek history. Dilthey
tra~s the unfolding of the Greek Enlightenment by arguing that the emergence of naturalism
forced the boundaries of the older narrative to be rethought. Dilthey characterizes the spirit of
Enlightenment as that "which presses forward in an endless sea of tradition in search of
enlightenment" (Dilthey 1988: 287).
Dilthey characterizes this period of Greek history as one which "extended the sphere
dominated by natural explanation and made minds more sceptical about assuming
supernatural intervention" (Dilthey 1988: 163). Barnes writes that the presocratics "hit upon
that special way of looking at the world which is the scientific or rational way" (Barnes 1987:
16). Perhaps, it would be more accurate to substitute the term naturalistic for scientific.
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Barnes (1987) throughout his book, sees the presocratlcs as doing science, and offers many
parallels to modem science. Even so, the presocratics, or the ancient Greeks in general, did
not develop a science in the modern sense Q.e. of instrumentally manipulating reality through
technology).
In the days of the hegemony of the Homeric poems, the Greeks probably did not
seriously question the normative value of the dominant narrative. There was no reflectivity in
the traditional narrative of the Homeric poems. The poem changes with the emerging
naturalism of the presocratics. There was a constant hermeneutical interplay between the
older interpretative horizon and the emerging interpretative horizon of naturalism. Dilthey
writes: "The principle from which these first researches [Ionian naturalism] drew conclusions
still contained many features of a mythical setting. It Included formative power within it akin to
mythical forces, capacity for metamorphosis, purposefulness, and, as it were, footprints of the
gods In operation" (Dilthey 1988: 166). Thales held that spirits caused movement, whereas
"Anaximanders mythical belief was that all things, as they pertsh, are doing penance and
suffering for the injustice of their sep~rate existence in accordance with the temporal order"
(Dilthey 1988: 166). The older narrative intersects and changes in relation to the emerging
narrative of rationalism: "Replacing primitive ideas by ideas more suited to their objects was ...
difficult for this science" (Dilthey 1988: 166).
The Greeks had to reconcile their traditional world view, epitomized in the Homeric
poems, with the emerging naturalism and the contacts they had with other peoples. The
traditional narrati'Ve, the Homeric poems, acts as the basis from which the new mode of
understanding is brought forth, whieh is eventually negated by the newer story. The
anthropologies of the presocraties, like those of Anaximander and Xenophanes (Havelock
1957: 36-51), are also an important precursor in the intellectual history of the humanism of the
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sophists. They begin the movement away from divine explanation which was especially
prominent In the Homeric poems. Plantinga writes: "Man is also historically swam; that is to
say, he possesses a histories/consciousness, and this is precisely what enables him to
trsnscendQn the sense of see beyond) the conditions of his own history" (Plantinga 1980:
133). We attempt to move beyond, to transcend, in an effort to create expressions of life.
Dilthey notes how the rise of naturalism of the lonians was followed by the rise of democracy:
tiThe colonial cities of Ionia had rapidly advanced towards developing democratic
constitutions and toward unleashing their powers" (Dilthey 1988: 164). There appears to be an
antinomy between the objectivity of the natural sciences and the pluralism of liberal
democracy. The objectivity of the sciences appears to point to a single dominant view. The
pluralism of liberal democracy will yield a variety of models all regarded as authentic. At the
initial stage of Enlightenment, they both represent the destruction of the traditional narrative.
The stress on the finite nature of our understanding, legitimizes the epistemological
foundations of liberalism. Both Heidegger and Heracleitus are reacting to the dialectic of
Enlightenment. In a sense, they represent the negative pole of Enlightenment of self creation
and autonomy which is paradigmatic of liberal activity. The liberal, including myself, wants to
forever rethink the· possibilities that are before him or her.
Heidegger was attracted to Heracleitus both because of the openness of interpretative
horizons in his position and because of the violent antimetaphysical nature of his work. By
antimetaphysical, I mean an openness to a plurality of interpretative horizons. Joanne B.
Waugh writes: ItHeidegger maintains that the history of Being reached its highest point in
Heracleitus, before it went awry with Plato" (Waugh 1991: 605). Heracleitus was the embryotic
phase of the impulse to deconstruct the traditional narrative. He attempted to transcend the
inherent finite nature of our understanding (fragments 1, 2. 45, 79, 91, 123. Note that
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fragments are numbered according to the Diels-Kranz system. d. Freeman 1948). The liberal
can draw upon hermeneutics to construct a theoretical foundation for liberalism. Furthermore,
the liberal can stress the inherent finite nature of experience and the variety of interpretations
which sUbsequently emerge. The liberal would argue that all interpretations are inherently
finite and also open to revision. I WOUld, howewr. argue that there has to be some constraint
on revision. In the third chapter of this thesis, I will examine the question as to whether the
notion of revision should be applied to liberalism in a radical sense.
Heracleitus was against metaphysics, as defined by the Diltheyean sense of closure
(or In the Rortian 1992 sense of "final" vocabulary which Waugh herself cites approvingly.
Waugh 1991: 607). Joanne B. Waugh writes:
If we read Heracleitus as one who 'does not yet think metaphysically,' that is, as one who is
thinking and writing before the literate logocentric tradition fashioned by Plato and Aristotle,
the reasons for Nietzsche and Heidegger's admiration may become clearer tvVaugh 1991:
613).
Both Nietzsche and Heidegger were against metaphysical thinking and advocated an
openness of interpretatiw horizon. Heracleitus represents an alternate way of thinking for the
western tradition. According to Heidegger, this altematiw, antimetaphysical way of thinking
has been enshrouded by the 'Torgetfulness of Being."
Both Heracleitus and Heidegger hold that our understanding of truth is contingent and
that the real world is in a state of flux. At the same time, Heracleitus (and also Heldegger)
stresses the holism of thought as well. Seidel writes:
It was the togetherness of Logos and Physis which in Heidegger's view made the thought of
the pre-Socratics truly great. And it was the gradual parting company of this togetherness
which account in large measure for the beginning of metaphysics in the philosophies of Plato
and Aristotle, and hence also of the forgetting of being which has unfortunately characterized
the history of western thought since that time (Seidel 1ga7: 1).
Waugh writes: "In a sense, then Heracleitus represents for 'Westem philosophy' the road not
taken. one that both Nietzsche and Heidegger seem to think would have been preferable to
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that actually followed" (Waugh 1991: 613). In Being and Time (Heldegger 1967: especially 41-
63), Heldegger deconstructs the history of Being and attempts to provide direction for a new
and antlmetaphyslcal way of thinking.
In the Heracleitean/ Heldeggerian model of truth, the horizon is always open. An
openness In interpretation rewals, howewr. only one part of Being (or Logos) while the
remaining parts are concealed. A central fragment fo r Heidegger's analysis is: "Nature likes to
hide" (fragment 123). The quotation immediately challenges, at least on some level, the
concept of objectivity which figures prominently in Enlightenment thought. Heidegger stresses
the nature of physis. "Physisdoes not mean 'essence' (dss Wese~ the ho lior the 'what' of
things (Heidegger 1975: 113). Physis is not a 'What," but rather a "how": "'-he fragment does
not think of physis as the essence of things, but rather thinks of the essential presencing
(verbal) [Wesen] of physis" (Heidegger 1975: 113). Physis. the process of putting finite
limitations on infinite Being and logos, is a universal process. ThUS, while there is some effort
to undermine the "objectivItY' of the term, it remains for Heldegger universal. This makes it
inherently undogmatic and antimetaphysical: there is an inherent openness to interpretatlw
horizons. Physis is functioning in a similar manner to Dilthey's notion of life and Heidegger's
notion of ontological difference.
While Heracleitus holds that the real world is always shifting, he also holds that there
are certain patterns which occur in change. and that those changes are intelligible to human
beings. The pattern, the ever shifting interpretation of reality, is given an image by Heracleitus.
That image is "fire." It is the substratum, the ground, upon which all interpretations weaw
together. The image of the river also serves a similar function. Cherniss writes:
The meaning behind phenomena that he had so discovered was not only that the whole world
is a process and nothing else, a process that had no beginning and will never have an end,
but that all things are one because the process has an ineluctable order, the order being a
fixed proportion of change (Cherniss 1951: 333).
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In the essay "On the Essence of Truth," Heidegger writes: ''To let be- that is, to let
beings be as the beings which they are- means to engage oneself with the open region and
its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were,
along with itself" (Heldegger 1977: 127). According to Heidegger, truth occurs in the open,
finite field. Any revealing, or method of revealing, is a "clearing" wherein Being can reveal
itself. Dilthey, like Heidegger and Heracleitus, attacked the idea of metaphysics which he
characterizes as a struggle for "finn foundationS-' (Dilthey 1988: 149). An openness of
Interpretative horizons, which is the essence of liberalism, can be viewed as the path. the
string of possibilities, that the tradition of Western philosophy has neglected. The main
tradition in Western political philosophy has been the espousal of metaphysical approaches.
Consequently, the vigour of the modem communitarian position should be seen 'as a logical
historical development. Both modern communitarians and the central western political
tradition advocate a metaphysical closure of interpretation of horizons against a liberal
openness of interpretative horizons.
Havelock. while he does not argue that Heracleitus can be useful for liberalism, argues
and persuasively demonstrates that there was a great spirit of liberalism in Greece which has
often been underrated and ignored:
Liberalism is a part of the intellectual history of classic Greece, but I is not part of those
pollical concepts which have hitherto been accepted in the West as classic, as typically Greek,
as the expression, definitive and complete, of a unique Greek experience of citizenship in
the city-state (Havelock 1957: 11).
The sophistic movement has been continually discredited by the tradition of Western
philosophy. Given the academic monopoly throughout the ages which celebrated Plato and
Aristotle, there must be a vigorous and robust rethinking of Greek liberalism. Cynthia Farrar,
not unlike Havelock (1957), wants to reconstruct ancient liberalism "rom behind the shadows
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cast by Plato and Aristotle, and by our own preconceptions" (Farrar 1988: 1). Plato and
Aristotle, because of the closure in their interpretative horizon, represent a communitarian-like
position. Liberalism is only possible when a people becomes aware of the limitations of its
tradition.
The paradox of Enlightenment is the tension between nomos and physls. Barker
lucidly describes the paradox of Enlightenment:
Nature abode by one law, and men hovered between many. Physics and anthropology stood
opposed to one another, and their opposition issued in the antithesis of natural law and
human custom. It is partly, perhaps, in this way that an antithesis came to be made between
two terms one of which comes from the study of science, and the other from that of human
institutions (Barker 1ge4: 65).
This runs parallel to the henneneutical distinction between the human and natural sciences.
Nomos "contrasted with what is natural and universal" (Guthrie 1969: v. 3: 227).
The thrust of liberalism in Greece was to challenge the nomos of the interpretative
community. However, this is a process which takes time, and certain historical conditions
haw to be there if the deconstrudlon and reconstruction of tradition Is to take place.
Havelock writes: "Nomos Is not like a piece of property which you could abandon or pick up
again at will" (Havelock 1957: 139). Sometimes liberals, like Sartrean existentialists, have been
accused of supporting flippant revisionism. ~ the drop of a hat, as some communitarians
hold, liberals can radically change positions and ideas (and conceptions about political and
moral matters). Havelock continues: lilt [nomo61 is painfully acquired; its makes total sense
when you have it; but when you lose it, it becomes a lost cause" (Havelock 1957: 139). The
questioning of societal narratives is a slow and arduous process. However, once traditional
values have been questioned, it becomes exceedingly difficult to go back (the neo-Aristotelian
dream). Once interpretative horizons have been smashed open with the hammer of freedom,
reconciliation is virtually impossible.
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Democritus attempted to resolve the gUlf between physisand nomos. At the same
time he acknowledged the fad that we can never grasp reality in its totality: "t will be obvious
that it is impossible to understand how in reality each thing is" ~ragment 8. d. Freeman 1948.
All presocratic fragments in this thesis come from this source). In another fragment, he
acknowledges that the Homeric poems were a coherent story about reality: "Homer, having
been gifted with divine nature, built an ordered structure of manifold verse" (fragment 21).
According to Democritus, within the Homeric poems there is coherent narrative about reality,
but according to him It is not a sufficient notion of adequacy of interpretation. But this picture
(description) of reality is not sufficient as it has no notion of adequacy of interpretation. There
is no notion of constraint or an external justification of the narrative. In the spirit of Greek
Enlightenment, however, Democritus was not content with this. Democritus attempted to
provide a notion of adequacy for narratives. He wanted to put constraints upon narratives.
Unlike his postmodem successors. such as Rorty who sees no need for constraint,
Democritus wanted to constrain narratives by an appeal to objectivity and normativity. It is not
enough to merely acknowledge the existence of a narrative. Rather. one must attempt to
Justify It with a naturalistic explanation. If we follow Democritus on this, what Homer intended
was not an objective justification of a narrative. but rather a narrative which exists in an insular
manner, apart from any attempt to justify it
Using this rationale, we can see the Homeric poems were. for Democrltus, merely a
creation of the human mind and not a reflection of reality. Democritus acknowledged that the
human mind creates narratives which are fragments of the larger reality. He writes: 'Man is a
universe in little [Microcosnf' ~ragment 34). As such. there is a difference between human
constructions about reality and reality Itself. The inherent incomplete nature of our
explanations about real~ is echoed in another fragment: "We know nothing in reality; for truth
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lies in an abyss" (fragment 117). Farrar writes: "By uniting atomism and anthropology.
Democritus revealed man's nature as a creature of both cosmos and poliS' (Farrar 1988: 197).
Democritus lived and wrote in the climate of flowering Greek liberalism. Democritus endorsed
an open-ended conception of rationality. In the writings of Democritus. who accordingly may
be viewed as important in the background of liberal theory. there was an inherent tension
between the positive and negative poles of Enlightenment.
Materialist atomism was important for his liberalism. Havelock characterizes
Democritus' doctrine of atomism as describing "pattems not produced in response to eternal
verities nor directed by an all-powerful providence. but rather themselves producing a series
of problems with which atomic man has to wrestle ... '1 (Havelock 1957:154). Human beings
must recreate themselves to be freed from the drudgery of tradition. Farrar speaks of the
"normative constraints" (Farrar 1988: 192) of Democritus' atomism. Democritus (fragment 124)
points to a "picture of man as having a basic nature" (Farrar 1988: 202). The notion of human
nature Is Important for both liberalism and hermeneutics. Democritus moves towards a
reconciliation between objectivity and pluralism. Like nature itself, there is a patteming in the
manner in which we construct narratives: "Those whose character is well-ordered have also a
well-ordered life" (fragment 61). Democritus wants to link his atomistic. naturalistic explanation
with the manner in which we live our lives.
Havelock holds that Antiphon's "fierce naturalistic rejection of classes and orders in
society must have sharpened the focus of egalitarian theory in the fourth century" (Havelock
1957: 381). Havelock characterizes Antiphon's notion of law as "a non-natural compact or
convention" (Havelock 1957: 401). Antiphon's contract theory has similarities to both
Rousseau and Rawls. Havelock adds also that "liberals accepted this. but deleted the
qualification 'non-natl.Jra.1' II (Havelock 1957: 401). Instead of being externally objective or
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natural, many liberals turn to a merely intersubJectlve Justification which they rationalize as
"contract theory.'1 Antiphon challenged the status quo and the limitations of nomos. as well as
the contingent nature of societal constructions. Kurt Raaflaub notes that
..• the discrepancy perceived by some Sophists between the law of nature (physls) and man-
made laws or conventions (nomoi). This discrepancy seemed particularly noticeable in the
clash between the strong individual's natural claims to unrestrained power and the restrictions
imposed on him by the community's norm (Raaflaub 1994: 123).
Antiphon rejects both objective and the intersubjedive constraints. In doing so, he
creates something similar to the Nietzschean strong man who must create his own essence
and his own social reality. Neither nomos ~nters.ubjectivenorms) nor physls (objective laws of
nature) should constrain him. Power and the ability to create one's self thus becomes
synonymous with physisltself. In fragment 44, Antiphon writes:
Justice, then, is not to transgress that which is the law of the city in which one is a citizen. A
man therefore can best conduct himself in harmony with justice, if when in the company of
witnesses he upholds the laws, and without the witnesses he upholds the edicts of nature. For
the edicts of the laws are Imposed artificially, b14 those of nature are compulsory. And the
edicts of the laws are arrived at by consent, not by natural growth, whereas those of nature are
not a matter of consent (fragment 44).
Farrar writes: "Unlike Protagoras, Antiphon believes that man's interests are asocial" (Farrar
1988: 117). Antiphon has somewhat of the Nietzschean "will to power." Society constrains
individuals: I'Man's freedom consists in heeding his nature and pursuing his own advantage.
Nomoiare contingent and arbitrary as well as coercive, and it is physiswhich makes for order
as well as freedom" (Farrar 1988: 117).
By contrast, Protagoras believes that the nature of man is inherently social and that
there is a shared system of understanding. Protagoras' slogan, "Man is the measure of all
things," points to the extreme negative pole of Enlightenment with a definite orientation
towards intersubjectivity. Undoubtedly, Protagoras argues against any form of "conceptual
monism" (or political metaphysics). but also argues that this advocacy of pluralism does not
have to lead to relativism. Kerferd suggests an almost hermeneutical interpretation of
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Protagoras' doctrine. Protagoras offers us a positive pldure. and a thick theory of liberalism.
Kerferd notes that the dodrine of man being the measure of all things can be interpreted as
capturing different aspects of an objective reality (Kerferd 1989: 86-87). A similar argument
can be dlscemed in the Thesetetus. The thrust of it is that there does not have to be an
extreme relativism attributed to Protagoras. Instead. the fact that I experience X in such a
manner and you experience X in a different manner need not mean that our interpretations
are incommensurable. but rather that they capture different aspects of X.
Protagoras' hermeneutical doctrine of truth is not diametrically opposed to Platonic
dialectic. Farrar questions Plato's reading of Protagoras:
As a claim about the human basis of knowledge rather than a thoroughgoing epistemological
relatMsm rno one judges what's false', Protagorean theory can readily accommodate the
existence of men who are 'wise' because they are experienced, and perceptive about the
experience of others. They know the truth, but not a truth independent of human existence
(Farrar 1988: 71).
One of the problems of getting textual evidence for Protagoras. and the sophists in general, Is
that the majority of his work survives in the writings of Plato, the sophists' greatest detractor.
Nonetheless. there is enough evidence to gUide us in our interpretation if we critically
examine the sources by engaging in a hermeneutics of suspicion. In any case, the notion of
Protagoras as a hyper-relativist is not sound. Implicit in his position is the notion of a
contextualized. intersubjective grounding of our interpretations of reality. Havelock notes that
"he technique of 'holding dialogue" as sophists understood and practiced it, includes the
negotiation of opinion, the meeting of minds in discussion and the finding of common
ground" (Havelock 1957: 223).
Protagoras, unlike Antiphon, holds that there is a shared mode of understanding for a
community. Because of Protagoras' assumption of a democratic polity, there is a
corresponding thickness to any conception of the Good generated by his system of thought
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In many ways, Antiphon represents the caricature of liberals so common in some
communitarian writing, such as Taylor's "Atomism." Protagoras. however, holds that our
experience of reality Is lived and that we share certain assumptions as communities. At the
very least, we have the capacity to exchange narratives with each other. Protagoras, who was
living in democratic Athens, took democracy as a given and his manner of interpreting reality
(as found in the Theseletus) provides a theoretical foundation for liberalism. We, as
individuals and as members of interpretative communities, always interpret reality from
different perspectives. Instead of being characterized, as Plato describes us, as dwelling in
the caw, the land of appearance, we can see that we are inherently bound and gUided by
the narratiws that society provides for us.
Protagoras can be seen as an ancient precursor to Richard Rorty. Both hold that there
are no objective constraints on our interpretations of reality. Both are hostile to the notion of
metaphysics and to the closure of interpretative horizons. Protagoras sees interpretation, as
not constrained by naturalistic explanation. but rather by intersubjedlw limitations. There is
no notion of external justification, but rather both liberals, Protagoras and Rorty, advocate a
coherence doctrine of truth. The famous slogan of Protagoras summarizes this position: "Of
all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are
not, that they are not" (fragment 1).
Regardless of their intersubjective nature. there are nonetheless constraints in
Protagoras' system of knowledge. The liberal society in which Protagoras lived provided a
thick background for the individuals of Athens. The society provides the backdrop for
specUlations about the Good life, and liberalism. The modus vivendiin Athens was taken for
granted. However. from this shared pool of collective understanding, it was the individual
Athenians who helped reshape collective understanding. Consequently, it was the individual
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who helped redefine the narrative of the society. There was a dialectic, as Kymlicka's theory
of liberalism holds (and mine as well though with differences), between the individual and the
community. Assessing the merits of Athenian democracy, Farrar writes: IIAiI citizens were
thought to be capable of appreciating and feeling the connection between their interests and
those of the community because they were constantly, as active political participants, asked
to assess and interpret this connection" (Farrar 1988: 275).
The connection between the individual and community Is a central issue for liberalism,
but it Is also implicated in the concept of a hermeneutical conversation. The hermeneutical
conversation is always growing, always incorporating new pools and streams to the totality of
the objectifications of mind. Hajo Holbom writes of the Diltheyean hermeneutical enterprise:
"New objectifications of life may wither in time, but they add a new meaning to life as a whole.
For life itself grows, and it grows through man" (Holborn 1950: 118). Life grows because
human beings are always interpreting life from different perspectives. Dilthey stressed the
negative pole of Enlightenment, that of self-creation and that of the negation of the traditional
narrative. Holbom writes: IIDilthey praised the Enlightenment for its confidence in the power of
human reason and its secular interpretation of the world.II (Holbom 1950: 97). But Diltheys
hermeneutical conversation lacks the constraint of materiality such as is found in the work of
Habermas. Holbom notes that Dilthey received recognition for his "resurrection of German
.. idealism" (Holborn 1950: 90). It is the idealistic limitations of the hermeneutical method that I
will challenge in the second chapter. This line of thought will be fleshed out more thoroughly
in the third chapter.
Plato, like the sophists, attacked the Homeric poems, but with very different motives
and results. Plato's attack on the sophists led him to a closure .of interpretative horizonsas he
attempted to reconstruct a narrative from the elements which had been deconstructed. The
37
narrative of the Homeric poems was deconstruded by means of two Impulses: 1) the
naturalism of the presocratics, and 2) the sophistic, liberal movement. The sophists had
attacked the traditional narrative, culminating In the most radical sophists in a movement
towards a belief in opening, and freedom. Plato's fundlon in the Enlightenment dialectic was
that he was moving back towards closure, the same sort of closure which existed in the
Homeric poems. In contrast to the I'negativity' of the sophisitic liberal movement, Plato
attempts to thicken the notion of the Good.
Plato appeals to the meta-concepts of objectivity and authority in an attempt to ground
his narrative. Plato attacks, like Aristotle, Greek liberalism and also indirectly the opening of
the interpretative horizon. Plato wants to fill in the negativity of the Greek liberals, which was
brought about by deconstruction, with "positivity,II with some measure of thickness. Plato
offers an exhaustive and exclusive account of the Good. Aristotle, and to a lesser degree
Platol are often used as precedents for attacks on contemporary liberalism. Their theories are,
in tum, an attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for communitarianism. Both Aristotle
and Plato advocate a closure of interpretative horizons which results in metaphysics in a
Diltheyean sense.
Plato characterizes the sophists as "those who wander in the region of the many and
variable and are not philosophers" (Plato 1989: 174). Plato refers to the education of the
sophists as the soil which brings forth the "motley multitude" of the masses (Plato 1989: 184).
The sophists teach nothing "but the opinion of the many" (Plato 1989: 183). Throughout The
RepUblic, Plato contrasts appearance (sometimes represented as found in the views of the
sophists) with reality <as that found in his own position). Appearance is characterized as
"opinion" (plato 1989: 201). Plato characterizes appearance as lithe twilight of becoming and
perishing" (plato 1989: 201). He continues to say that the lives of the mal:¥" "mere
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shadows and pictures of the true" (Plato 1989: 289). Plato implies that the liberal Is sceptical
about the Good. The democratic state Is a "lawless life, which by his seducers Is termed
perfect liberty" (plato 1989: 265).
Within this representation, there are no standards for the Good life (a common
complaint of both communitarian and communitarian-like thinkers). We hear echoes of this
sentiment in our own age with the meteoric rise of the right wing in the Canadian west and
also by the takeover of the Republican party in the United States by the religious right
Liberalism (and democracy) is equated with immorality and licentiousness. Plato, like many
modem communitarians. sees liberalism as a threat to moral order which could lead to social
disintegration. He adds to his description that democracy is "full of variety and disorde.... (Plato
1989: 250). Plato. in relation to the philosophy of the sophists, was "gUilty of philosophical
propaganda" (Havelock 1957: 213). By contrast, Plato speaks of the philosopher as "holding
converse with the divine order" (Plato 1989: 192). ThUS, the system of knowledge. and in tum
the political order advocated by Plato. seeks to jUstify things in terms of a divine order rather
than in terms of the human standards of the sophists. There is a dialectical movement
backwards from the sophistic system of intersubjective justification. towards the older
presocratic approach of justifying the political system on cosmological arguments. The
Platonic dialectic move is not entirely unlike the modem communitarians' appeal to
arguments involving communal standards.
While there may be certain aspects of Plato's political project which are disturbing to
the liberal temperament. Plato's methodology does have certain henneneutical and liberal
possibilities as well. The emphasis on process in his dialectical methodology goes against a
metaphysical conception of reality. and in turn of substantialism and essentialism. The
hermeneutical method is a dialectical method; it is an ongoing conversation. Gadamer
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characterizes dialectic in the following manner: "Dialectic, as the art of asking questions,
prows itself only because the person who knows how to ask the questions Is able to persist
In his questioning, which Involves being able to preserve his orientation towards opennesS--
(Gadamer 1975: 330). Gadamer adds to this by saying: "Dialectic as the art of conducting a
conwrsation is also the art of seeing things In the unity of an aspect (sunoram eis hen eidos)
i.e. it Is the art of the formation of concepts as the working out of common meaning"
(Gadamer 1975: 330). There is a shared ground of common meaning through which the
conwrsation can take place.
The work of Aristotle represents the next stage of the Greek Enlightenment He seeks
to resolve the apparent paradox of Enlightenment: that of objectivity and pluralism. Aristotle
distinguishes between theoretical (universal) knowledge and practical knowledge Qocal). By
examining the communitarianism of Aristotle, we can move effectively to a deconstruction of
the communitarianism of our age. There seems to be an irreconcilable difference between the
theoretical (universal) and the practical (local). Objectivity, represented by the theoretical,
clashes with pluralism which is represented by the practical (the embodied experience). The
pradlcal relates to the partiCUlar, whereas the theoretical relates to the universal. Aristotle
writes: "Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only ... •• (Aristotle 1947: 433).
Aristotle adds that "practice is concerned with particulars" (Aristotle 1947: 433). In addition.
Aristotle claims: "That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it is ...
concerned with ultimate particular fact ...1' (Aristotle 1947: 433-434). Gadamer comments on
Aristotle's thought: npradical reason is far removed from any universal teleology" (Gadamer
1986: 160).
Aristotle separates the theoretical sciences from the practical sciences. His position
mirrors, In many ways, the tensions In Enlightenment thought. The theoretical element
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denotes mainly such concepts as necessity and objectivity. One could, in the case of
Aristotle, also employ the term 'natural' to create various hierarchies: 1) between freemen and
slaves (Aristotle 1947: 561,559), 2) between Greeks and non-Greeks (Aristotle 1947: 607), 3)
between men and women (Aristotle 1947: 560-561), and 4) between human beings and
nature (Aristotle 1947: 556, 431). Aristotle's metaphysics of essentialism enables him,
however, to fall into the trap of assigning essences to different groups of people. His system
orientates towards substantialism because every entity has a certain function (ie/oS} which is
deterministic and inescapable. Aristotle uses this idea to Justify the ordering of Greek society
which supported the creation of hierarchies and the suppression of various classes of people.
Aristotle, like those In the hermeneutical tradition, applies two different methodologies
to these different object domains. Thus, there is a dichotomy between the poles of
Enlightenment: that of objectivity (the universal) and that of pluralism (the particUlar). While
Aristotle does separate the theoretical from the pradlcal, he does not resolve the paradox of
Enlightenment. He creates a pluralism of standards for rationality (different communal
narratives), but it is also impossible for these standards to be compared, resulting in a
commensurability problem. The assumption of the plurality of community standards Is the
main thrust of communitarian theory.
Communitarians, both modern (8einer, Macintyre and Taylor) and ancient (Aristotle)
hold that there is only one rational solution, one conception of the Good life, to be found for
each situation (each state of circumstance). Each location (to use MacintYre's tenn) has its
own proper telos. The communitarian position is especially metaphysical because of its
closure of interpretatlw horizons (this is, incidentally, what Dilthey means by metaphysics and
I will follow him in this usage). Aristotle uses nomosand ethosto constrain the self-created
individual of the sophists which was powered by physis. The attempt at closure by Aristotle
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represents the move to place this thinness In some context and give the moral vocabulary
some body. Aristotle wants to return to a narrative similar to that of the preenllghtenment
age. He wants a conceptual monism, with no conceptual holes. In short, he wants a closure
of Interpretative horlzons.
Gadamer writes of Aristotle that "every existent thing is 'good' when It fulfils Its telos
(purpose. goal)" (Gadamer 1986: 177). There Is nothing outside the goal which constrains It,
but rather the goal Itself is the justification. The society, not the Individual (as in the case of
Anglo-American liberalism), is the teiOs. Aristotle writes: "Every state is a community of some
kind, and every community is established with a view to some good" (Aristotle 1947: 533).
Aristotle states quite clearly that he does not envision a universal conception of the Good, but
rather that every human community has its own entirely valid conception of the Good.
Aristotle holds that there is a plurality of interpretative horizons. but within each of these
Interpretative horizons there Is a sense of closure. The self is made thick with an almost
deterministic tie to the communal narrative of its society. While Aristotle's notion of localized
conceptions of the Good might be too excessively thick, he does rightly attack excessively
thin theories of the Good. Aristotle provides insight when he describes the Platonic idea (form
of the Good): "Or is good nothing other than the good itself? In that case the Form will be
emptyl (Aristotle 1947: 315).
I concur with Aristotle on the point that this notion of the good needs to be "filled out.n
The Good cannot exist in abstract. universal tenns, but rather exists in specific location: lrrhe
good. therefore. is not some common element answerable to one Ideall (Aristotle 1947: 315).
The Good is the proper and the rational solution of a given political situation. The Good
cannot be defined universally. but rather needs a context in order to be fleshed out. The
Good "cannot be $Qmething universally presenting all cases and singlell (Aristotle 1947: 314).
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Gadamer concludes: "He means that we must start with our pradlce Itself and the living
awareness that we haw in It what is homologgumeon (agreed upon) as good" (Gadamer
1986: 162).
Aristotle's philosophy stresses embodied and lived experience, and hence. is similar to
Dilthey and others in the hermeneutical tradition. this contrasts with the more uniwrsallstlc
pretensions of Rawls' original position. Aristotle's position is situational and defined by the
context of a specific location. The stress on practice, at least at some level, accentuates
pluralism. There is a pluralism of interpretative horizons, but not an additional pluralism of
possibilities for each Interpretatiw horizon. this difference Is extremely important and I will
return to It later. The difficulty with this approach Is that it tends to more of a description of
local pradice than an attempt to critically analyze it.
Aristotle attempts to resolw this apparent paradox of Enlightenment by making the
distindion between "egal" and "natural." The natural Is that 'Which eWrywhere has the same
force and does not exist by people'S thinking this or that ..." (Aristotle ,,1947: 413). Similarly,
the "natural," not being a mere societal construdion, comes with a certain objediw
determination. On the other hand, the legal is "hat which is originally indifferent, but when it
has been laid down is not indifferent ..." (Aristotle 1947: 413). The natural forms the core, and
helps to ground any notion of metanarratiw. This section, book XV: chapter 7, implies quite
strongly the notion of conceptual holes. For Aristotle, there is an inherent difference between
the objective reality of laws and our interpretation of the reality of these laws. Politics is placed
within history. Aristotle does not distinguish between the legal and the natural and
consequently does not resolve the paradox of Enlightenment.
In another passage, Aristotle admits to the presence of conceptual holes in laws: "In
those cases, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly.
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the law takes the usual case though It Is not Ignorant of the possibility of erro.... (ArIstotle 1947:
421). The law accommodates the Influx of new experiences. by bending to their particular
circumstances: "... the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone. and is not rigid. and so too
the decree is adapted. to the facts" (Aristotle 1947: 421). Law occurs inside history and.
changes consistently in the light of the phenomenological possibilities of new experience.
Once again. Aristotle approaches the notion of conceptual holes: "There is a ...
combination of qualities in good men who differ from any individual of the many ... because in
them the scattered elements are combined" (Aristotle 1947: 597). This implies that the
conception of the Good requires the natures of many individuals to construct it. This
combination would be embodied in one person. A sort of hermeneutical conversation Is
necessary in order for there to be a full and complete picture of the Good life. Aristotle uses a
metaphor to explicate this point: "And as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better
than a banquet. fumished by a single man. so a multitude is a better jUdge of many things
than any individuar' (Aristotle 1947: 610). A hermeneutical conversation allows conceptual
holes to be filled. Aristotle continues: "Let us assume that they are the freemen. and that they
never act in violation of the law. but fill in the gaps which the law is obliged to leave" (Aristotle
1947: 610). Individuals can bridge their differences. with a dialogue between them.
Communitarians. such as Aristotle. fall into the problem of justification. The sophists.
and their modern offshoots such as Rorty.1 have no external justification for the validity of the
narratives that they are.telling. I include Aristotle in this because in his political and ethical
writings there is no attempt to analyze the narratives using metastandards. but rather only a
description occurs. The narratives of these communitarians are self-contained. The narratives
use themselves to Justify their own normativity. The question is begged because the
justification itself is the object which ought to be Justified. The problem with this approach to
44
morality and politics. which I will elaborate later. is that it becomes nothing more than a
Justmc8tlon of the status quo. It Is a description rather than a critical examination. However.
this is Justmed by an appeal to the nonnative standards of the community. Who determines
normative standards in Aristotle? Is it the elite of the society? How is that a consensus? Is it
the religious leaders of a community? These questions must be examined.
As I have already stated, it is the elite (or those who have knowledge) in Aristotle who
define or determine the Good. Aristotle writes:
Therefore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he
who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion
perverts the minds of rulers even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected
by desire (Aristotle 1947: 813).
"Reason" is. as I see it. a rhetorical term here. used to Justify an elitist conception of the Good.
Aristotle betrays the aristocratic and elitist bias in his work: "... democrats identify with the
status of freemen. supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth) and supporters of
aristocracy with excellence" (Aristotle 1947: 203).
Excellence (aret4 is effectively equivalent to hierarchy. and we must be careful to note
that modem communitarians are implying similar notions with their moral vocabUlary. Aristotle
adds: "For a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge....' (Aristotle 1947:
598). Some of Aristotle's remarks against the masses are quite stark: "Now the masses of
mankind are evidently quite slavish in their taste, preferring a life suitable to beasts" (Aristotle
1947: 312). Aristotle holds that happiness is the proper telosof political and moral life:
"Happiness ... is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of adion" (Aristotle 1947:
317). He adds that happiness "comes as a result of virtue and some process of leaming or
training ..." (Aristotle 1947: 322). But the problem remains: who gets to define happiness?
Aristotle does not articulate what it would be in concrete terms, but rather defines it only in
vague tenns. Happiness will be defined by the elite of the community and it is they who will
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determine the standards of excellence for a community.
The modem communitarian has the same conception of the Good life. It is not enough
for the modem communitarian, essentially a neo-Aristotelian, to apologetically explain away
Aristotle's endorsement of slavery by blaming It on historical circumstances. The sophists, the
Greek liberals such as Antiphon, violently attacked the notion of slavery in Greek society. Do
the elite, including philosophers who are leading the contemplative life, acquire this on the
backs of the oppressed? Did the Indians of the Americas have to experience near genocide In
order to fuel the European industrial revolution? (The resources taken from the New World
were an important fador in the development of the industrial revolution). The same sort of
apologetic line could be used today: we need a vast underclass (In Saskatchewan this Is
overwhelmingly aboriginal) in order to maintain the economic prosperity of others (mostly
Anglos). Clearly such rhetoric has to be exploded in order to arrive at a fair and critical
conception of justice.
I have taken the time to discuss the Greek Enlightenment extensively to point out the
general dialectic of Enlightenment. Also, It is important to examine Aristotle's historical
relationship to modern communltarians who attack liberals and use Aristotle as a source of
authority and justification. Havelock comments on the importance that Aristotle has had in the
Western tradition: "Aristotle has exercised over the Western mind a moral authority not unlike
that which has been wielded by the Old Testament and for essentially the same reasons"
(Havelock 1957: 376). One cannot overestimate the incalculable influence that Platonism and
Aristotelianism have had upon the shaping of western culture and the western mind.
Macintyre is not against a plurality of traditions in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,
but rather, like Aristotle. is against a plurality of standards within a historical space (a
III0cation". He argues against the second form of pluralism by invoking Aristotle's principle of
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non-contradiction (Macintyre 1988: 4), which, unless supplemented, is a rather simplistic way
of attacking pluralism. Macintyre pushes for conceptual monism (by this I mean that there Is
dominant narrative operative within a given location) and a sense of closure in the
interpretative horizon, while stressing the positiw pole of Enlightenment with no conceptual
holes in the narrative. He argues against the uniwrsalistic claims of Enlightenment, and
instead argues for a local sense of rationality. Agreement of moral vocabulary is essential,
acoorc:ling to Macintyre, if political life is to be possible. The pluralism of liberalism is the
target here.
I have characterized Aristotle as a conceptual monist. Beiner, a communitarian, attacks
the particular interpretation of Aristotle that I am presenting. He writes that II the great strength
of Aristotle's ethics is its wonderful sensitivity to the complexity and multidimensionality of
human ethical experience'l (Seiner 1992: 59). Aristotle simply gives us a plurality ofstandarc:ls
without providing variety, as each location has its most dominant narrative. Aristotle's ethical
and political thought is nothing more than an apology for the status quo. Beiner writes: 'arhat
is why the liberals' charge of monism against Aristotle is so grotesquell (Seiner 1992: 59).
Once we sort out what we mean by pluralism, asl haw attempted to do. the charge of
monism against Aristotle. which I level. is sound and reasonable. Beiner characterizes
positions such as mine (e.g. that Aristotle is a conceptual monist) as lIimpotent moralism"
(Seiner 1992: 63). In positions such as 8einer's and Aristotle's, there is an attempt for a
closure of interpretative horizons and to have one conception of the good for each location.
For Aristotle. the bedrock of this is the polisand for 8einer it is the state.
Macintyre wants to use Aristotle to construct a thick picture of the Good which runs
counter to the Rawlsian picture of the Good. In the wake of the deconstruction of the tradition,
Macintyre seeks to construct a conceptual monism which will repel the 'Idark forces" of
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liberalism and pluralism. Macintyre writes that 'he Aristotelian tradition can be restated In a
way that restores the rationality and intelligibility to our own moral and social attitudes and
commitments" (Macintyre 1988: Ix; passage originally in After Virtue). He sees hope In a
hermeneutical conversation with the past (e.g. with Aristotle), but not In a conversation In the
present. Macintyre creates a good guy r'he Aristotelian" tradition), bad guy ~he antl-
Aristotelianj dichotomy (Macintyre 1988: 1(0). The anti-Aristotelian are represented by the
"sophists and Thucydides" (Macintyre 1988: 100). The Aristotelian tradition that Macintyre
supports represents the communitarian camp, whereas the anti-Aristotelian tradition
represents the liberal camp. By invoking Aristotle as a theoretical foundation for his
communitarianism. and by discrediting ancient liberalism, he is attacking modem liberalism in
an indirect way.
Instead of providing a critical examination of a society, both Macintyre and Aristotle
(and other communitarians) merely describe the moral vocabulary of a given interpretative
horizon (a culture or political entity of some kind). Their theory of both the Good and the self
becomes too thick. People seem to blindly follow roles that have been predestined for them
by their society. Nowhere in the ontology of communitarianism does the option exist for the
individual self to critically examine his or her society. Rather, the narratives of a society are
taken as ontological assumptions with little room to revise them. This works to the advantage
of the conservative who benefits from the status quo. It does nothing for the individual and
the collective of individuals whom the system does not benefit.
The essentialism of both Aristotle and Macintyre implies that each entity has its proper
place in the schema of things, making their systems teleological. MacintYre writes: "For the
po/isis human community perfected and complete by achieving its te/os, and the essential
nature of each thing is what it is when it achieves its te/os' (Macintyre 1988: 97). The problem
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with the communitarlan position (which Itself represents a certain phase of the Enlightenment
dialectic) Is that It begs the question of justification which I have already discussed. Macintyre
writes: "A violation of the bonds of the community by the offender has to be recognized for
what it Is by the community. if the community Is not itself to fall" (Macintyre 1981: 151).
Macintyre implies that if there Is a sense of pluralism, the community will collapse; if an
individual questions the mores of a society. then it will collapse.
There are two possible Interpretations of Macintyre's position. In one sense, perhaps
the most harmless interpretation, the Good life is seen as nothing more than a meaningless
notion. The other sense. which I think Madntyre implies, advocates a kind of right-wing
reactionary govemment or community which has only one narrative to guide moral decisions.
According to his position, if there Is only one standard, then there cannot be any disputes
about what should be considered rational. He calls lithe numerous altemative modes of
ordering" a "modern account" (Macintyre 1988: 133). But clearly the possibility of pluralism is
not strictly a modern phenomenon, as the Greek liberals, the sophists, adwcated their ideas
contemporaneously with Plato and Aristotle. Macintyre charaderizes Aristotle against the
liberal: u•••Aristotle is the protagonist against whom I have matched the voices of liberal
modemity... ·1 (Macintyre 1981: 146).
Beiner attempts to answer the question of what one can glean from Aristotle that will
be relevant to the modern audience. Beiner writes: liMy answer is that Aristotle makes
available to us above all is a certain vocabUlary, a language in which to discuss and debate
our ethical and political concerns, and that In the realm of morals and politics. vocabulary
matters" (Seiner 1992: 74). Throughout his book What is the Matter with Liberalism?, Beiner
attacks much that is essential to the ontology of liberalism, including the key notions of
pluralism and rights and invokes the authority of Aristotle to buttress his position. He notes:
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One of the chief theoretical advantages of an Aristotelian moral language Is that it allows one
to speak of moral and pollical phenomena without having to resort to the reductive notion of
"values," whether individual or coUective (Beiner 1992: 40).
Seiner Is appealing to the objective aspect of Aristotle's thought. But, as I already pointed out,
the apparent tension between objectivity and incommensurable pluralism is unresolved.
I think that we can take from Aristotle the notion of embodied experience, but his
endorsement of slavery and "natural" order are fundamentally problematic. Before moving to
this problematic, I want to say that the original position of Rawls avoids the local in favour of
the universal as I will argue later. The original position is too vague and needs to be
supplemented in a manner similar to Plato's notion of the Good. Through Aristotle's notion of
1i'Jed experience, we can draw attention to the localized nature of narratives. The self is given
a content and engages in a hermeneutical conversation with other selves about the Good.
This positive picture can of course be modified as one engages in conversation with other
people within society. In this way, we can link the hermeneutical project of Dilthey with
Aristotle. Dilthey's stress on the interchange between the I and Thou is exactly what I am
speaking of with the notion of hermeneutical conversation. At the same time, I want to use
this link to bring light to the debate between liberalism and communitarlanism.
I shall now to address the problematic of objectivity in Aristotle and discuss how it
relates to the American Indian. It is my goal to cast doubt on the communitarian project by
showing some of the ideological consequences of Aristotle's theory. I want to turn to the
examination of how some of Aristotle's views have been applied in the context of the
aboriginal peepie of North America. Aristotle has been used to jUstify the natural orderings of
different races; Aristotle has been used as a legitimization of the hierarchical relations
between different classes of different people. Throughout the history of contact between
aboriginal people and European people (including the present day), aboriginal people of the
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Americas have been characterized as being irrational. In the medieval and renaissance
periods. Aristotle was the central figure in western philosophy.
The Spanish attempted to sort out theoretically the issues involved in their domination
and conquest of the peoples of the Americas. A great debate arose between Las casas and
SepUlveda at Valladolid in 1550-1551. Las Casas was sympathetic to Indians and argued on
their behalf. whereas Sepulveda argued that Indians should be SUbjected to Spanish
domination. Lewis Hanke summarizes the position of the Spanish jurist Juan Glines de
Sepulveda who used Aristotelian doctrine of natural slavery which is "that one part of mankind
is set aside by nature to be slaves in the service of a master....' (Hanke 1975: 13). The
medieval Spanish clergyman wanted non-Spaniards to do hard labour. In an analogous
manner. the elite of ancient Greece wanted other. "lower" classes of people to do manual
labour. The Aristotelian "doctrine of natural slavery" was first applied by John Major in 1510
(Hanke 1975: 14). Also. Sepulveda's doctrine was not novel because Victoria in De Indis
"analyzed and refuted it long before SepUlveda espoused it" (Hanke 1975: 22). Sepuldeva
was "one of the best trained minds of his time" and had "just completed and published ... his
Latin translation of Aristotle's PolitiCS' (Hanke 1975: 31). Sepulveda Iwas probably the
foremost Aristotelian in Spain" (Hanke 1975: 59). On the other hand, Las casas was armed
with years of experience living with American Indians and 'with his own Apologia' (Hanke
1975: 39).
While he did not participate in the debate, Fernando Vazquez opposed the
implementation and use of Aristotelian values on to the Indians. Hanke writes: Illn the
introduction to this work he struck a blow at those who invoked Aristotle's theory of slavery by
asserting that limen try to cover their wars with a cloak of justice" (Hanke 1975: 81). Vazquez
is noting that the term justice is being used to legitimate the discourse of, what are in fad.
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unjustpractices. The existing conception of the good Is taken to be "like a cloak.II Other
conceptions of the Good are downgraded. Vazquez de Menchaca adds: "...they seek to Justify
this tyranny with fictitious names. describing it as a doctrine beneficial to those who suffer
vexations. whereas In reality never has anything been heard or seen farther from the truth and
more worthy of scorn and derision" (Alcade 1931. d. Hanke 1975: 81-82). The use of
Aristotle by the Spanish apologists for the enslavement of the Indians is an anticipation of
things to come. Rafael Arevalo Martinez goes as far as to compare Sepuldeva's racial
doctrines with Hitler's (Martinez 1975: 3-4. d. Hanke 1975: 95).
I have looked at the Greek Enlightenment and have. through an examination of this
historical period. attempted to move towards a hermeneutical foundation of liberalism.
Narratives are part of the 0 ngoing process of Understanding and are Inherently finite in
nature. Throughout this chapter. the often beleaguered sophists. the liberals of antiquity. have
been examined from a different. non-Platonic perspective. Furthermore. Aristotle has often
been used by communitarians to legitimize their positions. In tum. Aristotle has been used to
legitimize the SUbjugation of whole groups of people. At the same time. one of the purposes
of this chapter has been to demonstrate the necessity. in the examination of the paradox of
Enlightenment. to stress and recognize the Importance of lived and embodied experience.
With both Plato and Aristotle. there is a strong attempt at closure. Interpretative horizons
become ossified and they acquire a metaphysical status.
Throughout the Westem tradition (and indeed In all traditions the world over). there
has been a tendency towards a closure of interpretative horizons which amounts to
antlpluralism. In his thoughtful article. liThe Plural Society and the Westem Political Traditlon,"
Kenneth McRae explores this history of antipluralism in the westem tradition. McRae writes:
I suggest that in the political tradition of the West, and in its transmission through the centuries
as an intellectual heritage, there has been a recurring element of insensitivity, not to mention
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systematic bias. that has worked to the detriment of cultural pluralism and diversity In Western
societies (McRae 1979: 678).
Throughout this chapter. I have followed and outlined the arguments of such thinkers as
Havelock and Farrar who have attempted to do ancient liberalism justice by pointing 0 ut the
biases of traditional scholarship. Traditionally. scholarship has favoured Plato and Aristotle
and has tended to brush aside the liberals of antiquity. Instead of exploring the possibilities of
pluralism. traditional scholarship has stressed the closure of interpretative horizons and is. at
its core. inherently antiliberal In its motivations. assumptions and inspiration.
The hermeneutical exercise of looking at the Greek Enlightenment is important to our
present day situation. My point in investing the energy and time in this examination is not to
engage In a dry and esoteric archeology of the past. Rather. the purpose is to examine
certain ideas of the past in terms of their relevance today. It Is by deconstructlng and
reconstructing the past that we can properly situate ourselves in the present. We are historical
beings. and the narrative of liberalism is one which emerges out of history. McRae stresses
the importance of historical examination: IIMuch of the contemporary world lives under such
conditions of societal pluralism. and the problem has assumed vastly increased dimensions in
the post-colonial periodII (McRae 1979: 678). In the second chapter. in my analysis of group
rights. I will thoroughly examine the phenomenon of pluralism in the post-colonial landscape.
McRae continues: liMy question .. is to what extent the Westem intellectual tradition. both in
its doctrines and in the institutions to which they have given rise. can offer useful gUideposts
for political systems of this type" (McRae 1979: 678).
Throughout his article. McRae examines the existing tendency towards antipluralistic
thinking running from Aristotle (with his polis-centred theories). and the medieval period.
through Hobbes with his attempt to superimpose positivism on political philosophy (e.g.
thinking of society as a mechanical entity). The various manifestations of nationalism which
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tend to also advocate a closure of Interpretative horizons. McRae writes: "Indeed the net result
of such an effort might show the Western tradition to be even more hostile to societal
pluralism than I have already indicated" (McRae 1979: 686). He is somevvhat sceptical that
theory can provide concrete and useful aids for the practice of pluralism. He does however,
see some hope: "Although I have argued that the Western tradition has been largely
unsympathetic to the claims of societal pluralism in the past, there is every likelihood that It
possesses some untapped resources in this area and some capacity to adapt" (McRae 1979:
687).
McRae creates a list of different items which can help us to rethink liberalism in the
Western tradition. One of the items is ·'closer scrutiny of those elements favourable to cultural
pluralism in the Western political tradition ...n (McRae 1979: 687). I hold that one of these
resources is the liberalism of antiquity. By engaging in a henneneutical conversation with the
liberalism of antiquity, we can make sense of pluralism in our own age. We can make
liberalism a viable option through a historical examination of its roots.
Kenneth D. McRae stresses the need for a rich and vibrant conversation on pluralism.
He writes:
My own conviction is that the intergroup tensions characteristic of most plural societies will
surface whether or not their component groups are explicitly recognized. and that the best
chances for conflict management lie in acknowledging cultural pluralism and buDding upon It.
openly. in a spirit of compromise. and before the time for rational discussion runs out (McRae
1979: 688).
We need not look far to see the urgency for a peaceful pluralism. The Canadian political
landscape is pluralistic. The events of the summer of 1995 at Ipperwash aFld Gustafson Lake
point to the urgency of a need for political solutions. It is through dialogue and hermeneutical
conversation that solutions can be found in a non-violent way. My thesis attempts, at least in
a small way, to contribute to this process.
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Farrar characterizes Plato and Aristotle's political theory as 'he retreat from politics"
(Farrar 1988: 266). It Is a flight from politics because It avoids the manifold possibilities to be
found in political landscapes. Instead of dealing with the various political possibilities of the
situation, one retreats to a certain type of "conceptual monism.II Modem communltarians often
use Aristotle as a fulcrum around which to construct a theoretical foundation for their position.
They attack modem liberalism and modemity in general indirectly by using this strategy. I
have attempted to put Aristotle in perspedive. By using a hermeneutical analysis of the
Greek Enlightenment, I attempt to resurred the sophists as an alternative route in political
philosophy. This alternative route is against the substantialism of the metaphysics of the
dominant tradition in the Westem political philosophical tradition. By attempting to re-examine
the historical roots of communitarianlsm and liberalism we can more comfortably come to
terms with the debate that besets our age.
ENDNOTES:
1. I· classify his version of liberalism as communitarian. I will Justify this in depth in chapter
two.
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CHAPTER TWO: RIGHTS, HISTORY AND
NATIONHOOD: TOWARDS A TRANSHISTORICAL
UNDERSTANDING OF LIBERALISM
In this second chapter, "Rights, History and Nationhood: Towards a Transhistorlcal
Understanding of Liberalism," I want to extend the argument of the first chapter. In the first
chapter, I argued that there is an inherent plurality in the human interpretation of reality. In
this chapter, I will argue that a just society ought to provide a material blanket of support
around minority cultures' interpretations of the Good. If material support is not provided, these
interpretations of the Good could become relics of the past. Genuine and meaningful
pluralism needs material support. The thomy problem of pluralism comes up most strongly in
regards to the relation between nation states and national minorities. If there is to be a just
and meaningful pluralism of cultural communities in a nation state, there has to be a link
between material circumstances and interpretative framewol:ks. Differences between culturall
national peoples create the possibility of deep pluralism. With cultural homogeneity, pluralism
is potentially less deep and less divisive. Rawls tacitly assumes the condition of cultural
pluralism in A Theory ofJustice. This pluralism is not deep but rather is only a superficial one.
By insisting on the importance of cultural communities. I am importing a thick theory of the
self and the Good into my ontology of liberalism.
At first glance, one perhaps may surmise that my project of developing a thicker
theory of the Good might make my position more compatible with communitarianism than
liberalism. By taking thick theories of the Good seriously. I undermine the traditional liberal
thin theory of the Good and the self. I do, however. believe the stance that I am defending is
liberal. Rawls assumes a thin and universalistic conception of the self. My thick theory of
liberalism uses henneneutics as a methodological aid and this will speak for
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commensurability between different communities. Rosen writes of the connection between
hermeneutics and politics: "Every hermeneutical program Is at the same time Itself a political
manifesto or the corollary of a political manifesto" (Rosen 1987: 141).
Will Kymlicka in liberalism, Community and Culture also argues for a thicker theory of
the self and the Good. The thrust of Kymlicka's liberal position Is to Include history and
national minority rights in the ontology of liberalism. but at the same time he avoids the trap
of incommensurability by appealing to transhistorical. Kantian standards. His view is close to
that of Habermas who also argues for normative constraints in narrative construction. not
outside of history but from within history. Kymlicka rejects the communitarian (or Hegelian)
interpretation that we find in Rortys book Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. With Kymllcka's
transhistorical. normative standards. one can critically reflect on the practices of a society. I
concentrate on two examples from aboriginal communities: 1) Pueblo theocracy (Kymlicka's
example). and 2) the status of Cree women (my example). Through hermeneutical
methodology. we can discern the possibility of a conversation between different narratives. In
the end. the collection of narratives forms the objective mind (Diltheys term). The intersection
of different narratives implies the existence of a metanarrative and metaconversation. Despite
this intersection. there could still be liregions" where the narratives do not overlap. Thus. I
stress that this is not a fusion ofhorizons (Gadamers term). but rather an interchange
between narratives and is made possible by their commensurability.
The framework of my discussion will be the current position of aboriginal peoples
living within the boundaries of the nation state of Canada. Some may complain that theory
should not be concemed with practical situations. Perhaps, theory loses its "purity" if it is
tainted with historical practices. Theory should. some may say. attempt to transcend the
limitations of the present historical moment to discern ahistorical realities (the old Platonic
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point of theory). A detached perspective allows for a critical analysis. but theory must engage
the lived experience (or embodied experience) if it is to be meaningful. If the theorist does not
incorporate lived experience (or embodied experience) into his political ontology. then there is
a theory/ pradice dichotomy in his or her thought. The theory would not adequately reflect
and take into acoount the pradice of the day. In contrast to an ideal theoretical perspective. I
wish to adlwly engage with historical pradices. and in the process. critically examine them.
At the same time, there must be a move to think beyond them. When I use the term
transhistorical. I mean a sort of transcendence- a sort of thinking outside an interpretive
framework. Theory's purpose is to engage historical pradices. but also to think beyond them.
Often political theorists write from the perspectiw of the mainstream culture with or
without being explicitly conscious of it. Because of this perspective, they perhaps do not
challenge the status quo as much as they otherwise would. Someone who comes from an
Angl01 background (or a member of another dominant culture) may nothave the same
interest in critiquing the pradice of his or her society. He or she may merely describe the
pradices of their society (as Rorty and the later Rawls do). There is less at stake for him or
her in challenging the contemporary pradices of the historical location. The perspedive of the
outsider allows one to critically retied and conceptually move outside the pradices of the
day. The perspective of the outsider (or Qher) allows one to critically tear apart pradice. The
Qher in general has less reason to advocate a maintenance of the status quo. The Other has
more to gain by questioning the status quo.
In the next chapter. I will thoroughly examine how Rawls' universalistic perspedive fits
into the dialectic of Enlightenment. For the time being. I will register a few points. During the
modem Enlightenment. the traditional medieval narrative was dismantled. The successes of
the physical sciences demonstrated the benefits of the new. emerging ideology of scientific
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rationality. The task of philosophy became the pragmatic clarification of concepts within the
framework of new scientific rationality. The metaphysical specUlations of the medieval period
were discarded. The nevv scientific rationality pictured reality from an objective, mountain-top
perspedive. The narrative of scientific rationality claimed to be the one true picture of reality.
The instrumental mode of rationality still dominates our age. In turn, the methodology of the
natural sciences has heavily influenced the methodology of the human sciences. I will say
more about this in chapter three.
Rawls (of 1971) holds that his principles of justice are normative and universal. Rawls
feels that he has discovered them through the process of the reflective equilibrium (Rawls
1971: 20, 48-51). His principle of reflective equilibrium functions in the same manner as the
dialogue does in Plato's writings. In some way, I think that we could view Rawls (qua narrator)
as a sort of Socratic interlocutor. For Rawls, the dialogue in A Theory ofJustice is about the
determination of the ideal principles of justice. Unlike the Socratic conversation, the
conversation that Rawls puts forward in the original position does not have any thickness or
content. Sandel (1982) protests the lack of content of the self in Rawls' original position,
arguing that the self is inherently contextual. Despite Rawls' protests, the self of the original
position is essentially Kantian (Sandel 1982). The self is stripped of all of its contingent traits.
How does one have a conversation about the ideal conditions of justice when one does not
have a context? Even Plato worked from a thick picture (Athenian democracy, or at least his
interpretation of it) which he consequently detached himself from. The point of the matter is
that Rawls does not really consider deep and meaningful pluralism as he tacitly assumes a
congruence between cultural community and political community.
In a sense, Rawls' notion of political consensus seNeS as a backdrop for the
conversa'tiQn of the pQlitical. community. The Iatar RtiNls brings out a communitarian, historical
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spin on liberalism. Rawls claims that he wants a "political and not metaphysical" (Rawls 1985:
224) conception of liberalism. The post-1980 Rawls' stress on the "political" aligns him with
pragmatism. The term "metaphysical," especially if we follow Rorty (1992), Implies an
ahistorlcal theoretical perspective. It seems that Rawls, while showing his Kantlan colours in A
Theaty ofJustice, later argues that liberalism is not necessarily a universal and ahistorical
ideal of social space. Instead he confines it to a certain historical location. Despite this retreat
Into quasi-communitarianism tendencies, Rawls argues that pluralism is a normative condition
of absolute value: "... the fact of pluralism- is not a mere historical location that will pass away
soon; it is, I believe, a pennanent feature of the public culture of modern democracies" (Rawls
1987: 4). With pluralism, where many conceptions of the Good exist, there is an inherent
conflict of interpretations of the Good. Some conceptions of the Good may be incompatible
with one another. Consensus helps to alleviate conflict: "... conflicts with political values are
much reduced when the political conception is supported by an overlapping consensus, the
more so the more inclusive the consensus" (Rawls 1987: 17). Rawls adds:
But the point of the idea of an overlapping consensus on a political conception is to show how,
despite a diversity of doctrines, convergence on a political conception of justice may be
achieved and social unity sustained in bng-run equilibrium, that is, over time from one
generation to the next (Rawls 1987: 5).
While I take issue with the way Rawls fleshes out the concept of consensus, I think that there
is something worthwhile in it. As a general conception. it can be used to build a
hermeneutical foundation for liberalism because consensus implies the notion of
conversation. I will explore this in greater detail later.
While there is a way of interpreting the post-1980 Rawls as a historicist (e.g. as
affirming that liberalism is historically located; see especially his 1980 "Kantian
Constructionism'· essay). there is much in his thought that still implies universalistic
normativity, e.g., his claim that "an overlapping consensus is quite different from a modus
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vlvendils clear from our model case" (Rawls 1987: 11). Rawls sees the concept of
overlapping consensus as having normative weight In our historical period. It Is not a mere
description. according to Rawls. but a "moral conception" (Rawls 1987: 11). Rawls' point Is
that his notion of the principles of justice and also the Idea of overlapping consensus have
normative validity in our historical period. They do not necessarily apply In other contexts and
historical periods.
In another article. "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical." Rawls describes the
consensus as the "shared Intuitive ideas" of the citizens In a state (Rawls 1985). With a stress
on atomic egalitarianism. there is no room in Rawls' ontology to accommodate the notion of
group aspirations and group rights. In that sense. Rawls represents the latest manifestation of
the classical liberal tradition which sees the individual as an end in itself. Rawls has a
"conception of society as a system of co-operation between free and equal persons· (Rawls
1985: 249). Rawls fleshes out what he means by Justice as faimess:
.•• this more fundamental idea is that of society as a system of fair social cooperation between
free and equal persons. The concern of this section is how we might find a public basis of
political agreement (Rawls 1985: 229).
Grounding his conception of society is the assumption of a congruence'between the cultural
and political communities. Such a congruence allows for the implementation of a political
consensus with relative ease.
Van Dyke characterizes the congruence between the cultural and political communities
in Rawls' work:
He does speak of different kinds of societies, but gives the impression that in crucial respects
they are alike, statements about one being applicable to aU. Through most of the book the
apparent assumption is that societies are homogeneous (van Dyke 1975: 607).
Bloom adds to this:
Because Rawls does not take seriously the possible conflict of important values, because he
really presupposes the existence of the consensus he believes he is setting out to establish,
because he would prefer to simplify the human problem and narrow our alternatives rather than
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face the fundamental conflicts requiring philosophic reflection, Rawls does not see that the
contract theorists could not be satisfied with rejecting some views of the good as merely
incompatible with the contract but had to find grounds for showing that they are untrue (Bloom
1975: 653).
On the score of cultural homogeneity. Bloom suggests that Rawls is not engaged in a critical
examination. but rather In a mere justification of the status quo.
Van Heerden has a similar characterization of Rawls' liberal project: f •••• the liberal
search for common ground rests on the assumption of cultural homogeneity which does not
apply in a country such as South Africa" (van Heerden 1994: 99). Undoubtedly. what van
Heerden has to say is equally applicable to the country of Canada as both the blacks of
South Africa and canadian Indians. in their own lands. have been colonized by Europeans.
Van Heerden is not arguing for a doctrine of incommensurability. but rather points out that an
incongruence between the cultural and political community is problematic. Throughout his
article HLiberal Neutrality and Cultural Pluralism.II van Heerden argues that all cultural
communities must have some political power: "This requirem~nt is particularly acute in the
case of minority cultures such as. for example. the aboriginal Indians of North America and
canadall (van Heerden 1994: 99). The traditional liberal mantra of egalitarianism (such as that
which we have in John Rawls' original position) ignores the embodied experience of the self.
The point of the recognizing of cultural membership is to facilitate equality between
individuals. The purpose is genuine equality and is not to give one group special treatment
over another. Generally members of the majority have huge advantages over members of
minority nationalities. Van Heerden writes: "Kymlicka contends that by treating cultural
membership as a private matter liberalism jeoPardizes the very ends it wishes to advance.
namely individualism and egalitarianism" (van Heerden 1994: 99).
Kymlicka notes that sometimes "those who have the same citizenship may also have
the same cultural membership" (Kymlicka 1992: 135). But. most of the countries of the world
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have significant national minorities within their borders. Liberal theory must address this fact
squarely. There is rarely, if ever, a close correspondence between the cultural and political
community. Kymlicka writes: "But the two forms of community may not coincide: the political
community may contain two or more groups of people who have different cultures. speaking
different languages. developing different cultural traditions" (Kymlicka 1992: 135). In our own
country. there are two significant groups of national minorities: 1) aboriginals and 2) French
canadians. Despite the presence of these significant minorities. Anglo Canadians have
political hegemony. The English language is used in all locations outside of Quebec as the
major language of business and government. Because of the manner in which democracy
fundions. the majority always wins. and the majority in canada is Anglo. Kymlicka writes: Hlfs
surprising ... that liberal theorists haven't explicitly defended, or even discussed, this
implication of their theories" (Kymlicka 1992: 137). Kymlicka (1992) attacks the manner in
which liberal democracy fails to provide the basis for rich and deep cultural pluralism in
culturally diverse nations. To use Habermas' term. there is in reality in contemporary liberal
democracies a crisis oflegitimsc~
I would like to make one important qualification here. There is a very large difference
between national minorities and immigrant minorities (for example those who come after the
.
incorporation of the nation state). The nation state is important to political philosophy, and its
historicity must be taken into account in theory. In the case of Canada, this would be after the
establishment of the Anglo-dominated federation. National minorities such as Indian groups
and French Canadians are in a strong position to question the nation state of Canada. There
is a moral argument to be made in that these national minorities, within the present territory of
canada, were independent nations before the establishment of the nation state of canada.
Unless one subscribes to a sort of "will to power" philosophy of history, then the existence of
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prevlous nationalities will continue to raise important questions.
I want to use a couple a of quotations to round out my point:
The continuing sense of Indian nationhood is further fostered by the fact they are significantly
unUke other canadian ethnic groups. They have an inatienable land base, aboriginal and treaty
rights, and a SPecial status in the Constitution and the Royal Proclamation. Also, unUke aD
others in the Americas, they are not immigrants. They are the original PeOple; they have no
other homeland (Pathways ofSslf-DeltHTTIination 1984: xv).
Indian nations preexisted in canada before the arrival of various European immigrant groups.
Unlike other groups immigrating to canada. Indian nations have no other. distant homelands.
If one argues that Indians are merely conquered nations. then one has left the realm of
serious political and moral philosophy. The existence of the nation state of Canada would
then be morally bankrupt. Most white immigrants came to this country by choice. and gave
up their rights to recognition of their nationality here. They have legitimate claims for rights
qua individuals but not qua members of nationalities. Furthermore. their patterns of
immigration were sporadic and do not constitute the development (with the exception of the
French and English) of legitimate nations of people who developed historically within the
geopolitical space of Canada.
Sol Sanderson. a former chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations and a
citizen of my first nation (the James Smith Cree First Nation) writes:
People of dlferent ethnic and cultural backgrounds can feel comfortable living in canada in a
melting-pot situation because they know that their mother country is always going to be
fostering and preserving their culture, their language, and so on. It is not like that for us
Indians. We have no place to retreat to. We have to stand firm where we are. So, in
Saskatchewan, in exercising our trust obligations to future generations of Indians, our people
and leaders are concentrating on safeguarding our cultural heritage (Sanderson 1984: 154)
One of the reasons I engaged with the thought of Dilthey (and the hermeneutical
tradition) in the first chapter was to argue that political philosophy needs a sense of
embodiment, thickness instead of the detached. thin view of the self which is usually bandied
about by liberalism. Kymlicka is clearly aware of the dangers of universalistic liberalism which
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ignores the concrete. historical. embedded experience of people. A thicker understanding of
the self. as a function of history and experience. drops any mountain-top (thin universalistic)
pretensions. Kymlicka is clearly aware of the dangers of universalistic liberalism found both in
Rawls and also in the White Paper of Pierre Trudeau. Because Kymlicka and I rely on a
thicker theory of the self. there is a shared element between our positions and those of
communitarians. underscoring perhaps the great potential of a dialogue between the liberal
and communitarian camps. Like Kymlicka. Gutman speaks of the "constructive potential of
communitarianism" (Gutman 1985: 321). One of the "constructive potentials of
communitarians" Is to stress as Kymlicka and I do. the embodied nature of experience.
If we think of individuals as Isolated from their contexts. then cleariy we will have to
assume the backdrop of the dominant culture (there usually is a dominant culture in every
nation state) whose narrative dominates interpretations of the Good. Ironically. by ignoring the
importance of cultural membership. liberals undermine the traditional liberal tenet of
egalitarianism. The conceptions of the Good life will reflect the interests of the dominant
culture and members of minority nationalities will be placed at an immediate disadvantage.
Members of the majority culture would clearly have a huge and unfair advantage. One of the
great failures of modern liberal democracy is that it falls to acknOWledge the manner in which
the majority can have political power over minorities. Majority does not equal morally just Mill
of course warned against the tyranny of the majority and it is partly for this reason that he
proposed a system of rights. In the same way. collective rights protect members of national
minorities from the tyranny of the majority.
I have just noted that Mill warned about the potential for a tyranny of the majority.
Ironically. Mill endorses the tyranny of larger nationalities over smaller ones. Kymlicka writes
that "Mill insisted that it was undeniably better for a Scottish Highlander to be part of Great
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Britain, or for a Basque to be part of France, 'than to sulk on his rocks, the half-savage relic of
past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest In the
general movement of the world' "(MIII 1972: 363-4. d. Kymlicka 1995: 53). A Hegelian
assumption about the primacy of world historic peoples is reflected in this statement. The
larger nations, such as Great Britain. France and Gennany, were allegedly worthy of
remaining nation states, whereas Mill held that smaller nations. such as Croats, Scots, and
Basques, should be subsumed within the larger nation states. We could extend this
understanding to the presentpo litical landscape of canada. Using Mill's model, English and
French canada would be considered the larger nations (or peoples), whereas. the Cree, for
example, would be considered smaller nations.
Kymlicka adds: urhe great nations were seen as civilized. and as the carriers of
historical development" (Kymlicka 1995: 53). Lord Durham applied Mill's distinction between
great and satellite nations to canada:
His solution. endorsed by J. S. Mill and adopted by the British government. was the more or
less forcible assimilation of the French, so as to create a homogenous English nation-state. He
had no sympathy for the 'vain endeavour' of the French Canadians to maintain their 'backward'
culture (Kymlicka 1995: 55. Kymlicka cites Craig 1983: 148-150).
The same assimilatlonistlc policy was adivated by the Canadian govemment against Indian
peoples. In the third chapter, I wish to argue that far from being a 'backward culture,' Indian
philosophy has much to add to contemporary discourse.
No the same time. at a certain lewd. Reslpolitikwill dictate that the majority language.
which is English in most Parts of canada. might be the best for business or other pragmatic
matters. The majority culture, English. already has de facto right in virtue of its majority and
the manner in which democracy fundions. If we use Rawls' original position as a heuristic
device, we would certainly want to choose conditions that would ameliorate our situation if we
had happened to be born into a national minority.
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The Dworkin insurance scheme (Dworkin 1981: 297-299. cr. Kymlicka 1992: 192), like
Rawls' original position, attempts to take into account the contingencies that could surround
an Individual's selfhood (e.g. his wealth, etc.). Dworkin uses the idea of purchasing insurance
to construct a model to argue for egalitarianism. According to Dworkin's insurance scheme,
we do not know what our lives will be like so we have to bUy insurance In case things do not
end up very well for us. Kymlicka imports possible cultural membership in a group into
Dworkin's insurance scheme. Kymlicka wants to flesh out Dworkin's hypothetical self and give
it content, taking cultural membership seriously. Kymllcka allows calculating for the possibility
of belonging to an oppressed minority culture. He extends Dworkin's Insurance scheme by
presenting the hypothetical event of two ships with passengers of distinct language
communities. A computer translation language allows people from different languages to talk
to each other. Some people from the same culture will choose different life projects.
Dworkin's Insurance scheme ''Would have to be some form of collective insurance, since the
insurance payments are useless to individuals by themselves" (Kymllcka 1992: 193) An
Individual needs a community to engage in cultural practices. Instead: "Aboriginal people
would need to receive and employ the insurance benefits collectively' (Kymlicka 1992: 193).
In contrast to the universal liberalism of Rawls, Trudeau (which I will discuss later), Dworkin
and other traditional liberals, this insurance scheme takes cultural membership seriously.
Kymlicka's take on Dworkin's insurance scheme gives Importance to groups and in
turn to an embodied sense of experience. Van Dyke stresses the imPOrlance of embedded
(0r lived) human experience:
These groups commonly share a tradition and culture that set them apart, and the members
tend to have a consciousness of kind. In practice many such groups demand what they
regard as justice for themselves as collective entities; that is, they demand legal status and
rights as collective entities (van Dyke 1975: 607).
Van Dyke is talking about national minorities within a nation state. To accord rights to a
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collective entity instead of to Individuals is perhaps a strange way of thinking about rights.
Kymlicka (1992) prefers to think of according rights to individuals who are members of a
group. Also. with Habennas' model. it is individuals qua members of groups who experience
a legitimacy crisis. I shall return to this point later.
Bloom notes that there is "nothing in the original position that corresponds to any
man's real experience" (Bloom 1975: 652). In order to have a genuine, liberal hermeneutical
conversation, we have to have a full, thick conception of the self. For there to be an equality
between individuals, the existence of national minorities has to be taken into account through
collective rights. In this way, members of minority nationalities will not be coercively SUbjected
to the will of the national majority. In my model of liberalism. I propose a notion of
asymmetrical federalism for collectives of minority peoples (nations such as the Cree and the
French). To respect the dignity and rights of Anglo citizens in Canada, the scope and degree
to which these rights would- exist would have to be limited. An example of this would be
English rights in Quebec. Clearly the rights of the English minority have to be proteded from
the possible tyranny of the majomy.
Kymlicka notes that having a system of aboriginal rights might serve as "an attempt to
distribute fairly the costs arising from our recognition of the values of cultural membership"
(Kymlicka 1992: 200). Because of this, aboriginal people would be accorded rights in order to
protect their interpretative frameworks. One way in which it might be proposed that this could
be made concrete would be by restricting the mobility rights of non-aboriginal people.
Because of possible threats to aboriginal cultures, "aboriginal leaders advocated restrictions
on the mobility, property, and voting rights of non-aboriginal people" (i.e. within aboriginal
territories) (Kymlicka 1992: 183). I support Kymlicka's point, but I think that we have to be
careful how we interpret this idea. I think that it would be exceedingly difficult to restrict the
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movement of people into the North. I think what would be more realistic would be to establish
a system of rights which would help keep aboriginal communities from being overwhelmed by
nevvcomers. One such mechanism would be the establishment of co-management boards
which would insure aboriginal inwlvement in political matters. The curtailing of exploitation of
the North by multinational corporations, such as C8meco, Is an Important part of this process.
Also, minority language rights would allow aboriginal people to create their own education
boards.
Large nation states have the same demands as minority nations. canada restrids the
influx of people Into Its borders. One of the motivating fadors Is that canada wishes to
maintain English and French as dominant languages. Another fador is the limited resources
of the land. The same applies to Indian nations such as the Cree nation. In fad, one could
argue quite cogently that the "Immigration" of European canadians into Indian lands has been
rather generous. Indians have strong moral claims for maintaining that at least some of their
previous land possessions be areas of limited Immigration by non-lndlans. During the 1990
Meech Lake debate, Elijah Harper, an eloquent Cree politician, argued that Indian peoples
had signed Treaties in a spirit of generosity. Indian people have always wanted to share the
vast resources of this great land. It seems morally sound for Indians to argue that immigration
should be limited In certain areas of Indian residence (e.g. the North, reserves). Such
colledive rights safeguard the cultural matrix, the framework of understanding of aboriginal
cultures: ..... SPecial rights are needed to treat aboriginal People with the respect they are
owed as members of a cultural community" (Kymlicka 1992: 183-4). Rights also provide the
basis for a redistribution of wealth.
In the first chapter, I attempted to argue for the inherently finite nature of human
consciousness and human understanding. I tried to argue that human beings interpret reality
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from a multitude of perspectives; the fact that there is a pluralism of interpretations of the
world which is an s prioricondition of human consciousness. In the Greek Enlightenment. the
emerging notions of objectivity and pluralism On the dialectic of Enlightenment) did not so
much InwNe a change of material conditions but rather a change In Ideas. The change that
occurred with the emergence of the new narrative of the modern Enlightenment was radically
different from the Greek Enlightenment The new emerging narrative provided humanity with a
basis for materially manipulating reality, through instrumental rationality which I will discuss in
greater detail in the next chapter. in a way which did not occur in the Greek Enlightenment. It
was not until the modem Enlightenment that there was a change in material conditions. The
modem Enlightenment framed our understanding of reality in decisively material terms.
Furthermore. the natural sciences grounded and shaped all interpretations of the Good and
constrained narratives, contra postmodemists such as Rorty and some in the hermeneutical
camp such as Gadamer who believe that narrative construction is not constrained. Unlike
others in the hermeneutical tradition. I extend the notion of adequacy of interpretation to
reality itself (not just to a written text). In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how the
aboriginal conception of the Good can add to the rationality of modem science.
But for the time being I merely want to stress that it is not enough for a political
theorist to say that, "Yes, aboriginal people, you have your conception of the Good. 11 If there is
no corresponding blanket of material support for an interpretation of the Good, then it is a
mere idealist platitude. In the last chapter I made the claim that the Greek Enlightenment was
more a revolution of ideas than anything else. The modem Enlightenment created a new
narrative which valued naturalistic explanation. Modern science. because of its great
successes, made it imperative for each narrative to come to terms with the objective, material
conditio~;requirecLto sustain that narrative. For national minorities, rights address the
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materiality of conceptions of the Good. I will argue that rights, when thought through, will be
sufficient to safeguard a culturally distinctive interpretative framework. A just nation state
would allocate goods to component minority nationalities so that, by means of those goods,
their distinctive interpretative horizons could be preserved.
Walzer argues against a pluralism of interpretive communities: minority cultures should
be absorbed into the mainstream cultural/Interpretive community. In Walzer's conception of a
nation state, there is an assumption (or at the very least an expectation of) a congruence
between cultural and political community. In many ways, Walzer's communitarian position
elucidates some of the dangers of a strong communitarian position which stresses ethnicity.
The twentieth century, perhaps because of the advent of modern technologies, has seen
heinous things done in the name of "collective rights" and "collective self-determination." The
kind of asymmetrical federalism that I am advocating will allow different nationalities to live
together peacefUlly in a nation state. Walzer's hard-core communitarian position supports
nationalism: "New states and govemments must make peace with the old inhabitants of the
land they rule. And countries are likely to be shaped as closed territories, dominated, perhaps
by particular nations" (Walzer 1983: 79). Citizenship would be extended only to members of
minority cultures through a process of "naturalization" (Walzer 1983: 80). Kymlicka rightly calls
this grandiose notion of citizenship "ictitious" (Kymlicka 1992: 227). This notion of citizenship
also corresponds very closely to Trudeau's notion of citizenship, in the White Paper of 1969,
which I will discuss later.
Kymlicka, like Walzer, does acknowledge the importance of cultural membership:
'Walzer's emphasis on the social understandings of historical communities may seem like a
useful corrective to recent liberal inattention to questions of cultural membership" (Kymlicka
1992: 234). There is, however, a dark side of the stress on "embodied" experience, as well,
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which can be Ipolitically disastrous" (Kymllcka 1992: 234). Machiavelli. like Walzer. wanted to
create a congruence between the cultural and political community through force. Both
Machiavelli and Walzer jUstify this on "realpolitik grounds" (Kymlicka 1992: 224). Kymlicka
charaderizes Walzer's dominant culture (nationality) of a state as "cultural creators" (Kymlicka
1992: 224) who impose their will upon national minorities within the nation state. The process
involved by the dominant culture is a produd of the negative pole of Enlightenment. In
another article. Walzer mediates his position between "high-minded moral absolutism" and "a
sort of low-minded ... neo-Nietzschean sUbjectivisml1 (Walzer 1992: 99).
Undoubtedly. his position has both elements. There is a "high-minded moral
absolutism" because of the closure of the interpretive horizon supported by the boundaries of
the nation state. Walzer refers to cultural communities as "historically stable" (Walzer 1983: 83)
and he also uses the term "national family" (Walzer 1983: 78). There is not the possibility of
the liberal condition of openness: lithe distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon
closure and. without It, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life" (Walzer 1983:
71). There is also the "neo-Nietzschean subjectivism" evident in the nation state (with Its
dominant ethnic majority) being seen as a "cultural creator." The two poles of Enlightenment
are thus linked in this position. There is a certain closure of interpretative horizons. While this
closed interpretative horizon is an intersubjective creation, it is taken to be "0bjective" and
"authoritative.11 In After Viltu~ Macintyre argues that we have a choice between Nietzsche with
a will to power, or Aristotle's closed community standards. Ironically. the two elements are
linked and interrelated in Macintyre'S and Walzer's position.
The Nietzschean element, the negative pole of Enlightenment. can be disastrous for
national minorities. Because of Realpolitik. some members of the national majority such as
the ·Reform party and the Liberal party of British Columbia, consider national minorities to be
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conquered peoples. Some in the national majority hold that members of minority nations
should assimilate into the "creative will" of the na~ional culture of the majority. However.
current practices are not moral in themselves simply because of their existence. Anyone who
merely describes practices. such as Rorty and Macintyre. dodges the task of critical analysis.
Practices have to be justified with argument and can always be revised and improved in light
of new and emerging circumstances. There is very little difference between Walzer's "will to
power" position and the individualism of Rawls' liberal ontology. While Walzer deliberately
wants to absorb minority cultures into the national culture. Rawls' position does this in a more
implicit manner. Rawls as a liberal advocates pluralism quite strongly. but this pluralism
assumes a congruence between the political and cultural community (Kymlicka 1992: 137-
138). The logic of Rawls' position is implicitly assimilationalist with his classical liberal
ontology of individualism. Both Rawls' and Walzers positions will lead to the absorption of
minority cultures via different routes.
I shall later argue that Trudeau's liberalism. and the current political landscape of
canada. are also manifestations of the same phenomenon. On the surface. the liberalism of
both Trudeau and Rawls liberalism (which both received their articulation in the early 1910s)
have laudable goals. stressing the equality of all citizens. But on a deeper level. the ontology
of individualism of classical liberalism divides the minority into discrete small units (which itself
is characteristic of instrumental rationality which I shall discuss later) which will be forced into
the majority culture through a "democratic procesS. 11 There is no basis for justifying this
morally or politically. With such a position. we have moved outside of political philosophy.
and have begun only to describe history and politics without critically analyzing them.
The political landscape in Canada may be reduced. from the perspective of Anglo
canada. to a process of demarcation between conquered people and the conquerors. This
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seems to me to be a spurious Inspiration for moral philosophy. It reminds one of
Thrasymachus' position in the Republicand the Melian dialogue in The Peloponneslsn War
with the domination of the strong by the weak having become the criterion for detennining the
relationship between groups. In pradice this is often how different groups have interaded.
Noel Dyck summarizes the power imbalance between whites and Indians:
... the tutelage that Canadian Indians have experienced has been based neither upon a
contractual agreement nor a negotiated understanding but upon the power of one side to
regulate the behaviour of the other in accordance with a set of unilaterally selected purposes
(Dyck 1991: 24).
It becomes a master-servant relationship between the "conqueror" and "conquered," creating
a strong hierarchy. Dyck writes: "In order for tutelage to achieve these ideological, political,
and national purposes it must destroy aboriginality and create dependence" (Dyck 1991: 30).
The domination and degradation of Indians by the govemment is and has been cultural
genocide, distinguished from biological genocide which I shall deal with later, and the
destrudion of a Habennasian lilife..world" (a manner of interpreting reality and the Good).
In multinational states such as canada, it is the group in power, to a large measure
but not exclusively, who defines the listable standards" of the political community; all of this is
done in the name of democracy. Without recognizing the importance of minority nationalities,
democracy and liberalism become nothing more than masks hiding the reality of assimilation
of minority cultures. The dominant group dominates the weaker group; the Anglos rule the
French and aboriginals; and the French struggle to assert themselves over aborignals. By
accepting liberalism on a shallow, face value basis, as an equality between individuals, the
opportunity of genuine pluralism and equality evaporates. With an ontology of radical
egalitarianism, liberalism fails in its qUintessential task of critical analysis and becomes a sort
of historical apologetic. It is not enough for the political theorist to merely describe the
domination of one particular group, but rather he or she must attempt to ground his or her
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position with critical arguments. Despite Anglo canadians, especially the Reform Party,
protesting the "speclal" treatment of aboriginals, they fail to realize that their ethnic group
dominates the "democratic" process with an almost complete hegemony of political power. In
virtue of this fact, we might think of the members of the majority culture as having de facto
group rights (that is group rights in practice). Their language, English, is the dominant
language. Also, they are hired more often, in terms of proportion, than members of other
groups. People of their background control much of the capital in this country.
By thinking of rights in this sense, with the acknowledgment of de tseto rights of the
majority, group rights talk is placed on its head. No longer is the burden of proof for having
group rights on the shoulders of national minorities. It acknowledges the unfair distribution of
wealth (the link between materiality and interpretation of the Good) and power and urges that
the majority jUstify its privileged position. By linking pradice and theory, one can deconstrud
liberal democracy talk and demonstrate that it can be, in some cases, nothing more than a
certain Nietzschean will to power. Important questions are raised about legitimacy in the
nation state as recent events in Quebec demonstrate.
Both Walzer and Rawls share the assumption of cultural homogeneity. Walzer writes
that 'he theory of justice must allow for the territorial state, specifying the rights of its
inhabitants and recognizing the collective rights of admission and refusal" (Walzer 1981: 81).
We have the xenophobic thinking of the Reform Party, with their "code talk" about immigrants
and national minorities, and the Parti Quebecois with Jacques Parizeau's disparaging remarks
about the "ethnic' vote after the results of the 1995 Referendum were known, and also with
some aboriginal leaders with their "pedigree" laws for citizenship determination. A "politics of
Otherness" makes the possibility of an exchange between interpretive frameworks
exceptionally difficult. Walzer fleshes out this idea in terms of "territory" and "locations" (Walzer
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1983: 79). I would, however, agree with Walzer that there is a link between land and people.2
Walzer adds that "the link between the people and the land is a crucial feature of national
identity" (Walzer 1983: 81). Location helps to define a people not only in a geopolitical sense,
but also in a cultural sense.
Walzer argues for something of a Rawlsian political consensus in terms of ethnic-
national heritage. He articulates perhaps more honestly than Rawls that there is a
correspondence between the political and cultural community. Walzer's position is extreme
and leaves its adherents little room to manoeuvre. There is no possibility for members of the
minorities to have any rights in the nation state qua members ofnationsl minorities. Walzer's
spheres of justice could be envisioned as circles which do not touch or intersect; there Is no
connection between them. There is no possibility for a hermeneutical conversation between
the various parties. While Rawls' notion of self is excessively thin, Walzer's is excessively
thick. If aboriginal people wanted a "collective right" in Walzer's sense, there would be no
room for them to retain their cultural membership in a state dominated by Anglo culture. They
would have to form their own nations. Walzer's position does not seem to provide the sort of
stability that we need in today's world. Walzer's (and less directly Rawls, solution to the
thomy problem of cultural pluralism Is assimilation or separation. Instead we have to striw to
find a common core of rationality; there has to be commensurability between different
historical communities. Clearly nation states have to accommodate national minorities if there
is to be peace and, perhaps more importantly, justice.
Van Dyke demonstrates the perilous position that many minorities are in, partiCUlarly
indigenous cultures:
Groups around the world described as indigenous are generally weak, and it is everywhere
agreed that special measures in their behalf are commonly justifiable if not imperative. As in
the case of American Indians, reservations are often established for them (van Dyke 1975:
612).
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Rawls' position Is highly resistant to the notion of group rights. Walzer's position Is also
resistant to the perseverance of national minorities in a nation state; the only solution to these
problems is for these national minorities to separate. which is particularly severe. In canada.
national minorities such as the Quebecois and aboriginal peoples have resisted attempts to
assimilate them into the mainstream Anglo culture. Under the rubric of "universal citizenship,"
there has been the illusion of equality.
In the early 19608. there was a movement in the United States' for civil rights by Black
Americans. An influential case. Brown l'. Board ofEducation, sought to realize the liberal ideal
of equality in relation to the educational facilities of American citizens. Kymllcka writes that "in
the Brown v. Board ofEducation case ... the Fourteenth Amendment of the American
Constitution. guaranteeing equal protection of the law to all its citizens. was used to strike
down legislation that segregated blacks in the American South" (Kymlicka 1992: 141). Blacks
had been excluded from society, refused entrance into various schools, and also refused the
opportunity to live in certain areas of cities. They did not want to be excluded from American
life any longer and argued for a colour-blind society. Groups rights were not important to
them because they were not national minorities with an inalienable land base. They were
American citizens, albeit with an ethnicity. It must be noted that the triumph of black
Americans is truly one of the great feats of twentieth century liberalism.
In the late 1960's. shortly after being elected. Trudeau argued for an abstract. ideal
notion of the universal self. In response. at least in part. to the United States' "just society"
program of the Johnson administration. and the explosion of civil rights in the United States.
Trudeau attempted to push for the same kind of colour-blind society in canada. People would
not be jUdged according to their racial, ethnic. or religious backgrounds, but rather would be
treated equally under the rubric of universal citizen. The notion of universal citizen has to be
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qualified. While Trudeau pushed hard for the establishment of bilingualism and biculturalism
in Canada. he did not recognize any collective rights for French Canadians; he implemented
the policies as a response to demographic factors. Within this traditional liberal ontology of
radical Individualism and universalism. there is no room to accommodate cultural
membership. The self Is seen in sterile abstract terms. diwrced from the lived and embodied
experiences of human beings. Kymlicka summarizes a Rawlsian-Trudeauian answer to this
question posed by the possibility of a theory! practice dichotomy: IIBut that complaint [that
real equality will not be achieved], while valid, is more about our failure to live up to the goal
of a colour-blind society than about any flaw in that goall • (Kym,licka 1992: 182).
Trudeau wanted to mirror the blossoming of civic participation in the United States.
Kymlicka argues that the reasoning of Brown "underlay the Canadian govemment's 1969
proposal to remove the special constitutional status of Indiansll (Kymlicka 1995: 59). Trudeau
promised lito make Govemment more accessible to people, to give our citizens a sense of full
participation in the affairs of Government..... (Trudeau 1968. cr. Weaver 1981: 8). Weaver
writes: II 'Participatory democracy' became the catch phrase, although the meaning of
participation was never publicly explained by Trudeau" (Doerr 1973: 98. d. Weaver 1981: 8).
Trudeau made a pretense of consulting aboriginal people about their future. Weaver writes:
"An early connection between civic participation and Indian policy was established in 1967
when the government decided to hold systematic consultation meetings with Indians to
discuss revisions to the Indian Actll CHeaver 1981: 10). In the end, aboriginal people were not
treated with respect nor taken seriously. The consultation process was nothing more than a
superficial gesture. Weaver writes: "Participation was said to have taken place, but in fact, it
did not occur; Indians were not party to the deliberations that produced the White paper"
r-Neaver 1981: 10). The famous White Paper was the prodUct of this "consultationll and
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marked the betrayal of aboriginal people. Noel Dyck writes that the 'he contents of the White
paper revealed that the government had chosen its policy proposals without much regard for
Indians· suggestions ..." (Dyck 1991: 108).
Trudeau was quoted as saying: .11 am against any policy based on race or nationalism"
~nterviewwith Harry Hawthorn, February 1976, Vancouver. cited In Weaver 1981: 54). Weaver
adds that 17rudeau did not believe that the future should be fettered to the chains of the past"
C'Neaver 1981: 54). This goes against the more historical, embodied notion of experience of
liberalism found in Kymlicka and Habermas. Trudeau wrote to Dave Chouchene, then an
aboriginal leader, that cultural diversity should sustain Itself on Its own and Iinot artificially,
through social legislation or by seeking the protection of history" (Trudeau 1969. d. Weaver
1981: 180). Trudeau's position was that cultures should flourish on their own strength and not
be "propped Upll by governmental intervent.lon. Weaver comments on Trudeau's stance of the
period: "In his Ideas about society and culture, Trudeau took a strong social Darwinian
approach In emphasizing freedom and competition" Weaver 1981: 54). Strong cultures thrive,
whereas weak ones die. There is a "market place" of cultures. as It were. Many (among them
Rawls) critique the unfalmess of the "market place" of wealth, but without qualification or
analysis. They also accept the concept of the I'market place of cultures. II Undoubtedly, there
are historical reasons for this as liberalism was historically linked, at least In part, to the
emergence of a free market economy. Liberal theorists put constraints on the flow and
distribution of capital in the same way that they must rethink the flow of "cultural capital. II
Weaver characterizes Trudeau's policies in the following manner: "Policies should
begin with an appreciation of the current political realities.. not outmoded historical constraints"
C'Neaver 1981: 54). The statement mirrors Rawls' ..time-slice theory" (Nozick's term) of the
original position, where the manner in which goods~ iAitiaUy acquired is not considered.
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Trudeau emphasizes the ahlstorical nature of his position with his denial of aboriginal rights:
"..no society can be built on hlstorlcal'mlght-have-beens' "(Trudeau 1968: 9. cited In Weaver
1981: 55). Trudeau's stress on Realpolitikls not unlike that of Machiavelli and Thrasymachus.
Instead of confronting the historical realities of the political landscape of canada, Trudeau
hides behind universalistic liberal talk, attempting to divert the concerns of national minorities.
Trudeau, with his Rawlsian vision, views a society as an aggregate of individuals and
not various groups. Weaver writes: "Collective rights, such as those of minority groups, are of
secondary interest, for the state is viewed as an aggregate of individuals, not groups, whose
fundamental freedoms are to be respected" ~eaver 1981: 55). With this "universalistic" view
of the individual, the self is viewed as an entity which cannot make rights claims on the basis
of history: 'With the focus on the individual, equality, and freedom, liberalism as a system of
ideas ignores the social collectivity by framing political rights in terms of the individuar'
~eaver 1981: 55). ThUS, the group does not haw rights qua a collective entity.
The White Paper of 1969 "proposed a global termination of all special treatment of
Indians, including the Indian ActA (Weaver 1981: 4). Sanders writes of the Liberal position of
the time: "Special status was identified as a trap. The proper goal was equality of rights"
(Sanders 1983: 319). I have already discussed how this surface level ontology of liberalism
really at a deeper or second level signifies the forced and gradual incorporation of the
national minority into the mainstream culture. Sanders adds: "Indian treaties would end.
Aboriginal rights claims and the promised Indian claims commission were rejected" (Sanders
1983: 319). The goal of the White Paper called for nothing short of the gradual assimilation of
aboriginal people and the destruction of aboriginality.
Ironically, instead of solving the "Indian problem" once and for all, It merely provided a
point around which Indians rallied. Noel Dyck writes: "In October 1969 the Minister of Indian
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Affairs felt compelled by public criticism to stoutly deny that the White Paper was either a
program for 'cultural genocide' or a device for stripping Indians of their lands" (Dyck 1991:
109). Weaver adds: '''-he White Paper became the single most powerful catalyst of the Indian
nationalistic movement, launching It into a determined force for nativism- reaffirming a unique
cultural heritage and identity' rt/eaver 1981: 171). Eventually. Trudeau did withdraw the White
Paper because of strong pressure from Indian groups. Sanders characterizes this as an
"effective Indian veto" (Sanders 1983: 335).
I took the time to examine Trudeau's position on aboriginal rights because It provides
a basis for theory on which to reflect. If, as canadian citizens, we are to make sense of
liberalism, we certainly have to put them in the context of praxis, namely, the Canadian
political landscape. Theory, if it Is not to become meaningless and esoteric, must take
practice into account. Trudeau's point was to argue for a universalistic sense of citizenship
which did not take culture Qncluding the case of national minorities) very seriously. I want to
reiterate the counter position:
Cultural membership is more fundamental than most associations into which persons freely
enter. I follow Kymlicka •.. in regarding culture as the context within which individ18ls may
exercise choice, but which is itself not open to choice (van Heerden 1994: 97).
Habermas, like Kymlicka and van Heerden, endorses the view that individuals are
embedded within interpretative horizons. Habermas uses the term "systems" (Habermas 1975:
118) and he also uses the term "Iife-world" (Habermas 1975: 4). He believes ina pluralism of
interpretations of the Good (reality), but sees the possibility of a conversation between
individuals in different interpretive frameworks. I would argue, contra Kymlicka (1992) and van
Heerden, that an individual is not intrinsicaJlytied to a culture. Kymlicka (1995), however,
argues that it is possible for the self to shift cultural allegiances without the use of coercion by
the majorlt)' culture: lilt would be implausible to say that people are never able to switch
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cultures" (Kymlicka 1995: 84). Like Habermas and Kymllcka (1995). I believe In the possibility
of transhlstorlcal dialogue about rationality between people in different life-worlds. I would
agree with Kymlicka (1992) and van Heerden to the extent that we cannot choose in advance
Into which culture we will be born. As Rawls famously put things. our birth circumstance Is
arbitrary from a moral point of view.
The concept of life-world grounds Habermas' political philosophy, which he
characterizes as ·'the avoidance of chaos. that Is, the overpowering of contingency"
(Habermas 1975: 4). He speaks of "community" and "shared meaning" ''that is constitutive for
the socio-cultural life world" (Habermas 1975: 10). At first glance. this may sound as if
Habermas is arguing for a closure of interpretive horizons. On the contrary. Habermas' notion
of thickness only situates an individual within an interpretive horizon: "The unity of the person
requires the unity-enhancing perspective of a life-world that guarantees order and has both
cognitive and moral-practical significance" (Habermas 1975: 118). Like Aristotle. Habermas
stresses embodied experience and the practical nature of moral life.
Kymlicka's term "societal culture" bears a great deal of resemblance to Habermas'
term life-world. Kymlicka defines a "societal culture" as "a culture which provides its members
with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities. including social.
educational. religious. recreational. and economic life. encompassing both the public and
private spheres" (Kymlicka 1995: 76). A social culture is "embodied in pradices covering most
areas of human activity" (Kymlicka 1995: 76). OUr membership in a societal culture thickens
our experience and "provides us with an intelligible context of choice. and a secure sense of
identity and belonging. that we call upon in confronting questions about personal values and
projects" (Kymlicka 1995: 105).
Unlike Aristotle. Habermas and Kymlicka avoid commensurability problems. People
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from different Interpretative horizons can communicate with each other. Habermas refers to
this as discursive ethics. This is not the closure of interpretive horizons. but rather openness
within interpretative horizons with the possibility of a hermeneutical exchange through
conversation. Life-worlds can always change. Kymlicka writes: liN6\\' experiences or
circumstances may reveal that our earlier beliefs about the good are mistaken. No end is
immune from such potential revision" (Kymlicka 1995: 91). Habermas relates the life-world of
modemity to contemporary political practice. Lik6\\'ise. Kymlicka notes that modernity affords
indigenous peoples new possibilities:
WhHe indigenous peoples do not want modernization forced upon them. they demand the right
to decide for themselves what aspects of the outside world they will incorporate into their
cultures. and many indigenous peoples have moved toward a more urbanized and agricultural
Ufestyle (Kymlicka 1995: 104).
Non-western people may wish to incorporate aspeds of modernity into their discourse and
practice, but this must not be done in a way that merely reintroduces the colonialism of the
Church or that of large -resource companies such as C8meco. Inherent in both the positions
of Kymlicka and Habermas is the assumption that the administration of a society must
correspond to the wishes of those being govemed. Throughout Legitimstion Crisis, Habermas
argues that a crisis emerges when the administration of a society does not correspond to the
will of the people.
Habermas' thesis is that there is always a conflid. a tension. between the apparatus of
the state and the will of the people (a sort of conceptual hole). Habermas frames this in terms
of class strudure:
Economic crisis is immediately transformed into social crisis; for in unmasking the opposition
of social classes. it provides a practical critique of the ideology of the market's pretension to be
free of power (Habermas 1975: 29).
Habermas is seeking to demonstrate the existing dichotomy between appearance and reality.
There is the appearance in western societies of a society being ruled democratically. but the
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Interests of the workers (who are underemployed or unemployed) demonstrate the limits of
this society. The tension between appearance and reality points to the antinomies of the
rationality of the life-world. I apply this analysis to the relation of the ruling majority to national
minorities. The crisis occurs because there are contradidions of interest in the system.
In the first chapter, I examined the Greek Enlightenment and illustrated how
conceptual holes emerged in dominant narratives. A crisis in terms of reason emerged
because of the dismantling of traditionallife..world structures (with the tension between
objectivity and pluralism). There was a crisis in the patteming of rationality itself. For
Habermas, a" 'rationality deficit' and a 'legitimation deficit' result from the difference in the
strudures of the economic system and the administration" (Habermas 1975: 47). With this
crisis, (which is the emergence of conceptual holes intemal to the life-world), "cultural
traditions are undermined and weakened" (Habermas 1975: 47). Habermas writes: "Crisis
states assume the form of disintegration of social institutions" (Habermas 1975: 3). A crisis of
legitimacy forces us to rethink the political institutions which govem our lives.
central to Habermas' position is that democracy does not really exist in the westem
world except in the form of an illusion. The "steering capacity' of the community does not rest
with the people but rather with technology. Habermas throughout Legitimacy Crisis uses the
term "steering powe"" to refer to political power, relating this notion to the apparatus of the
state (Habermas 1975: 138). There is an emphasis in modem political administrations on
achieving certain goals and these goals are in turn influenced by technology. Habermas
sketches out this conflid:
... on the one hand, the priorities set under economic imperati~ cannot be allowed to
depend on a general discursive formation of public will- therefore politics today assumes the
appearance of technocracy. On the other hand, the exclusion of consequential practical
questions from discussion by the depoliticized public becomes increasingly difficult, as a result
of long-term erosion of the cultural tradition which formerly had regulated conduct, and which,
till now, could be presupposed as a tacit boundary condition of the political system
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(Habermas 1975: 5).
By replacing the older narrative, the technocratic framework becomes the dominant narrative.
Habermas adds: "Because of this, a chronic need for legitimation is developing today"
(Habermas 1975: 5). The need for legitimation develops not only along class lines, but also
along national minority lines. In canada, this Is between Anglos, Quebecois, and aboriglnals.
While Habermas stresses the embodied notion of our experience, he also stresses the
fad that it is individuals who experience crisis. While there are large scale narratives and
interpretive horizons, it is individuals who are engaged with and experience crisis: "Systems
are not presented as subjeds, but according to pre..technical usage, onlysubjeds can be
inwlved in crisis" (Habermas 1975: 3). Individuals are the loci of consciousness. While
communities exist around them, the individual is the entity through which society becomes
conscious of itself. The resolution of a crisis is to give freedom to those caught up in it
(particularly those who do not benefit from it). Habennas writes: "'-0 conceive of a process as
a crisis is tacitly to give it a nonnative meaning- the resolution of the crisis of legitimacy
effeds a liberation of the subjeds caught up in it' (Habennas 1975: 1). The resolution of the
crisis of legitimacy will undoubtedly help liberate aboriginal people through some form of self-
government with a form of participatory democracy.
Habermas does not hold that every crisis will bring forth some notion of freedom.
Rather, he focuses his attention on the stark constrast which arises between the ruling class
and the under class. Habermas applies this to classes, whereas I extend it to the relationship
between the majority nation with the minority nations. For the interests of the minority
nationalities, the resolution of the legitimacy crisis can lead to nothing but an amelioration of
their political situation.
The way that this crisis of legitimation would be realized would be the installation of
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participatory democracy which would involve aboriginal people in a meaningful manner
(unlike Trudeau feigning in 1969 a "consultation" with aboriginal people). Habermas writes:
Genuine participation of citizens in the processeses of political will-formation, that is.
substantive democracy. would bring to consciousness the contradiction between
administratively socialized democracy production and the continual private appropriation and
use of surplus value (Habermas 1975: 38).
Aboriginal people would represent themselves and would not be paternalistically governed by
a centralized government. This would be a shift in the power structure of a society.
Participation by citizens would question the distribution of wealth and power.
I want to postulate what aboriginal self-government would mean, but before I do that I
want to move towards the question of rights and nationhood. I have tried to do three main
things so far: 1) demonstrate the embodied nature of political experience, 2) demonstrate the
significance of life-world and cultural narrative, and 3) raise questions about the traditional
universalistic liberal ontology of individualism.
The notion of nation state has been considered sacrosanct in the post-WOrld War Two
geopolitical landscape. Political situations within the borclers of nation states are often
considered I'ntemal matters.11 Also, another consequence of the notion of nation state is the
dismissal of claims of national minorities. Questions of legitimacy involving national minorities
have to be addressed in a more imaginative and creative manner than they have been in the
past.
Patrick Thornberry, in his useful and informative article, "Is there a Phoenix in the
Ashes?- International Law and Minority Rights,ll provides a useful historical analysis of the
notion of national minorities in the post WW11 era. Thornberry writes that "he negative
consequences of the minorities experiment has largely conditioned the postwar response"
(Thornberry 1980: 438). Partially as a response to the opportunistic manner in which Germany
used the claims of German nationals living in neighbouring states, the United Nations framed
87
rights In Individualistic terms. Individuals are seen as Individuals without culturaV national
allegiance. The United Nations attempted to avoid reference to the thickness of the selfs
experience and "deleted all references to the rights of ethnic and national minorities"
(Kymllcka 1995: 3). The boundaries of nation states have been considered Inviolable.
Thornberry notes that the term "natlonal minorities" (Thomberry 1980: 448) has not been used
in recent history. With the political ontology of cultural homogeneity (or at least this is the
expectation) stress is placed on individual rights. Thomberry writes:
The universalist and reductionist language of the modern human rights movement has tencled
to obscure the fact that denial of rights is still intimately connected with membership in groups
existing outside the ideological framework of states (Thornberry 1980: 421-422).
Like Kymlicka and myself. Thornberry is arguing against the universalist notion of citizenship
which clearly works more to the advantage of the majority.
There was a different approach taken in the period before WWII under the auspices of
the League of Nations. Thomberry writes:
Under the League of Nations. human rights and minority rights. though limled in their
application, formed a coherent package. Human beings were dealt wlh both atomically and as
members of particular communlies held together by a common consciousness or cultural,
religious or linguistic tradition (Thornberry 19eo: 454).
Neither of these elements can be absolute. but rather they are coterminous:
As a practical matter it is important to stress the essential, mutually complementing functions
of minority rights and human rights; the former are an indispensable part of the broad postwar
humanlarian movement. In case of a clash between them. neither class of right is absolute.
thought the presumption against infringement of fundamental individual rights is a very strong
one (Thornberry 1980: 458).
In the era of the League of Nations. there was an attempt to balance individual rights
with group rights. I shall examine an example involving Poland below. The context of choice
for individuals was taken seriously. Instead of seeing the self as not having any essential
qualities. the self should be viewed as being embodied and lived. Also. an important and
essential link between theory and pradice is established by this recognition. Thornberry
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writes: "Human rights reflect the antinomy of state versus Individual whereas minority rights
are often characterized as group rights, and are sometimes equated by critics with privileges"
(Thomberry 1980: 440). The point of group rights (or asymmetrical federalism) is to level the
playing field. If importance Is given to Individual rights. then the collective right (or
nationhood) of the group would be tempered. Women would be protected to a greater extent
from sexist policies. I think that rests in a sort of "parallelism" with an appeal to transhistorical
standards. By this. I mean that there are transhistorical standards which apply to s11
interpretative communities. I shall examine the issue of sexism later.
Group and collective claims cannot exist in isolation from other concems. Rights must
always be considered in light of the historical context in which they occur. Rights are always a
function of other people's interests which must always be taken into account. Indian rights
cannot exist in isolation from other people'S human needs. Rights can be seen as a way of
creating a hierarchy between different groups of people with those of the collective right
holding an unfair advantage. A radical rethinking of the nature of rights allows for a more
discerning perspective. If we think those in the majority culture have unfair advantages then
we no longer see the collective right of the minority as an unfair advantage, but rather as a
way of levelling the "playing field." Collective rights also reduce the potential of '~he tyranny of
the majority' and make genuine pluralism possible and tenable. Certain powers of the central
government can be decentralized in order to make asymmetrical federalism a viable solution.
The hope of liberalism is that all individuals are to be recognized and treated as
equals. The dream of liberalism is for the integrity of people to be protected. When Mill refers
to the tyranny of the majority in On Uberty, the purpose of rights is to safeguard the dignity of
people. Their life projects cannot be dictated to them by the majomy. If this were to be the
case, it would make for a very shallow definition of democracy and liberalism. Deep· pluralism
89
extends the protection afforded by Individual rights to the lewl of a coUedivity. My quarrel Is
not with the substantive basis of Rawls' original position and the fundamental liberal values.of
equality. Rather. I want to extend the liberal project, to make it more ambitious. I want rights
to Include collectivity and the strength of colledlvity claims from an appreciation of history.
History itself is not the final arbitrator of the soundness of colledlw rights claims. We
could imagine a case where white South Africans argued that because of history. they haw
an historical claim to rights. We must look at history, but we must analyze and determine the
manner of historical claims. We must not only ask: Is this treaty between two nations valid
simply because it exists? Or is it valid because it is the way it should be?
Kymlicka in liberalism, Community and CUhure does not consider the validity of
historical claims such as Indian treaties in Canada. Kymlicka (1992: 135-161, 182-205) argues
that in order to haw genuine equality, cultural membership must be taken seriously if
individuals are to be truly respeded. Cultural membership embeds Individuals within
Interpretative frameworks. In a wry recent book, Multlcuhural Citizenship, Kymlicka bUilds
upon his "equality arguments" by considering the role of historical agreements such as Indian
Treaties:
Respect for such agreements is important, I beDeve, not only to respect the self-determination
of the minority, but also to ensure that citizens have trust in the actions of government
Historical agreements signed in good faith give rise to legitimate expectations on the part of
citizens, who come to rely on the agreements made by governments, and it is a serious
breach of trust to renege on them (Kymlicka 1995: 119).
The move by Pierre Elliot Trudeau to rescind Treaty rights was perceived by Indian leaders as
a violation of good faith. Throughout the history of Canada, Canadian govemments, both
federal and provincial haw violated Treaties. and have engaged in acts of cultural genocide:
1) Treaties have been ignored when convenient for canadian govemments. 2) Indian children
were taken away from their homes and SUbjected to ideological propaganda of the Church, 3)
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Indian languages were outlawed, 4) reserve lands have been continuously expropriated, and
5) the Department of Indian Affairs, because of funding arrangements with Bands, is in the
process of undermining Indian Tribal Councils and organizations such as the Federation of
Saskatchewan Indians. These adions undennine, to put it quite mildly, the sense of good will
between Canadian govemments and Indian governments.
Historical agreements can, of course, be amended for a variety of reasons. First, the
original agreements might have been made under coercion and one party may seek to
redress this through renegotiation. Second, circumstances may change which make the older
treaty outdated and in need of revision. Kymlicka does not envision historical agreements as
binding in perpetuity, but rather that they be used as a starting point. Collective rights haw
their roots in history, but their main job must be to empower those who require protection.
The interpretation of these rights must be done in such a way as to be fair to all those
affected by their application.
The League of Nations took the claims of minority cultures seriously. Ironically,
however, this was done only in the context of European nations and it ignored the colonial
nature of many European states. The United Nations was a movement away from colonialism
between European and New World nations, but still maintained cultural imperialism with
nation states. We could see how this applies to Canada. Before WWII, the nation claims of
Indians were not taken too seriously. Let us remember that it is only now, 150 years after
"conquest,·· that Indian rights are being negotiated in British Columbia. The League of Nations
restricted their activity to mostly European minorities. After WWII, the United Nations pushed
for the emergence of New World powers, but ignored the claims of national minorities within
these borders. In contemporary discourse, there is much jargon of "violating the internal
borders of nation states."
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The League of Nations, despite its limitations, also took a proactiw role in protecting
national minorities. For example. it was argued by League of Nations members that minorities
in Poland should be protected. Thomberry writes:
•.. In districts with substantial numbers of non-Polish speaking nationals, adeql.8te facilities
were to be provided by the Polish government to ensure primary instruction in their own
language, though the government could make the learning of Polish in such school obligatory
(Thornberry 1980: 432).
Control of education for any minority group is absolutely essential if it is to survive as a
national minority. Kymlicka outlines the reciprocal recognition of national minorities in this
case:
... Germany agreed to accord certain rights and privileges to ethnic Poles residing within its
borders, so long as Poland provided reciprocal rights to ethnic Germans in Poland. This treaty
system was extended, and given a more multilateral basis under the League of Nations
(Kymlicka 1995: 2)
I will describe Derick van Heerden's analysis of South Africa, but for the time being I
want to register a couple of points. While the League of Nations between the two world wars
strove to recognize the rights of national minorities within European nation states, it did
nothing but buttress European colonialism.
Derick van Heerden, in addressing the question of liberal neutrality and cultural
pluralism, while not accepting minority rights on an "a priori" basis (van Heerden 1994: 1010),
endorses the notion of education for minority cultures. Van Heerden writes: "This question is
important because education is perhaps the area where the effects of political neutrality are
felt most severely by minority cultures" (van Heerden 1994: 102). Without education rights, the
status quo is preserved with the majority culture dominating the minority culture. Language
instruction would be given in the language of the majority which is masked as the "neutral"
language. Education is a political activity. Indian experience in residential schools echoes this
process. Van Heerden stresses the importance of embodiment for the citizen: '1nitially ... the
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child should be allowed to discover the culture of which he Is a member" (van Heerden 1994:
102). The authors of Pathways to Self-Determlnstionwrlte: liThe Indians' sense of their own
nationhood derives also from having their own language and culture and from a conscious
knowledge of shared tribal achievements and glories In their past" (Pathways to Self-
Determination 1984: xv). Van Heerden Is not proposing a Walzerlike isolationism, but rather
the basis from which the subject can later have a conversation with other members of the
society. The point is that we have to know who we are before we can talk to others: HAs he
grows up the process of discovery should lead the child to new worlds; worlds that may even
be foreign to his own culture" (van Heerden 1994: 102).
The attempt to deny a cultural group an education in their own culture is
commensurate with the destruction of the culture. I have hesitated to use the term genocide,
but I think it is a useful term. Nonetheless, I think that we have to delineate this term,
distinguishing between "cultural" and "biological" genocide (Thomberry 1980: 444). Kunz also
makes the distinction. He notes the shift after the Second World War:
The United Nations Genocide Convention certainly wants to protect minorities at least against
"physical and biological" genocide, although it carefully avoids mentioning cultural genocide,
and fails to mention political minorities (Kunz 19s5: 285).
I think that biological genocide includes the wholesale destruction of the culture both in tenns
of cultural artifacts and also in terms of the slaughter of the members of that culture. Recent
examples of this would include: 1) the Holocaust, 2) Rwanda, 3) Bosnia and 4) cambodia.
While there has been widescale death of aboriginal peoples in Canada, I do not think that
there was the same effort in Canada to destroy aboriginal populations (with the exception of
the Beothuk tribe in Newfoundland). There has however been blatant and systematic "cultural
genocide" which is ''the destruction of the specific characteristics of a group by various
measures designed to undermine its cultural and linguistic traditions" (Thornberry 1980: 444).
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After the Second World War, there was a shift in that European colonialism was addressed.
But, unlike the League of Nations which sought to proted national minorities within nation
states, the United Nations took the borders of nation states as sacrosand.
Thus, the ability of a people to control activities such as education and related
adlvities is essential for the survival of a national minority. This must be one of the most
fundamental points for aboriginal demands for self-govemment. York writes:
canadians often assume that Indian self-government would entail the creation of a sovereign
state or a new level of government But in reality, self-government has a much more practlcal
meaning for most Indian bands. It begins with the freedom to regain control of individual
elements of their community: their schools, courts, health system, and child welfare system.
These are institutions that affect people most directly. By asserting their right to make their own
decisions in such vital areas, Indian bands are tiberating themselves from a state of
dependence on government (York 1990: 28).
The James Bay Cree agreement is an example of how self-govemment could work in
other Indian communities. Dan Smith writes:
They are now legaUy called federal band corporations, similar to municipalities but with
provincial-like powers over such central concerns as hunting, fishing and the environment.
Most community services, including policies, are delivered by the Cree through their own
regional government authority, a school board and a health and social services board, all
created earlier through the separate land claim agreement and tied closely to the government
of Quebec (Smith 1993: 95).
Another important component of aboriginal claims to self-government has to be the
inalienability of their lands. The Federal govemment holds their lands '1n trust" for them. In the
summer of 1995, several Indians in British Columbia set up an armed camp and demanded
negotiations of outstanding land claims with the canadian govemment. Events such as this
demonstrate the frustration that Indian people feel over the expropriation of their lands by the
federal government. One question that we have to ask is: why does the canadian government
own aboriginal land?
The aboriginal people of Canada, like the Quebecois, are nations which were
subsumed by the Anglo culture (for most European immigrants who live in English canada
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now identify with this culture). The Indians of.Canada. including the Cree. negotiated their
treaties with the British crown on a nation to nation basis. Since then the Canadian
government has engaged In a systematic attempt at cultural genocide. No longer are Indians
treated as nations. While Quebec technically never was a nation as they were a colony of
France. they nonetheless have strong historical grounds for nationhood. In the wake of a
paper-thin victory for the Non side in the 1995 referendum. many premiers and Anglo
Canadians went on diatribes about special status for Quebec. Instead of treating Indians and
also Quebecois as equals. they are treated in a subservient manner. Noel Dyck writes:
seventeenth century French missionaries were, in effect, the precursors of nineteenth-century
Indian administrators and twentieth-century bureaucrats and tutelage agents. What all of these
historically specific figures have had in common is their belief that they know what is best for
Indians and their wOlingness to impose exclusive paternalistic tutelage control whenever they,
as tutors, feel that Indians are not acting in their best interests (Dyck 1991: 5).
While generally not admitted into political ontologies. there must be room in political
discourse for primordial human responses such as pain and anger. Perhaps in the history of
discourse in the westem tradition these have been dismissed as irrational. but they help to
form an important part of lived and embodied modes of scholarship. certainly as aboriginal
people. we must find peace within our minds if we are to have freedom and real. meaningful
self-government. I do not think that it is morally justifiable for Indians to bear arms at any
point. The use of violence against Canada. be it an armed camp or terrorist activity against
the Canadian nation state. or physical violence against citizens of our communities (especially
women. whom I will discuss later) would make our cause morally bankrupt in the same way
that Quebec's refusal to acknowledge Cree self-government makes their cause morally
bankrupt.
Because of the cultural genocide that has been inflided on Indian people, Indian
communities are very damaged and there is a great deal of pain and anger. Several
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companies in the South exploit the North for their own benefits. One such example is cameco
in Saskatchewan. The capitalistic exploitation which occurs between the North and SOuth
maps nicely onto Habermas' class analysis. Also, residential schools robbed us of our family
relations, setting the stage for generations of damaged human beings. We must acknowledge
our pain. and the sources of it, but we must also acknowledge how we haw hurt those
around us. Phil Fontaine said: IIHealing and self-government are really one and the samell
(Smith 1993: 330). It is only through spiritual well-being that we can haw healthy
gowrnments. We have to take responsibility for our lives and do everything that we can to
improw our communities despite the overwhelming odds that are faced. Clearly, the notion of
responsibility for an adion must be tied to the notion of self-gowmment. When we search our
souls and find true peace we also find true freedom. If we choose to respond with violence.
then we will truly be conquered nations. If we respond with peace, we will mow towards
freedom. We can offer the world the blueprint to our freedom; we can share with the world
the ways in which we maintained our identities. This will not only benefit ourselves but will be
a gift for all of humanity to share.
Throughout this chapter, I have been discussing the importance of rights, nationhood
and national minorities. I haw been defending a pluralistic vision of interpreting reality. In the
process, I have tried to spell out clearly what self-determination would mean for aboriginal
people. Up to this point. I have been trying to defend the embedded nature of
understanding. but now I want to turn my attention to defending liberalism as a metanarratiw.
as an transhistorical standard. My version of liberalism. while stressing embodied. lived
experience. also embraces the notions of the transhistorical. universal. and quasi-Kantian
perspedive.
In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Rorty argues for a historical (Hegelian)
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understanding of liberalism. For Rorty. liberalism is "embodied in a concrete historical
situation" (Rorty 1992: 93). Rorty. in an almost Macintyre-like manner. does not see liberalism
as a metastandard but rather as a local standard. Rorty stresses the historical circumstances.
as I do (especially in Chapter 1). of how liberalism arose- namely the deconstruction of the
older. traditional narrative (medieval story). While Rorty acknOWledges history. he has no
room for the notion of constraint in his ontology. He argues for a Kuhnian notion of
incommensurability. Rorty argues for a series of closed systems. of closed moral
vocabularies. which are incommensurate with each other. If we apply this to pradice. then
there could be no hermeneutical conversation. nor any fusion of interpretive horizons. The
moral vocabularies of different people cannot interface in this model, but instead only
displace each other.
Rorty is against a metaphysical or foundational defense of liberalism and he notes that
his brand of liberalism is lIantithetical to Enlightenment rationalism" (Rorty 1992: 57). Rorty is a
pragmatic liberal and his liberalism tends to be more of a description of the current political
life than a critical foundation for liberalism. Rorty writes that Illiberal culture needs an improved
self-description rather than a set of foundations" (Rorty 1992: 52). I accused Aristotle (and
other communitarians) in chapter one of merely describing political landscapes instead of
critically analyzing them. Rorty is very close to Rawls' "political" not "metaphysical" concept.
Kymlicka writes: 'rrhe reason Rorty rejects 'philosophical metanarrative' is that he believes
there are no such things" (Kymlicka 1992: 65). Rorty denies the existence of "metavocabulary"
(Rorty 1992: 73). Kymlicka continues his sketch of Rorty's position: "...there are [for Rorty) no
reasons which aren't reasons intemal to a historical tradition or interpretive community"
(Kymlicka 1992: 65). Rorty adopts a postmodem position. By that I mean that he accepts no
external normative constraints on narratives. Rorty describes himself as an ironist who "thinks
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nothing has an intrinsic nature. a real essenceu (Rorty 1992: 7).
Rorty does not critically analyze different narratives. According to Rorty. narratives
have merit in virtue of their mere existence. Every narrative has an intrinsic value based on the
virtues of its existence. Kymlicka attacks this pragmatic. atheoretical interpretation of
liberalism:
When we criticize or defend values of our community, the meaning of our claims is not
captured by statements like IIWe do this' or' They don't do that.' If this is the contrast between
Kantian and Hegelian liberals, then Hegelian liberals are simply wrong (KymUcka 1992: e8).
Kymlicka argues for constraints on narratives. He is arguing for normative analysis over mere
description. Unfortunately. for Rorty (and also for Kymlicka who seems to accept Rorty·s
terminology). the notion of Hegelian liberalism is only misleadingly linked to Hegel. Hegel
held that there was a metanarrative. namely the phenomenology of the spirit. While Reason
was linked to historical circumstances. it was also transhistorically linked to other narratives.
Given Rorty's commitment to pragmatism. his attack on universalism and metaphysics
(he seems to equate these two ideas) seems inevitable. Rorty creates a false dichotomy. He
speaks of the 'lj:ension between an effort to achieve self-creation by the recognition of
contingency and an effort to achieve universality by the transcendence of contingency" (Rorty
1992: 25). Rorty holds that we have to have it one way ~r the other. Rorty continues his
simplistic charaderization of the western metaphysical tradition: II••• the Western philosophical
tradition thinks of a human life as a triumph just insofar as it breaks out of the world of time.
appearance. and idiosyncratic opinion into another world- into the world of enduring truth"
(Rorty 1992: 29). Rorty. in attacking metaphysics. also seems to be taking a swipe at theory
in general: "Metaphysics- in the sense of a search for theories which will get at real essence-
tries to make sense of the claim that human beings are something more than centerless webs
of beliefs and desires" (Rorty 1992: 88).
98
In another passage, he makes the connection between the two kinds ~ liberalism
which I characterized earlier: ''The metaphysician, in short, thinks that there is a connection
between redescription and power, and that the right description can make us free" (Rorty
1992: 90). Rorty has no faith in philosophy as a theoretical activity, viewing it merely as a
descriptive activity. Rorty takes a swipe at Habermas and stresses the historical nature of
liberalism (he thinks of local vocabularies in a way not unlike Maclntyre~. Rorty writes: "Such
agreement does not have (pace Habermas) any ahistorical conditions of possibility, but is
simply a fortunate prodUct of certain historical circumstances" (Rorty 1992: 195). Rorty's point
is that just because we agree that liberalism is pragmatically useful in the present, it does not
follow that liberalism is transhistorically valid.
The problem with Rorty's liberalism is this: political narratives are considered to be
valid merely because of their existence. One could provide the same sort of argument for the
existence of Nazi Germany. The practice seems to jUstify itself. This points to the dangers of a
radical, historically based, lived notion of experience. It leads to irrationality and there are no
grounds upon which it can be critiqued. The experience is so thick that any attempt to
critically analyze it is hampered. There is no possibility of moving transhistorically between
narratives. Also, there is a certain incommensurability between different interpretative
narratives. The possibility of a hermeneutical exchange between different narratives is
eliminated.
The communitarian camp has already attacked the alleged ahistorical pretensions of
liberalism. I define a communitarian in the following way: a communitarian is someone who
believes that experience is thick and lived and is the sole basis for sorting out political claims.
Some communitarians such as Sandel (1982) hold that liberalism ignores the embodied,
communal, historical nature of experience and attempts to make every narrative universal and
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objectlw. Amy Gutman characterizes Sandel's book In the following manner: liThe central
argument of Sandel's book Is that liberalism rests on a series of mistaken metaphysical and
metaethical views: for example. that the claims of Justice are absolute and unlwrsal..."
(Gutman 1985: 310). I call this ahlstorical because It is a one time assessment of the
principles of justice. I, on the other hand. hold that liberalism must be evaluated and shaped
through time. The Rawls of 1971 stressed the ahistorical positive pole of Enlightenment. The
post-1980 Rawis. like Sandel. retreated from this with his talk of "Kantian construdlonlsm" and
the historical"contingency of his principles of justice" (Gutman 1985: 312). I think that there is
something to a historical understanding of liberalism. but I do not think that we haw to go the
extreme of the post-1980 Rawls.
My version of transhistoricalliberalism tries to maintain the spirit of Rawls' original
position (as found in A Theory ofJustic~ but at the same time take into account the notion of
lived experience. Unfortunately. the post-1980 Rawls goes to the extreme of making liberalism
only a historical phenomenon. It has no importance or relevance outside of the climate of
industrial. democratic societies. He goes too far and falls into a communltarian-like position.
The thickness of the experience of people is the democratic background. Thus. Rawls' project
does not become a goal which all societies oughtto have. Rather. the project of political
philosophy is merely to describe what is. The position of the post-1980 Rawls becomes quite
modest and also quite similar to Rorty's.
I propose an alternative reading of the original position which does not slide into a
mere pragmatic description of liberalism. The original position could be thought of in the
following manner: we could all come to the table with our lived experience. We would engage
in a hermeneutical conversation with others around the table. We listen to their experiences
and compare them to ours. The experience is not thin. but rather thick. The difference in the
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content of our experience can be reexamined in the light of other experiences. The
comparison between different narratives allows one to determine normative constraints. Unlike
the henneneutics of Gadamer. my version of a hermeneutical conversation affords the
possibility of putting normative constraints on narratives. Through this interchange of
narratives with others. we can attempt to see the shortcomings of our own narratives. The
result of this process is the normative pool of possibilities which I call the metanarrative.
Some aboriginal traditionalists, who are de facto Rortyian communitarians, would like
to see nothing change in aboriginal narratives. Kymlicka characterizes collective right claims
along these lines: "Collective rights could refer to the right of a group to limit the liberty of its
own individual members in the name of group solidarity or cultural purity ...•• (Kymlicka 1995:
7). Morris Manyfingers Jr., speaks of the Federal government as having "consistently imposed
its own terms and conditions upon the Indian communities by defining those fadors which
comprise 'Indianness' "(Manyfingers 1986: 64). What constitutes "lndianness"? Male
dominatiol1 over females in the case of Cree culture? Surely a culture does not have an
essence, but rather is a cluster of ideals and practices. Manyflngers. In a Gadamerlike move,
stresses the role and inevitability of tradition:
In their quest to regain sovereignty that Indians surrendered to European colonizers, the
Aboriginal peoples must introduce the aboriginal concept of law based on custom and
tradition, a concept which included both common and custom law (Manyfingers 1986: 64).
Manyfingers adds:
The Indian Nations possess inherent sovereignty to govern themselves and their territories in
keeping with Indian law and in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Treaties; this inherent
sovereignty has been recognized and confirmed through canadian constitutional law and
common law (Manyfingers 1986: 66).
Also, Manyfingers holds that one possible solution to the question of aboriginal
citizenship would be that "Indian First Nations could conceivably draw up membership codes
with provision for both blood quantum and desire to practice membership values"
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(Manyflngers 1986: 71). This raises many important questions such as: Would membership
values Include male domination of political Institutions? Would women be excluded? Is
cultural membership only a question of race? Nationality and cultural membership provides
the Individual with a context of choice. Manyfingers argues for a closure of interpretive
horizons (a Walzerlike position) in his article, "Determination of Indian Band Membership: An
examination of Political Will." A strong nostalgia (MacintYre-like) for the past resonates In this
work: 'ndlan Nation control of Band membership must examine the importance of self-
determination, racial preservation and culture in developing membership codes" (Manyflngers
1986: 73). Manyfingers, Rorty and Gadamer need something more substantial than the mere
appeal to tradition. He needs a moral foundation, a metaphysical justification of the tradition
or a rethinking of that tradition, if required. If he does not do this, he merely repeats Rorty's
shortcoming, that of description instead of analysis.
Some traditionalists hold that everything should remain the same as it has been since
"time immemorial." I am suspicious of the latter term, "ime immemorial," as it serves the same
fundion that the terms objectivityand rations/itydo in other contexts. This phrase grounds
various claims in authority and gives a certain measure of legitimization. We also have to be
suspicious of those traditionalists who do not want to change anything. We have to ask
ourselves, 'Whose interests are best seNed by the status quo?" Those whose interests are
served by the present system will have little need or desire to think outside their system of
thought and material circumstances. Those who have been excluded from power by a
traditional narrative, such as aboriginal women, will offer some very succind criticisms of
traditional aboriginal culture. Because of their marginal position, they will be able to very
clearly think outside a system of thought.
Gutman applies the same sort criticism to her own European culture:
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What exactly does Sandel mean to imply by the sort of civic repubHcanism "impHcit without
tradition"? Surely not the mainstream of our trad ilion that excluded women and minorities, and
repressed most significant deviations from white, Protestant morality in the name of the
common good. We have little reason to doubt that a liberal politics of rights is morally better
than that kind of republicanism (Gutman 1985: 319).
Surely as aboriginal people we must also question our traditional narratives. During the
Charlottetown Accord debate, aboriginal women were particularly wary of the drawbacks of
colledive rights for their communities. Aboriginal women worried that their individual rights
would be violated within the confines of aboriginal self-govemment. It is true that aboriginal
women are excluded from political life in Cree communities. But certainly cultures and women
can gain more power economically and politically. Kymlicka affirms how group rights need
not hamper and restrid, in a negative sense, the aspirations of individuals:
They [i.e. right/4 do not favour traditional practices over non-traditional life-styles, or
religious over non-religious life-styles. They do not impose a particular conception of the
'health of the soul' on the member of minority cultures, or penalize dissenting conceptions
(Kymlicka 1992: 191).
When aboriginal women demand to be treated with more equality it is not that they are
being culturally tainted with white liberalism. Rather, they are responding to the universal
desire for equality and respect. They will not be comforted with Rorty's position that moral
vocabulary is just, and only, the description of moral pradices. Rather, aboriginal women will
demand that the pradices of our aboriginal communities change. Cultures change and not
everything a culture does is inherently valuable. The questioning of traditional values, as in
the case of aboriginal women, is not done as esoteric exercise, but rather to improve their
lives in a movement towards greater equality. Kymlicka's commitment to seeing historical
communities as "open-societieS-' demonstrates his commitment to the liberal ideal of
revisability. Amitai Etzioni's characterization of communitarians as "people committed to
creating a new moral, social and pUblic order based on restored communities without
allowing puritanism or oppression" (Economist Dec. 24, 1994: 33) bears comparison to
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Kymllcka's position. The primary point Is to acknowledge and strive towards an increased
openness of interpretive horizons.
For a very long time, aboriginal women were excluded from power In aboriginal
communities. Membership was determined by gender. For example, if an aboriginal male
married a white woman, the children from that union would have Indian citizenship, whereas if
an Indian woman married a white male, the children from that union would not have Indian
citizenship. It may seem that if aboriginal people were truly sovereign they would determine
their own membership. Sanders writes: "Indian leaders argue that they have an aboriginal and
treaty right to determine their membership. This right has not been recognized in Canadian
law. Parliament has assumed the authority to determine Indian membership by legislation"
(Sanders 1980: 326). But I think that there are certain grounds for appealing to transhlstorlcal
standards. In other words, I do not think that aboriginal people can simply say: 'Well this is
.what we do here and that is that." Aboriginal males cannot give soliloqUies about justice
between nations if we do not have Justice in our own homes.
Violence is rampant in aboriginal communities. I myself grevv up in these
circumstances. I myself have been physically violent to other males and to female partners. I
was in the Alternatives program which encourages men to deal with their violent tendencies
In a constructive manner. I think that this effort on my part is an active process of changing
dominant cultural beliefs. Many Cree males, particularly older ones, are sexist. The culture,
formally a plains warrior culture, is very male-orientated. However, I am engaged in the
liberal exercise of revising my projects and commitments. Violence is not an inherent part of
me and is something that I can change. I can separate myself from my ends (a liberal
conception). Sandel's embedded self, with a complete fusion between self and ends, seems
,
to only Justify the status quo. With Sandel's model of the self, change (except perhaps for
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completely intemal organic change) would be impossible as we would all have our societally
assigned roles.
Indian males have to acknowledge the injustices that they have inflicted within their
communities, if they are to talk with any credibility about justice between the nation of canada
and the Cree nation (or some other Indian nation). The question of aboriginal self-government
underlines the importance of addressing the question of male violence and male political
power. If violent men have political power, then the legitimacy of aboriginal self-govemment is
dubious and morally bankrupt All of this stresses the importance of a connection between
theory and practice. If I, as a liberal theorist, talk endlessly about injustice, but at the same
time inflict injustices upon others, then my task as a political theorist becomes quite hollow
and meaningless. It is only when I make every attempt to be a good human being, treating
others as equals. that my task as a liberal theorist is, in any sense. meaningful.
Interpretive horizons can shift. The communitarian story which does not in any way
attempt to constrain narrative with transhistorical standards is implausible. The communitarian
wants to acknowledge the validity of moral vocabularies only with certain historical
interpretatiw horizons. Kymlicka. like myself. wants to argue that liberalism is a metanarratiw
that can evaluate all moral vocabularies because of its normativity. "Open-societieg' which
emphasize equality and pluralism embody the ideal moral vocabulary. There is undoubtedly a
sense of risk involved in an open-ended society. A culture which did not take extraordinary
steps to protect itself would perhaps change radically owr a period of time. I think that the
possibility of radical culture change is the price to pay for individual liberty and an insurance
against the tYranny of the majority. The minority could be thought of as a microcosm of the
larger society. While minority cultures are protected from the tyranny of the majority culture by
collective rights. members of the minority culture are protected from the tyranny of the
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majority of their Individual cultures by Individual rights.
By examining the position of women In aboriginal communities. I argued that liberalism
Is a transhlstorical narrative. I tried to do this by showing how aboriginal women are not Just
responding to white liberalism. but rather that their concerns have transhlstorical validity. At
this point. I would like to use liberalism in an examination of aboriginal cultures (in particular
religion).
I do not want to leave the impression that if the problem of equality for women In
Indian communities is settled. then there will automatically be Justice for Indian people.
Justice must be thought of as a cluster concept which contains many elements which cannot
be narrowed to one component Clearly. justice must also involve recognition of asymmetrical
federalism and the right to develop language instruction for native languages. The openness
of the society might be limited by such a concept to an extent. but the rights of individuals
would not be overly infringed upon with such a measure as mandatory language education.
Interpretative horizons shift in religious matters as well. Kymlicka brings up the
example of the Pueblo Indians. He writes: ItSomeAmerican Indian bands are essentially
theocracies. with an official religion" (Kymlicka 1992: 195) Thus. in these cases. there Is risk
that the horizon of meaning becomes closed and static. People are not free to question the
values of the community. There is allowed to be only one interpretation of life. traditional
Pueblo religion. that cannot be threatened. There is no thinking outside of the system of
thought- the system of interpreting reality. Any change to the status quo is perceived as a
threat to the culture. Undoubtedly. individual Pueblo Indians might become dissatisfied with
some aspects of traditional life. They are. in Kymlicka's story, free to question the value of the
elements of their cultural narratives: "The ability of each member of the Pueblo reservation. for
example. to live in the community is not threatened by allowing Protestant members to
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express their religious beliefs" (Kymlicka 1992: 196). While some individual Pueblos
undoubtedly will not want to practice their traditional religion (or perhaps not all of it). this
does not mean that they have ceased being Pueblo Indians. While cultures change. there has
to be a degree of continuity. Habermas writes: "Apparently. traditions can retain legitimizing
force only as long as they are turned out of interpretive systems that guarantee continuity and
identity" (Habermas 1975: 71). Changes in cultures are typically a function of the tradition
from which they emerge.
In his recent book, MuhicultursJ Citizenship. Kymlicka retums to the example of the
Pueblos. He notes that lithe tribal government of the Pueblo Indians discriminates against
those members of the tribe who reject the traditional religion of the group" (Kymlicka 1995:
153). While the collective rights of the Pueblo people are protected, the rights of individual
Pueblos are violated:
Indeed, restricting religious freedom... violates one of the reasons liberals have for wanting to
protect cultural membership- namely. that, membership in a culture enables informed choice
about how to lead one's life. These sorts of internal restrictions cannot be justified or defended
wlhin a liberal conception of minority rights (Kymlicka 1GGS: 153).
Likewise. the Pueblo community, while having collective rights. violates the rights of
individuals. Kymlicka points to the Ottoman empire where groups were protected. but
individuals within these groups had no individual rights: liThe millet system was, in effect, a
federation of theocracies. It was a deeply conservative and patriarchal society, antithetical to
the ideals of personal liberty endorsed by liberals from Locke to Kant to Mill" (Kymlicka
1995:157). While Kymlicka defends group rights, he also defends the rights of individuals
within these groups.
Thus. Kymlicka's defense of rights has two layers: 1) the rights of groups, and 2) the
rights of individuals. Kymlicka's position incorporates a defense of both: ..... a liberal view
requires freedom whhinthe minority group, and equality between the minority and majority
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groups..." (Kymllcka 1995: 154). If Kymlicka only included the rights of groups In his position,
then he would be a communitarlan. The existence of the group right would defend a common
idea of the Good. But, by including the second item, Kymlicka's position is comfortably
liberal. The rationale for defending group rights within Kymlicka's position was not to defend
necesssrllya common notion of the Good, but rather it was to respect the context of choice
for individuals:
Liberalism is committed to (perhaps even defined by) the view that individuals should have the
freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the traditional practices of their
community, should they come to see them as no longer worthy of their allegiance (KymHcka
1995: 152).
The above examples demonstrate something fundamental about the view of the self
that I am adopting. I am advocating a view of the self which can change and adapt itself to
new conditions. One can critically evaluate one's culture and choose to reject certain aspects
of this culture. People are not cuhursl robots. and can reject items from their cultural
narratives. One such example Is the treatment of women within patriarchal societies. Another
example is the choice to reject certain aspects of traditional religions. In fad, I would say that
the liberal cultural ethic that I advocate allows people to withdraw from their cultures if they
choose. This is another instance of a clash between a liberal point of view and that of a
traditionalist. The liberal will always see the possibility of cultural change, whereas the
traditionalist wants to ossify practices and create a cultural metaphysics. Here I take
metaphysics to be defined in the Rortian and Diltheyian sense (i.e. closure of interpretatiw
horizons).
I would like to add one thing about the transhistorical validity of liberalism in this
context. Liberalism is the ability to think outside of a system of thought. This entails the notion
of revisability and the notion that historical narratiws of various communities can change. The
traditional narrative of medieval Europe was dismantled through the advent of the modem
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science. Because there was no development of the natural sciences In aboriginal
communities, one may accuse aboriginal people of living in a closed system. I do not think
that there is much to this argument. Aboriginal people have had a radical Enlightenment. This
does not mean that we have been radically "enlightened" by European culture, but that our
contad with European peoples has forced us to rethink our traditional interpretive
frameworks. We have experienced firsthand the adverse effeds of modem technology (I will
explore this in greater depth in the next chapter), demonstrating the fusion of theoryl pradlce
in our lived experience of instrumental rationality.
A rethinking of liberalism has to introduce the notion of constraint or adequacy. It
cannot be communitarian, or a Rortian free-for-all (Rorty's postmodem rhetoric unfortunately
has a great deal of currency, and is considered fashionable by many). What I say about Rorty
also applies to Indian leaders who wish to keep things the same with an appeal to traditions.
The notion of transhistorical (quasi-Kantian) liberalism stresses the existence of human nature
(which many in the postmodern camp deny), making a universal, hermeneutical conversation
possible with different interpretive horizons fusing with each other creating a rich and vibrant
metanarrative. Pluralism, at its best, seeks to take the best from every narrative to construd
an ideal metanarrative. The environmental ethic of aboriginal people is one such item that can
be added to the metanarrative of our age (one of the subjeds of the next chapter). This
interpretation of historical narratives is a hermeneutical conversation that involves all of
humankind and is transhistorical.
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ENDNOTES:
1. Perhaps the term Anglo might appear somevvhat slangy but I think that it does the job that
I want it to do. The term Is undoubtedly used extensively in contemporary political discussion
and is useful as a rhetorical term. Originally. in the course of the history of this country. the
term would refer to people of a British background. Through time. various European groups
have gravitated towards this culture group. and I would charaderize it as consisting of
persons who speak English as their primary language.
2. The gypsies are a counter example of where this would not really apply. Also. Jewish
people before 1948 really had no state and being Jewish was not tied to being in a location
as Jews were living all over the world.
3. Except that Macintyre thinks that one vocabulary. namely that of Catholic Christianity. has
transhlstorical validity. This poses a deep and fundamental paradox for Macintyre and anyone
who wishes to follow his line of thought.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE LIMITS OF REASON:
TOWARDS AN OPEN-ENDED CONCEPTION OF
RATIONALITY
A hermeneutical approach presumes that there is a shared system of understanding
between individuals. grounded within interpretative horizons. As I have argued, our
experience of reality is not uniwrsalistic and thin, but rather it is thick and lived. The
interpretative discourse in which we participate frames the manner in which we understand
the world around us, acting as a sort of filter. No interpretative horizon can fully describe the
phenomenological possibilities of experience. Conceptual holes exist and there will always be
a difference between the discourse (narrative or interpretatiw horizon) and the world of
possible experience. I differ from others in the hermeneutical tradition. notably Gadamer,
because I argue, to a degree that they do not. that the materiality of reality constrains our
interpretations. I hold that· the physical world and the findings of science constrain narratives
and discourse. I shall explore in this chapter the impact of modem science upon the manner
in which we think about "objedivity,··lIconstraim," and "adequacy." The narrative of science, at
least according to Gellner and Taylor, is the most adequate interpretation of reality.
In both the Greek and modem Enlightenments, a tension existed between objectivity
and pluralism. In the modem Enlightenment, the natural sciences dismantled the traditional
narrative of established Christianity. Because of the successes of the natural sciences,
scientific methodology was considered Paradigmatic of rational adivity. Liberalism, with its
more pluralistic conception of rationality. developed contemporaneously and was a produd of
the same historical impulses. The deconstrudion of the moral narrative of established
Christianity left a vacuum in terms of a collective. societal conception of the Good. The
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narrative of science punched holes Into the conceptual scheme of established Christianity. To
some extent liberalism has filled these gaps. Science developed Into the Ideology of
instrumental rationality which. at least In part, seeks to dominate the earth for primarily
intersubjective interests. In this Chapter, I shall outline several critiques of instrumental
rationality. In the end, I shall argue for a meta-hermeneutical conversation which will expand
the limits of rationality. While I discuss several critiques of science. I view science as providing
a basis for constraining all contemporary narratives.
Susan Bordo in her book, The Right to Objectivity: Essays on CIIneslan/8m and
Culture, laments the process whereby the holistic thinking of the medieval life world moves
towards a more instrumental. reductlonist mode of thinking. Bordo sketches the climate
during the period of the early Enlightenment: ·~o longer was there 0 ne true church-
sensationally increased levels of exploration and commerce with other cultures had radically
upset the eurocentricism that prevailed In the medieval era" (Bordo 1987: 13). The "closed
horizon" (to use Dilthey's term) of the medieval period was forcibly opened with the advent of
modem science and also contact with other peoples. The same process occurs, but to a
lesser extent. to the Greeks during their Enlightenment which is fully documented In
Herodotus' Histories. The life-world of the medieval period was both intellectually and
materially changed. Other cultures provide a reference point which ads as the basis for
enabling one to step outside of the norms of the community. The questioning of traditional
values is paradigmatic of the rationality of liberalism.
The PsrsdDx DfEnlightllnlllflntis the tension between the objectlveclaims of science
and the plursJlsticclaims of liberalism. Ernest Gellner sketches this out:
Liberalism, tolerance, pluralism, incline many to find pleasure in the idea of the multiplicity of
means and visions; but the equally reputable and enlightened desire for objectivity and
universality leads to a desire t~ • lust. the world and truth be but one, and not many
(Gellner 1994: 182).
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The liberal plurality of visions conflicts with the objectivity of science. Science was an attempt
to understand universal laws of nature. Universalism found expression also In political terms:
"The pursuit of universals, of the unity of men, is also on occasion inspired by the desire to
underwrite the brotherhood and equality of man" (Gellner 1994: 182). In Gellner's account,
there was originally a need for a plurality of visions but eventually one narrative was prown to
be the most accurate at describing reality. Charles Taylor in his article, "Rationality," offers a
similar argument.
I want to critically examine the pluralistic (or sUbjectMsf} pole of Enlightenment which
stresses self-creation. While a pluralism of interpretative horizons exists, we have to break out
of the hermeneutical circle because I'objective reality" ads as a constraint for narratives. The
"successes" of the modem sciences have decisively framed the manner in which we think
about adequacy and objective reality. Liberalism, like the sciences, attempted to define
reason In universal terms. John Rawls' principles of justice function in ahistorical and thin
terms. After the medieval story was deconstructed, there was a vacuum in the domain of
moral and political philosophy. liberalism filled this vacuum by attempting to "objectively"
ground pluralism. The environmental crisis provides a new historical phenomenon which
forces us to rethink the rationality of both the natural sciences and liberalism (which are
linked). The environmental crisis challenges the intersubjective, human based, interests of
liberalism.
I want to argue that different modes of rationality can complement each other. The
objectivism of science puts constraints on the narrative of liberalism. Conversely, instrumental
rationality has limitations. The narrative of liberalism already plays a central role in the
metanarrative of contemporary discourse. In addition, an examination of Douglas Cardinal's
aesthetic philosophy, will help us to understand the limitations of instrumental reason. These
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different modes of interpreting reality allow us to see different phenomenological aspects of
common objects. With this rethinking of rationality, the philosophy of aboriginal people can
also be incorporated into the metanarrative of our age.
I shall be looking at two examples of instrumental rationality and in turn three major
critiques of instrumental rationality. I think that I should try to define instrumental rationality.
Habermas articulates the deconstruction of tradition in terms of changes of an older
communal narrative: "Industrial society frees itself from historical traditions and orients itself to
technical control of natural substrata" (Habermas 1988: 17). The freeing of man from
traditional narratives accelerated the manner in which human beings could instrumentally
dominate nature. In an article entitled, '7he Undermining of Westem Rationalism through the
Critique of Metaphysics: Martin Heidegger," Habermas writes that "with the collapse of
religious metaphysical world views, all normative standards have lost credit before the single
remaining authority-science" (Habermas 1987: 111). There have been many successes as a
result of the application of science. In the dialectic of Enlightenment, one can see an ongoing
tension between the old Ideas of nomos and physis (Which I talked about in chapter one).
The emergence of the natural sciences allows one to think outside of the preexisting
historical tradition. The strong pole of Enlightenment is positivism, which Habermas defines as
the view that "[k]nowledge is Implicitly defined by the achievement of the sciences"
(Habermas 1981: 62). Habermas adds later: "Positivism stands and falls with the principle of
scientism, that is that the meaning of knowledge is defined by what the sciences do and can
thus be adequately explicated through the methodological analysis of scientific procedures"
(Habermas 1981: 67). Positivism, with its deconstrudion of the traditional narrative, allows us
a measure of freedom from the more traditional narrative: "... it frees subjeds from the
organized compulsions of the natural substratum and gives them access to a sphere of
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sUbjective freedom beyond society" (Habermas 1988: 17). Eventually. positivism (as defined
by Habermas). becomes a dominant narrative Itself: "As instrumental. reason assimilated Itself
to power and thereby relinquished Its critical force- that is the fins/disclosure of ideology
critique applied to itself" (Habermas 1987: 119). The first two phases of the dialedic of
Enlightenment are: 1) the deconstrudion of the older narrative and 2) the emergence of the
method of the previous deconstruction as a dominant narrative Itself.
I devote a considerable amount of time to examining Descartes' relationship and
importance to the Enlightenment. I would like to make a feN remarks about my rationale for
focus on him. First. many in the literature focus on Descartes (Bordo. Heidegger and
indirectly. Douglas cardinal). Second. in terms of philosophical literature. Descartes
emblematically represents the shift from medieval philosophy to modern philosophy and thus
has a great deal of historical importance. Third. while Descartes' own scientific endeavours
may not have been successful (his innovations in geometry. however. were certainly
Influential). his philosophy senles as a sort of manifesto for the scientific revolution. central to
my argument about instrumental rationality is the notion of detachment and antiholistic
thinking. Both of these themes are quite pronounced in Descartes.
In the age of Descartes. orthodox Christianity began to lose its hegemony over truth. A
small core of humanists. including Descartes. began to question the Catholic story. Despite
his ultimate rebellion against the Church. there are many references in the Cartesian corpus
to his Catholic education: "But we are now freed from the oath which bound us to our
master's words and are old enough to be no longer SUbject to the rod" (Descartes 1985a: 11).
He intimates in this passage that he is ready to move to a new way of thinking. He has left
the "control of [his] teacher" (Descartes 1985a: 115). In another passage. he refers to his
catholic education as his "old foundations" (Descartes 1985a: 117). He talks about students
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who are still clouded In their understanding of truth: "... saturated with his opinions In their
youth (since these are the only opinions taught in the schools) and this has so dominated
their outlook that they have been unable to arrive at knowledge of true principles" (Descartes
1985a: 182).
The project of the Enlightenment was. at least at first, to break down the power of
established Christianity through the development of an autonomous new science and
methodology. Descartes writes at the beginning of the Meditations about his doubt: "Some
years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my
childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently
based on them" (Descartes 1985b: 12). Through doubt. Descartes is calling into question the
interpretative framework which fonnerly grounded all of his beliefs. Descartes continues: "
realized that It was necessary. once in the course of my life. to demolish everything
completely and start right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the
sciences that was stable and likely to last" (Descartes 1985b: 12).
Essential to liberalism is the ability to think outside of a system. The older system, or
interpretative horizon. acts as a sort of reference point. The influx of new experience and data
allows the interpretative horizon to be understood from a different perspective. In the
Principles ofPhilosophy. this notion of Descartes as revolutionary is found quite clearly.
Descartes writes: II The seeker after truth, must once in the course ofhis life, doubt everything,
as fsr as it is possible" (Descartes 19858: 193). The ability to call into question many Items
that are within an interpretative horizon is a qUintessential liberal act. Doubt allows one to
question the foundations of any interpretative horizon. Descartes is prUdent by putting
constraints upon the dOUbting process: II The scope ofthe will is wider than that of the
intellect, and this is the csuse ofelTor"(Descartes 1985a: 204). Thus. while doubt may help
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deconstruct faulty narratives. it is constrained by objective reality.
Descartes used an Archimedean point in order to ground his narrative to prevent an
infinite regression of justification. Descartes felt that it was essential for concepts and ideas to
be clearly delineated from each other. These are simple epistemic fads. But the foundation of
his whole system is the doubting ego. Descartes writes: II '/ am thinking, therefore / exist'was
so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of
shaking it. I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the
philosophy I was seekingII (Descartes 1985a: 127). Schouls adds that Descartes' I'system of
knowledge, the cogito is indeed Descartes' Archimedean point" (Schouls 1989: 50). The
doubting self is similar to the self in John Rawls' original position. Neither function in the
context of a community, but rather fundion in terms of individualistic introspection. Both the
Cartesian ego and the Rawlsian self are stripped of their contingent properties and
understand reality from an ahistorical perspective.
The cartesian proJed stressed the causation between necessity and rationality:
IIReason or the truth dominates the will when we pay attention to what is clear and distindll
(Schouls 1989: 46). Descartes summarizes the point of the method in the DiscoufSe on
Method. IIrightly conducting one's reason and seeking the truth in the scienceS' (Descartes
1985a: 186). The only way we can understand truth is by overcoming the particularities of our
cultural and historical communities: "Overcoming partiality and obtaining facility in the method
is to allow one to break through cultural relativism into the realm of absolute truth" (Schouls
1989: 27). According to Descartes. reason is ahistorical and not embodied in any historical
culture.
Descartes stresses clarity and is fundamentally oppossed to holistic notions. Ideas are
clear "per se"and not "inter sliud (Descartes 1985a: 22). Contextuality. for Descartes, clouds
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reason and truth. Things are best understood when they are Isolated and made into universal
propositions. In order to be considered as knowledge, Ideas have to meet these -criteria of
clarity and distinctiveness" (Descartes 1985a: 2». These simple ideas also serve to ground
the narrative and prevent an infinite justification regress: Ufhese criteria therefore demand that
at the foundation of science there have to be utterly simple ideas ..." (Descartes 1985a: 20).
With this starting point, dedudion becomes the method through which the ideas are related
to each other. Descartes writes: "Dedudlon, therefore, remains as our sole means of
compoUnding things in a way that enables us to be certain of their truth" (Descartes 19858:
48).
Peter Schouls argues that all of the key concepts of Enlightenment philosophy exist in
Descartes' writings. Schouls writes of Descartes' projed that it "s about freedom, mastery
and progress. primarily as these concepts fundion in Descartes' works. The triad represents
the core of Enlightenment thought" (Schouls 1989: 3). Descartes believed in "universality of
reasona (Schouls 1989: 23). Schouls adds: uDescartes assumes that truth is objective,
absolute and attainable only in one partiCUlar way" (Schouls 1989: 23). Historical
understanding burdens the clear apprehension of the truth: "cultural context burdens him with
the kind of prejudice which seems to make progess [sic] ... impossible" (Schouls 1989: 65).
There was also the freedom from "social oppression" (Schouls 1989: 4) to which I have
already alluded.
Part of this process was masteryover nature which resulted in historical progress. The
new science and methodology was to provide the foundations for a new narrative that would
ameliorate the living conditions of humanity. Descartes summarizes his pragmatic project
which is a "practical philosophy which might replace the speCUlative philosophy taught in the
schools" (Descartes 1985a: 142). In this century, it is easy to see ways in which narratives of
118
instrumental rationality have been morally problematic and must be partially deconstrueted.
Schouls writes: "It is through mechanics, medicine. and morals that I gain mastery over nature
and so increase my autonomy" (Schouls 1989: 101). A pragmatic programme in philosophy
actively seeks to change the material conditions surrounding the life-world of human beings.
Descartes states that the goal of his project is to gain "mastery of nature" (Descartes 1985:
143). Schouls adds: "Reason serves the passion for dominion; scientific knowledge is the
instrument which is to make me the master of my fate" (Descartes 1985: 103).
Descartes wrote before the scientific revolution transformed, in a material manner, the
way in which human beings led their lives. Many people worked in difficult and toiling
conditions with limited economic reward. Furthermore, many socio-political obstacles
prevented people from challenging the way in which existing wealth was distributed. In the
previous Weltsnshsuungen of the medieval world, power was in the hands of the church and
aristocrats. Nature still dominated human lives through natural disasters and disease. The vast
majority of people experienced material impoverishment with the existing wealth being
controlled by religious and political elites. Because the elites controlled the flow of material
wealth, they had the capacity to shape and determine the dominant narrative. Political and
religious elites attempted to jUstify their hegemony over power and wealth through the
doctrine of the divine right of kings. The doctrine provided a means of legitimating the
discourse of the elites as well as their control of wealth.
Many individuals of European political communities were subordinated by the closure
of the interpretative horizon of the medieval age and also by the unfair distribution of wealth. It
was against the interest of the dominant elite groups to change the narratives and
distributions of wealth. In order to shatter the eqUilibrium between the discourse (interpretative
horizon) and the material conditions of the age, a revolution of both ideology and material
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means of production was necessary. The modem Enlightenment contained the necessary
conditions for changing the modes of production for both meaning (e.g. interpretative
frameworks) and materiality (e.g. the ability to instrumentally manipulate the physical world).
By destroying the hegemony of traditional practices, freeclom for the majority of people
became possible.
Schouls notes that one of the key Enlightenment ideals is to be free from the "arbitrary
domination of othersll (Schouls 1989: 4). Ironically, the instrumental rationality of modem
science has done much to facilitate the domination of non-western peoples inclUding
aboriginal Canadians Qwill say more about this in later sections). Throughout this chapter, I
will examine the cartesian notion of progress, which still has currency in contemporary
discourse. Descartes offers us a linear, IIclosedll conception of progress. In its place, I hope
to offer a more open-ended model of rationality. In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind,
Descartes defines method:
Bya 'method' I mean reliable rules which are easy to apply and such that if one foUows them
exactly, one will never take what is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one's mental efforts,
but will gradually and constantly increase one's knowledge till one arrives at a true
understanding of everything within one's capacity (Descartes 1985a: 14).
Because of the far-reaching impact that the Cartesian project has had upon the
modem world, Schouls thinks of llDescartes as Revolution~1I (Schouls 1989: 14). Descartes
wanted to create a new, objective foundation, upon which secure knowledge could be
systematically developecl. The cartesian project pUlverized medieval metaphysics and pushed
for a more pragmatic philosophy of instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality was touted
as the true way to understanding, a universal reason. Reason forced people to think outside
of the old system of thought and to forge a new mode for understanding the world: "Reason
commands revolution and, if its command is obeyed, reason promises mastery" (Schouls
1989: 107). Later, we will see how Taylors remarks echo this belief. Schouls acknowledges
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the Inherent tension between this objectivity of reason and the promise of freedom. It
demonstrates the dialectical tension between objectivity and pluralism. The roots of both
instrumental scientific rationality (which purports to be objectiviJ} and liberal rationality (which
purports to be pJursJlstiq, can be found in Descartes.
First, an historically Important articulation of instrumental rationality can be found In
Descartes. With the shattering of the traditional modes of production of the medieval life
world. a new narrative was needed to fill the interpretative vacuum. Ironically, the freedom
brought about by the modern Enlightenment eventually led to the subordination of non-
western peoples and also the physical world. The new modes of production allowed human
beings, who were originally Europeans, to more effectively manipUlate the material world (and
also other groups of human beings). The ideology of science and the corresponding changes
of production promised to free human beings from the shackles of the oppressive socio-
political structures of the medieval life world. Because of the Impressive manner In which the
narrative of science has allowed us to instrumentally manipulate the material wor1d, it does
demand a certain degree of attention. Descartes' writings articulate the theoretical basis for a
new methodology which supported the emergence of the project of the scientific revolution.
Second, the roots of liberal individualism can be found in Descartes. My position does
not necessarily entail that Descartes' position was itself a causal agent In the emergence of
liberalism, but rather that it provides a reflection and possible theoretical justification for the
liberal onto logy of individualism. The dOUbting ego moved outside the narrative and engaged
in an act of deconstruction. In chapter two. I examined the relationship between individual
and community: a balance must exist between individual rights and collective rights (or the
right of self-determination for nations). An individual. like the Cartesian doubting ego. can
always question an interpretative horizon.
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Comparison can be made between the Cartesian doubting ego and the 1971 Rawlslan
view of the self. For both, the doubting process was an individual process. Descartes'
doubting ego is a heuristic device that represents a process in which every IndMdual could
engage. Rawls' process of reflectlw equilibrium Is also such a heuristic device. Both heuristic
devices assume an ahistorlcal or universalistic stance. An Important distindion must be made
between the individualism of both Rawls and Descartes, and mine. While I stress that the self
is not necessarily bound to an interpretatiw narrative, I hold that the self always reacts and
responds to thick and lived experience. Unlike Rawls and Descartes, I hold that the doubting
process, the questioning of traditional mores, must invoNe others in a hermeneutical
conversation, if it is to be meaningful. The communal process of determining a political
consensus, in which many people engage in a hermeneutical conversation, has been
embodied many times in history. Traditionally, Indian people sat in circles to determine a
course of adion with each participant having the right to speak.
A politics of Othemess creates hierarchies with the dominant group SUbordinating
other groups. Descartes sees his methodology as the distinguishing mark of European
human beings: ''Thus we consider that it is this philosophy alone which distinguished us from
the most savage and barbarous peoples, and that a nation's civilization depends on the
superiority of the philosophy which is pradical there" (Descartes 1985a: 180). Descartes
distinguishes people from animals. Descartes notes:
The brute beasts, who have only their bodies to preserve, are continually occupied in looking
for food to nourish them; but human beings, whose most important part is the mind, should
devote their main efforts to the search for wisdom, which is the true food of the mind
(Descartes 1985a: 1eo).
It is only human beings in Descartes' writings that are considered sentient beings because of
their mental capacities. Furthermore, animals are described as "automatons" (Descartes 1988:
44).
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Descartes also describes the body. Including those of humans. as "machine"
(Descartes 1988: 44). In Descartes' ontOlogy, an almost unbridgeable rift emerges between
the mind and the body. The objectification of the world is an important component of
scientmc rationality. Descartes, in another passage describes animals as machines: "For we
can conceive of a machine so constructed that it utters words. and even utters words which
correspond to bodily actions causing a change In Its organs (e.g. If you touch it in one spot It
asks what you want of it, if you touch it in another it cries out that you are hurting it, and so
on" ..... (Descartes 19858: 140).
In the Treatise on Msn Descartes writes: "I suppose the body to be nothing but a
statue or machine made of earth ...II (Descartes 1985a: 99). The body Itself is made into
"Other.11 The res cogitans is a separate substance which can function independent of the body
and is paradigmatic of the whole enterprise of ahistorical Reason. Universal principles are
derived IndePendently from embodied experience which I think is one of the defining features
of instrumental rationality (and what Douglas Cardinal calls I'he ego-manl,.
I wanted to show the historical roots of instrumental rationality through my discussion
of Descartes. I want now to turn to Charles Taylor to illustrate the fad that the essential tenets
of instrumental reason have not changed. Charles Taylor's article, "Rationality,11 is a
contemporary argument for a similar position.
Charles Taylor is undoubtedly one of the most important theorists of our day. His
contributions to political philosophy have been immense and he is one of the leaders of the
communitarian camp in political philosophy. He stresses the thickness of our experience
throughout his writings and implies that there are authoritative horizons which ground the
actions and intentionalities 01 agents. However. unlike Rawls and Descartes, Taylor stresses
the importance of community. Thus, Descartes' mode of instrumental rationality could be
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called Individualistic, whereas Taylor's could be called communltarlan.
In his essay, IIRatlonality," Taylor argues for an instrumental conception of rationality by
comparing It to brands of rationality found In other cultures. By comparing the different
interpretative horizons of different cultures, Taylor Is engaged In a sort of henneneutical act.
Taylor asks the hermeneutical question: II••• are there standards of rationality which are valid
across cultures? II (Taylor 1994: 88). The question brings In the notion of the possibility of
commensurability between two systems of Interpretation. He argues for a Itweak version of
incommensurability" (his term), but he does this in such a way that the criteria of adequacy
are maintained. Taylor brings up the sensationalistic and simplistic example of Azande
witchcraft to demonstrate the incommensurability between European and non-European
traditions. He uses this example to argue against Peter Winch who had discussed the Azande
case. By using such a sensationalistic example, Taylor (and others) make it easy to label non-
western pattems of behaviour as irrational. He creates a politics of Otherness by seeking to
show that non-European views are inherently different from European ones.
Taylor 0 utlines the following set of tenets of Azande witchcraft, namely their views that:
1) after death, the intestines of suspeded witches are examined, checking for a 'Witchcraft
substance.II and 2) witchcraft is inherited. Given beliefs (1) and (2) it would seem that: IIA very
few post-mortem results would settle the question for everyone for all timell (Taylor 1994: 88).
Yet, the Azande continue to treat the question of whether person X or Y was a witch as open-
ended. Evans-Pritchard. whose position Taylor outlines in the article. takes these beliefs to be
irrational because they are contradldory.
Peter Winch in his article. IIUnderstanding a Primitive Society.II argues that the Azande
are not irrational. The thesis of his paper is that western people have a unique standard of
rationality. and that consequently these standards cannot be applied to the Azande. Winch
124
argues for a pluralism of standards of rationality and also for incommensurability between
interpretative horlzons. There are no tests of adequacy of interpretation of reality and this
represents the negative pole of Enlightenment- that of self-creation. The negative pole of
Enlightenment stresses freedom and pluralism. I hold that Winch's position about the
incommensurability between the different interpretative frameworks amounts to relatMsm. This
incommensurability must be made concrete in order to differentiate it from Taylors notion of
incommensurability. Winch's thought is inspired by Wlttgenstein's thought. There is a stress
on the incommensurability of different Iife-worids.
Habermas stresses the paradox of Enlightenment in Wittgenstein's thought:
In Wlttgenst8in's late phUosophy, the disempowered monopolistic language of the natural
sciences has given way to a pluralism of natural languages that no longer capture reality
theoretically within the framework of a single worldview, but rather practically within different
lifeworlds (Habermas 1geS: 126).
As long as signs can be cohesively related to each other. then sets of signs can be thought
of as coherent. One could even Imagine a member of the Azande culture coming up with a
rule which could link beliefs (1) and (2). above, together.
If there is no notion of adequacy of justification. then it seems we have arrived at a
Rortlan free-for-all. For Winch. the language game of the Azande cannot be translated into the
language game of modern, western culture. I think that Winch is begging the question of the
impossibility of translating different language games into each other. In his own work. Winch
is interpreting the Azande belief system which he could not do if this belief system was
incommensurable with western culture. Central to Winch's project is the exploration of foreign
cultures. Habermas writes: "Getting to know a foreign culture is possible only to the extent to
which a successful translation between it and one's own culture has taken place" (Habermas
1988: 137). The adivityof fusing interpretative horizons is the hermeneutical conversation of
interchanges of meaning. It is lithe field of hermeneutics. which Wlttgenstein did not enter"
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(Habermas 1988: 137). Translation and interpretation require the possibility of
commensurability between different interpretative horizons. While Winch needs this for his
project. his radical relativism makes a rational bridgehead between different interpretative
frameworks impossible.
Wlttgenstein moves from radical objectivism to a radical pluralism of standards of
rationality. There is a movement from a science based understanding of rationality to an
essentially coherentist conception grounded solely In language. The problem with
Wlttgenstein, as well as, Winch is that is there is no notion of objective constraint in their
pictures of rationality. A sort of Rortian free for all emerges. Wittgenstein, like Rorty, attacks
the notion of metalanguage and metanarrative, pushing instead for a radical sort of
SUbjectivism: 'Wittgenstein ... was doubtful about the conditions of possibility of a
metalanguage" (Habermas 1988: 132).
Taylor cheerfully grants Winch that different forms of life are incommensurable (but
not that they are so to the point where we cannot compare them). The activities of these
language games, those of the Azande and also of modem science, cannot be directly
compared and translated into each other's system of interpretation. Taylor holds that the two
interpretative framevvorks are different but he has a different rationale for this than Winch.
"Two activities are incompatible in pradice when as a matter of fad you couldn't carry them
both on at the same time" (Taylor 1994: 98). The rules of language games contradid each
other. Taylor adds: "For the rules which partly define these games prescribe actions in
contradidion to each other" (Taylor 1994: 98). He uses the games of football and chess to
illustrate his point. Using the example of the comparison between chess and football, Taylor
notes that the notion of inconsistency does not encompass enough to be an adequate
definition of rationality, for one cannot transport the rules of one game into another.
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Unlike Winch, Taylor Is not saying that there Is no metalanguage or metaconversation
which would inevitably involve all cultures. Taylor does not grant that there are no
transcultural standards through which we could jUdge different cultures. Both cultures are
simply using different rules to construct different pictures of the world. Taylor adds that
"incommensurable standards are rivals" (Taylor 1994: 99). The picture that Winch gives us is
one depicting both cultures qUietly go on playing their language games in isolation of each
other. Taylor rightly points out, that the "successes" of the natural sciences force a
comparison between the two. Technology forces us to take the scientific narrative seriously,
and impels one to question traditional narratives, and this standing outside allows us to note
conceptual holes.
Taylor holds that modern, western culture describes the world more corredly than
older, non-westem interpretative horizons. The success that the natural sciences have had in
instrumentally manipUlating the physical universe seems to verify this. Taylor defines his
notion of instrumentality:
The basic point is that given the kind of beings we are, embodied and active in the world, and
given the way that scientific knowledge extends and supersedes our ordinary understanding of
things, it is impossible to see how it could faD to yield further and more far-reaching recipes for
action (Taylor 1994: 101).
Increased scientific knowledge allows human beings to manipulate the world in more effective
ways. The ability to manipUlate the physical universe is, in many ways, the fulfilment of
Descartes' dream of progress. Increased technological manipulation cannot be ignored: "...
once a spectaCUlar degree of technological control is achieved, it commands attention and
explanation" (Taylor 1994: 102). The reason for this respect is that the narrative of
instrumental rationality corresponds more accurately to the extemal world than to other
narratives.
Because of the greater degree of accuracy, the narrative of modem science is more
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rational. The distortion of conceptual schemes gradually decreases over time as a more
accurate correspondence to objective reality is achieved. He writes: "The superiority of
modem science is that it has a very simple explanation for this: that It has greatly advanced
our understanding of the material world" (Taylor 1994: 103). He implies that the modem world
view has nothing substantial to learn from the world view of the Azande people, whereas the
Azande have everything to learn from the world vieN of modem science. Taylors notion of
incommensurability demands that ultimately we accept only one story. In his position, there is
no possibility of the stories being broken down into elements to create a new story. Later, I
want to show that Taylors eitherl or dichotomy of competing narratives is very misleading.
The alleged cultural superiority of EuroPean culture lies in its superior theoretical
understanding of the world. Taylor notes that this understanding began in Ancient Greece,
and was gradually perfected throughout history. Taylor writes that l'theoretical understanding
aims at a disengaged perspectiveu (Taylor 1994: 89). We attempt not to project ourselves on
to the world, but rather to understand the existing structures of the world. Taylor adds that
"we come to distinguish this disengaged persPedive from our ordinary stances of
engagement, and that one values it as offering a higher- or in some sense superior sense of
realityl (Taylor 1994: 89). This is exadly the sort of disengaged, disembodied notion of
experience that is entailed in Descartes' methodology. I think that we have to be careful to
register the benefits of a disengaged perspedive. One such benefit is that it allows one to
critically examine existing narratives.
There are two elements behind the rationale of bringing up Taylors position. First, I
wanted to show that the idea of instrumental rationality still has a great deal of force and
currency. Peter Schouls, at the end of his book Descartes and the Enlightenmen( explains
one of the benefits of his study. He writes:
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I trust that one fringe benefit of this study Is that It provides a solid foundation for the
deepening of criticism regarding both Descartes and the Enllghtenment thinkers, who drew far
more from his writings than most of their commentators have been willing to admit (Schouls
1989: 185).
Second. I wanted to denote the communltarlan limitations of this line. I haw defined
communitarianlsm previously as closure of the interpretatlw horizon. Taylor sees a definite
closure of interpretation with instrumental rationality, whereas I am arguing for an open-ended
liberal notion of rationality. By bringing the conceptions and vocabularies of "liberal" and
"communltarlanll into my account, I am attempting to demonstrate the manner in which the
human studies can enrich our understanding of the sciences.
I now want to tum to critiques of instrumental rationality from a'feminist, Heideggerlan
perspedive. and aboriginal perspectives.
Feminist scholarship, like Dilthey. has stressed the manner in which human experience
is lived and embodied which corresponds to the notion of thick experience as found In the
political philosophy literature (which I dealt with in the second chapter). The thrust of the
feminist critique of instrumental rationality is to point out the limited manner in which
"objectivity" has been defined. In the Greek Enlightenment and for a large part of the historical
dialectic of the modem Enlightenment, women were excluded from definitions of rationality.
As I have stated earlier, whenewr some entities are excluded from definitions of rationality.
there is a tendency for those in power to dominate the weaker members of the society.
Women 10m such a group.
An important part of the feminist critique is the apparent rupture between theory and
pradice which feminism discems. As many feminists see things. women's experience has
been degraded because it does not fit into the main stream mode of rationality. Jean
Grimshaw underlines the importance of the "insistence on the 'validity' of women's
experience. linked often to a radical distrust of theory" (Grimshaw 1986: 81). Feminists share
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with those in the hermeneutical camp an appreciation of lived experience and the practice of
ideology. Bordo stresses the foundational role of the Cartesian project: ""'e model of
knowledge that Descartes bequeathed to modern science, and that of which he Is often
explicitly described as the father, is based on clarity, certainty and detachment" (Bordo 1987:
14). Within the rubric of instrumental rationality, the self is detached from the world of objects
which brings forth a universalistic and theoretical understanding of our place in the world.
Feminists hold that lived and embodied experience is ignored In the cartesian project
in favour of detached, thin experience. Feminists also criticize the disengaged perspective.
central to the cartesian project is the distancing of the mind from the body which fumishes a
theoretical mode of understanding the world. The subject removes himself or herself from his
or her contingencies in order to obtain an objective perspective. Embodied experience is
discounted in favour of an ideal mental, detached perspective. From a detached, cartesian
perspective, the Other becomes something to instrumentally manipulate. The earth becomes
a set of objects which we can instrumentally manipulate for intersubjective interests. When
groups of human beings and the earth are seen as Other, they are conceptualized as means
rather than ends. A politics of hierarchy and Otherness has occurred historically between
male and female, human beings and animals, and between dominant and minority cultures.
Grimshaw goes on to write: "One of the central themes of feminism has been the
importance of women's experience, and one of its central enterprises has been to show how
a great deal of male theorizing about women has tended to deny, invalidate or be unable to
account for this experience" (Grimshaw 1986: 75). Throughout wide expanses of the
discourse of westem rationality. women have been marginalized in that discourse, and this
marginalization has been taken to imply irrationality: "Commonly, women's perceptions of
social reality have indeed been denied, suppressed or invalidated, and women have been
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labelled 'deviant' or 'sick' if they refused to accept some dominant definition of their situation"
(Grimshaw 1986: 83). Steven Fuller writes that a feminist critique of science will be particularly
valuable because women "Iack a clear vested interest in its maintenance" (Fuller 1993: 32).
Susan Hekman (Hekman 1991) argues throughout her book GenderandJ<nowledgethat
women have been excluded from mainstream definitions of rationality. "Objedive"talk
grounds this exclusion in authority.
Many feminists attack the pretension of authority in science. Sandra Harding writes:
"Objedivism insists that scientific claims can be produced only through dispassionate,
disinterested. value-free. point-of-viewless, objedive inquiry procedures. and that research
generated or guided by feminist concerns obviously cannot meet such stands" (Harding 1990:
87). Feminists. like Dilthey. want to embody experience and attack the possibility of a
detached perspedive. Harding in "Feminist Justificatory Strategies" suggests quite strongly
this position:
Once the Archimedean, transhistorical agent of knoWledge is deconstruded into constantly
shifting, wavering, recombining, historical groups, then the world that can be understood and
navigated with the assistance of Archimedes's map of perfect perspective also disappears
(Harding 1989: 199).
She links her position to Gadamer. Wittgenstein and Rorty (Harding 1989: 189). All of these
thinkers attack the notion and possibility of universal narratives which discount local
experience.
Thinkers such as Harding and many other fe~inists stress the concrete or lived notion
of experience. Grimshaw contrasts concrete thinking with abstrad thinking:
To look at a person or situation abstractly is to 'abstract'- that is to, discount or think away- the
unique or particular features of that person or situation and see it as coming under some
general concept or category. To judge concretely is to refuse to discount such unique or
particular features (Grimshaw 1986: 204).
Grimshaw's alerts the reader to the possibility of the limited force of abstradion. Nonetheless,
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abstraction can have a purpose: " 'Abstraction' ... Is neither good nor bad" but rather It is
defined contextually In terms of the "purpose" behind the abstraction (Grimshaw 1986: 213).
As I have argued throughout this thesis, thick experience situates the self at a starting point,
but we need to move beyond it to critically examine it. ThUS, both abstract and concrete
thinking are needed.
Helen E. Longino argues that we cannot ever avoid the notion of embodied
experience:
We cannot restrict ourselves simply to the elimination of bias, but must expand our scope to
include the detection of limiting and interpretive frameworks and the findings or
construction of more appropriate frameworks ... Instead of remaining passive with respect to
the data and what the data suggest, we can acknowledge our abRity to affect the course of
knowledge and fashion or favour research programs that are consistent with the values and the
commitments we express in the rest of our lives. From this perspective, the idee of a value-free
science is not just empty, but pernicious (Longino 1989: 212).
ThUS, we can interpret the objective reality of science from a variety of perspectives ancl in the
process engage in a hermeneutical conversation. Contra Harding, Longino is not arguing
against the objedivity of science. Rather, Longino holds that science always occurs in a
context and consequently is part of an interpretative horizon. Any interpretative horizon has a
degree of thickness and is not ahistorical as strong Enlightenment narratives purport
themselves to be. Longino does not hold that just because science is embedded in an
interpretative horizon there are no constraints on it. Instead, she proposes that we understand
the rationality of science as an open-ended activity.
With the emergence of a focus upon instrumental rationality, nature is seen as
something to be exploited for the benefit of human beings. Susan Bordo calls it a
"mechanistic reconstruction of the world" (Bordo 1987: 101). Frechet writes: "The work of
Descartes and Bacon marks a tuming point in the way we apprehend the world" (Frechet
1991: 206). She adds: "For Descartes, nature Is no longer organic and aliw; It is a machine of
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matter and motion that obey mathematical laws" (Frechet 1991: 2(6). Instrumental rationality
creates power: "Consequently, the purpose of science became not merely to know nature but
also to gain power over it" (Frechet 1991: 2(6). Instrumental rationality provides us with a
pidure of philosophy which stresses a detached, theoretical perspedive on the world which
does not consider the moral significance of the Other.
Bordo argues that the medievals saw the cosmos as being feminine:
Both the mechanistic reconstruction of the world and the objectMst reconstruction of
knowledge will be examined as embodying a common psychological structure: a fantasy of
"rebirthing" self and the world. brought in to play the disintegration of the organic, female
cosmos of the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Bordo 1987: 101).
But why does a more holistic understanding of the earth have to be defined as being
feminine? Susan Bordo comes close to falling into the essentialist trap. If instrumental
rationalism is. in fad. masculine, does this mean that men are also inherently this way? If so,
how could men change? It seems that Bordo, at least on some level, is just reverting to
Aristotelian essentialism. Like Aristotle, Bordo defines the two genders as having essential
natures, but at the same time, she gives women a more favourable and desirable essence
when compared to Aristotle.
Essentialism also implies determinism, and I think that it might be somewhat self-
defeating for Bordo to call instrumental rationality inherentlymasculine. If her purpose is to
provide a critique of the status quo, and to open up the interpretative horizon, then it seems
that there should also be the hope that society's narrative could change. If things are
essentiB/~defined (as Bordo thinks they are), then I do not see how change could occur. By
stressing the notion of essence, it seems that the interpretative horizon cannot be changed.
By creatively manipulating the entrenched polarity between masculine and feminine, she
nevertheless reinforces Charles Taylor'S eitherl or dichotomy in narrative construction.
Taylor's argues in his article ."Rationality," that all contemporary narratives must come
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to terms with science. In particular, Taylor argues that such narratives must espouse
instrumental rationality. All narratives that do not endorse instrumental rationality must be
rejected. Taylor understands modemity only from this perspective and sees, consequently, no
redemptive aspects of other narratives (non-westem ones), which could, In turn, supplement
the contemporary discourse about rationality. Instead, all of the elements of other modes of
discourse must be rejected. I, on the other hand, wish to argue that it is always possible to
deconstruct a narrative and then to take elements from it which are strong and reject the rest.
It seems that Bordo, like Taylor, wants to reject narratives in toto.
Denise Frechet also stresses the essentlalistic understanding of gender: "Mathematics
becomes a synonym for superpower and therefore is linked with the masculinity of those
already privileged" (Frechet 1991: 2(7). She also writes: ''The congruence with masculine
modes of thinking has consequences for women, for science, and for society" (Frechet 1991:
211). Like Bordo she is rather extreme In her views and sees modem science as a product of
"uterus envf (Frechet 1991: 210) and she speaks as well of "classical science as modem
man's phallic ritual" (Frechet 1991: 210). Bordo echoes Frechet's point: "Cartesian objectivism
and mechanism ... should be understood as a reaction-formation- a denial of the 'separation
anxiety' described above, facilitated by an aggressive intellectual f1ightfrom the female
cosmos and 'feminine' orientation towards the world" (Bordo 1987: 100). But the move from a
general critique of objective claims of science to gender essentialism is too sudden. Do
experiments which developed electricity demonstrate "uterus envy'? When Einstein dewloped
the theory of relativity was he gUilty of "uterus envy'? Some feminist polemic oversimplifies
complex problems.
If the narrative of instrumental rationality is to be expanded and redefined. there must
be commensurability while cogently pointing out the need to rethink mores. Narratives must
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be able to exchange elements with one another. Descartes. like many other Enlightenment
thinkers. saw the earth as something which could be instrumentally manipulated. The earth
was a machine. Bordo stresses. and I am in full agreement with her. the intersubjective
limitations of Instrumental rationality:
If the transition from the Middle Ages to early modernity can be looked on as a kind of
protracted birth, from which the human being emerges as a decisively separate entity, no
longer continuous with the universe with which it has once shared a soul, so the possibility of
objectivity, strikingly, is conceived by Descartes as a kind of rebirth, on one's own terms, this
time (Bordo 1Q87: 97).
The manner of understanding reality was framed decisively in tenns of human interests.
Bordo argues that the ''feminine" understanding of nature is superior to the "masculine"
understanding of nature. Grimshaw. contra Bordo. argues against Ilan assumption of separate
male and female realities' II (Grimshaw 1986: 82). While Grimshaw holds that there are
different ways of understanding reality. she still does not cast the pluralism of interpreting
reality in terms of gender. Keller similarly argues that a distindion between "(male) objectivity"
and "(female) SUbjectivity" which "denies the possibility of a mediation between the two"
(Keller 1989: 179). In her insightful article. "Feminism and Science.II Keller takes a
hermeneutical approach by seeing science as an object which can be interpreted from many
perspedives. Rather than rejeding the notion of objectivity as Bordo does. Keller wants to
"reconceptualize objedivity" (Keller 1989: 179). A reconceptualization of reality must take into
account feminism. The incorporation of lived experience forces a fusion between theory and
pradice. The relationship between theory and pradice shows the limitations of the dominant
narrative of rationality as it po ints to its finitude and limitations.
Martin Heidegger. one of the strongest critics of instrumental rationality. offers a
similar critique of the objective pretensions of modem science. Like Bordo. Heidegger attacks
the disembodied and detached mode of thinking which began in early modernity and which
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prevails In contemporary discourse about instNmentai rationality. Heidegger has attempted to
deconstruct the Enlightenment ideals of truth and objectivity. His phenomenological-
hermeneutical approach attempts to discem the multiple layerings in which reality (he uses
the term "Being" can be interpreted. One of the main themes of Heidegger's work is that the
understanding of Being has been fragmented and compartmentalized. Such understanding is
obvious in Descartes' writings. Descartes conceives of knowledge as that which can be
clearly and distinctly known. Later, I will examine how this fragmentation of knowledge is
presented in the three Kantian critiques. Also, both Kant and Descartes stress disembodied
and thin experience.
Heidegger stresses, in contrast to the disengaged perspective of Kant. Descartes and
Taylor. the embodied nature of our experience. He writes: "Being in-the-world is essentially
care" (Heidegger 1967: 237). Being does not exist "out there." Rather we come to know Being
through our embodied and historical experience. Because Being is revealed to Dsseln
(Heidegger's term for human beings) through time, different phenomenological possibilities of
objects are presented to us. Heidegger writes: "Dasein is an entity for which. in its Being. the
Being is an issue" (Heidegger 1967: Z36). Dasein refers to the human SUbject. Being, while it
does have an objective or independent existence from us (Being is an object which preexists
interpretation), is constantly being framed by our finite interpretation. Being is always
approached from a certain limited perspective. Every perspective, however, has constraints
and limitations and conceptual holes which arise within any interpretative horizon.
central to Heidegger's position is the idea that Being is always interpreted within a
particular horizon (in this sense he continues the henneneutical tradition of Dilthey). It is not
that the interpretative horizon only refers to symbols within itself. Rather, the interpretative
horizon is a perspectival, finite grasp of Being. Being is the set of objects in the world Which
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preexist the ad of Interpretation. Heldeggers claim is that the dominant mode of rationality in
our age Is Instrumental rationality. Human society and the earth Itself have been completely
transformed by this mode of rationality. Reality and Being are consequently filtered through
this Interpretative horizon and provide the backdrop of our deliberations about the historicity
which surrounds us. While Heidegger holds that all experience Is thick. he also maintains that
experience of modernity has been "ramed" [literal translation of the German term Gestellel1j
by instrumental rationality. I will elaborate on this point later.
Traditionally, liberalism has been concerned only with intersubjedive conceptions of
the Good that have reference to human beings. I argue that the environmental crisis which
faces us presses constraints on our conception of the Good. The environmental crisis
fundions in a similar manner to Habermas' notion of a legitimacy crisis. which forces a critical
examination of the dominant narrative. The dominant narrative of our age is instrumentality
and it must be both deconstruded and critically examined. The constraint is not that of
idealism, but rather of the material conditions imposed by the environmental crisis. We live in
a world whose existence is threatened. We have been extremely alienated from the earth
through the explosion of technology. We live in an age where our ozone layer is being
continually depleted. Consequently. it seems that the earth can no longer support the
interpretation of reality with the exclusive focus on human priorities that it once did. The
"progress" promised by the scientific revolution is being severely challenged. The
environmental crisis. which is the embodiment of the theory and pradise of science.
demonstrates the need to rethink our place in history.
Heidegger's approach is different than Rortys. Rorty and many feminist thinkers decry
theory as alienating. They subvert the dominant ideology, which degrades the lived
experience of marginalized groups. Inevitably, the inner contradidions of the dominant
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narrative (conceptual holes) become apparent. The project of theorists such as Rorty and
feminists such as Bordo is to challenge the hegemony that a certain ideology has over
contemporary discourse. In the case of both of these thinkers, the target is the
Enlightenment's discourse about universality. Whereas Rorty distrusts the role of theory,
Heidegger's fundamental task of restoring a holistic ontology demonstrates his attempt to
deconstruct (through the practice of theoretical examination) the dominant narrative of our
age. It is through his critical examination of lived experience practice that Heidegger differs
from some other thinkers whose primary focus is upon lived experience scholarship. Instead
of merely describing the practice of technology. Heidegger critically examines technology and
grapples with the problems posed by modernity. Instrumental rationality dominates the
discourse of modernity.
By stressing holism, one comes to challenge the climate of Otherness and alienation
created by modemity. By Othemess, I mean the rupturing between the SUbject and object.
Heidegger attempts to bridge the gap between the subject and object through the
hermeneutical act of interpretation. With Heidegger's ontOlogy, there is a link between Oasein
and the world (or the field of Being). Dasein is an extension of Being itself and not something
autonomous of reality. The early" Heldegger used the process of deconstruction to attempt to
discern a fundamental ontology (Heidegger 1967: 41-49). He attempted to stand outside of
the metaphysical tradition of western thought. In chapter one. I analyzed this to some extent,
looking at his relation to Heracleitus.
The later Heidegger uses this same process of deconstruction to critically examine the
historical thickness of the experience of modernity. Unlike others in the hermeneutical
tradition, such as Rorty and Gadamer. Heidegger stresses the relationship of the modern
interpretative horizon to materiality (i.e. the constraining force of the natural sciences). The
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difference between the modem Enlightenment and the Greek enlightenment is the manner In
which reality was materially and instrumentally manipulated. As I stated earlier. the Greek
Enlightenment was more a matter of a revolution of ideas. The modern Enlightenment. on the
other hand. brought forth science which has irrevocably changed our understanding of reality
and has increased our ability to change the material conditions around us. The increase in
wealth brought about by the practice of science. technology. has undoubtedly influenced the
emergence of liberalism and the shattering of the older political order because of the
emergence of new modes of production.
The essence of the Heideggerian project is to rethink fundamental ontology. He sees
Plato and Aristotle. both of whom are essentialists. as laying the foundations for the manner in
which we think about Being. Ballad writes:
... Heiclegger reads Western history as a choice dating from Socrates and Plato, to regard man
as the decisive factor in being. This decision remained for a long time more or less impficlt
until I emerged as the caglo in the philosophy of Descartes, as the I-principle (the I' think ..•11
of Kant, and as the Romantic belief in the Infinite productiveness and self-creativeness of the
ego) (Ballad 1970: 81).
The cogito provided the foundation for the Cartesian system. Later. I will discuss how Kant
incorporates this into his system. Kant moves the emphasis from the objectivity of the cogito,
that Descartes struggled for. to a radical intersubjective interpretation of knowledge. Kant
marks an important tuming point because he rejects the importance of extemality and
materiality of reality. Heidegger's critique of instrumental rationality attacks the objective
pretensions of intersubjective reason.
Heidegger further characterizes the manner in which Being has been depicted in the
Western tradition: ..... a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question of
Being to be superflUOUS. but sanctions its complete neglect" (Heidegger 1967: 21). Instead of
trying to see the whole picture and to engage in holistic thinking (as found in feminist thinking
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and aboriginal philosophy). we, especially in our age of instrumental rationality, tend to
compartmentalize things and concepts. The tendency towards reductionistic thinking is found
in Descartes' notion of clear and distinct ideas, with a corresponding stress on seeing
mathematics as paradigmatic of rational activity: "The Cartesian procedure is to presuppose
that any object (body) belongs to the mathematical and objective world and can be
exhaustively known only within it" (Ballad 1970: 43). Ballad adds: "The technological
interpretation of knowledge follows quite naturally to men of Gastell, men who are possessed
by the cartesian motive to become masters and possessors of nature" (Ballad 1970: 47).
The Gennan term Gestellrefers to a framing of our interpretative discourse which
stresses instrumental rationality. Gestell means a "framing" and replaces the metaphor of
interpretative horizon with the metaphor of an interpretative framework A framework, as
opposed to an interpretative horizon, implies an ossification of a conceptual scheme. In this
view, technology becomes the manner in which we frame and understand reality:
"Technology is a method for calling forth and transfonning the stock of reality according to
will" (Ballad 1970: 48). Science, in a sense, is a sort of Nietzschean will to power and,
ironically loses its status of objectivity and is used to interpret reality for the advantage of
those who wish to instrumentally manipUlate it. Instead of being objective, science merely
generates new possibilities for human exploitation.
Scientific rationality is not the only means of understanding Being. While scientific
rationality is a useful way, it does not exhaust all of the phenomenal possibilities of objects.
The manner in which we utilize different tools in the world, including the task of art making.
detennines the manner in which we comport with Being: tilt is in this process of the use of
equipment that we actually encounter the character of equipment" (Heidegger 19na: 162).
EqUipment is anything which allows and affords Dasein the possibility of constructing a
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conceptual map with which to Interpret Being.
JOrgen Habermas (1975) has demonstrated that the instrumental manner of
comporting with Being has manifested itself in the manner in which western democracies
function. Knowledge becomes very fragmented. Different bureaucrats manipUlate certain
fragments of the whole picture, which threatens to evolve into tyranny and could ultimately
undermine democracy. Modem states adopt this instrumental rationality and knowledge falls
to get distributed to the citizenry. The free interchange of knowledge ceases to be a free
interchange of knowledge. Being is sectioned off and divided into parts which prewnts the
emergence of a holistic. A fractured relationship exists not only'within the microcosm of
bureaucracy. but also within the macrocosm of society. Alienation encroaches and
governments lose their legitimacy. The relationship of scientific, instrumental rationality to
political pradice is pervasive and profound.
As I haw already noted, Taylor and Descartes decisively reject contemplative
metaphysics. While both Descartes and Taylor claim this to be objective, feminist philosophy
engages in a "hermeneutics of suspicion.11 Bordo shows us that Enlightenment thinking
separated human beings from nature in the same manner that happened in the Greek
Enlightenment with the distinction between nomos and physis. I agree with this. but I disagree
that this process is an inherently male one. However. feminist thinkers, along with Heidegger.
attempt to deconstruct the objective pretensions of instrumental rationality. Heideggers notion
of Being-in-the-World has much in common with the feminist (and hermeneutical) notion of
lived experience. According to these models, we understand reality in the context of the
interpretative horizon within which reality is interpreted.
Heidegger's retum to the question of Being invites a more holistic perspective. Uke
Herder. Heidegger stresses the importance of history. Ballad writes:
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Being Is accessible to man only In time. The opening prepared for the emergence of beings
(and for man himself understood as a being) Is historical; in different epochs, different aspects
of being have become disclosed. Correlatively, other aspects have remained hidden. The reign
of Gestell in the modern world, for e)Cllmple, would conceal as much as It reveals. Thus, all
disclosing of possibilities is also a closing of them off, a concealing (Ballad 1970: 50).
OUr understanding of the world and reality Is a historical process.
In ''The Question Concerning Technology." Heldegger takes Issue with the extreme
tendencies of instrumental rationality. Heidegger takes history seriously. and examines the
problem of technology In terms of the context of modemity. He writes: 'When we respond to
this essence. we shall be able to experience the technological within its bounds" (Heidegger
1977b: 287). By exploring the pradice of technology. Heidegger argues for a fusion between
theory and practice which would aid a movement towards the resolution of the crisis of
modernity. He writes: ''Technology is not eqUivalent to the essence of technology" (Heidegger
1977b: 287). Technology is not a Platonic essence for Heidegger. We are. for him.
completely enmeshed in a historical context in which technology grounds our interpretation of
Being. The critical examination of this historical context is a theoretical engagement. but it Is
based on the explicit engagement with the concrete environment of our age. Heideggers
reliance on the fusion of practice and theory relates his thinking to feminist philosophy.
Heidegger attempts to define the meaning of technology: ''The manufacture and
utilization of equipment. tools. and machines. the manufactured and used things themselws.
and the needs that they serve. all belong to what technology is" (Heidegger 1977b: 288).
Scientific rationality has decisively framed the manner in which we envision the objectivity of
reality. For this model. rationality is conceived in instrumental terms. and technology is seen
as a means of bettering our lives and as a means of reducing the misery of human existence.
Descartes articulates the idea that scientific methodology is a salvation. We mow towards a
perfected state of material mastery. Heidegger writes: "The current conception of technology.
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according to which it is a means of human activity, can therefore be called the instrumental
and anthropological definition of technology" (1977b: 288.). Instrumental rationality is an
interpretation of objediw reality which tries to present itself both as authoritive and absolute.
Descartes and Taylor hold that the instrumental paradigm of scientific rationality is
more '·objective'· and more adequate than other interpretations of Being. Heldegger. feminist
thinkers, and aboriginal philosophers all point out the limitations of scientific rationality-
namely. its focus upon clarity merely in small units. uniwrsal reason. antihistorical reason.
and the alleged ideal of the thinness of experience. All of these critiques challenge the self-
professed hegemony owr the truth of scientific, instrumental rationality. Heidegger stresses
the decisive manner in which scientific instrumentality has framed our llnderstanding of
objectiw reality:
The instrumental definition of technology is indeed so uncannUy correct that it even holds
for modern technology. of which. in other respects. we maintain with some justification that it
is, in contrast to the older handwork technology. something completely different and therefore
new (1977b: 288).
In modem times, there have been profound changes in the modes of produdion. The
material conditions of human lives haw been transformed. Because of the radical
transformation of material conditions, the modem Enlightenment has had a much more global
and "otalization of consciousness" (Adorno's term) than the Greek Enlightenment did on the
people of its time.
Descartes stresses the importance of gaining mastery of the material world in 0 rder to
improw human life. This element in Descartes' philosophy is argued persuasively by Peter
SchouIs in his book Descartes and the Enlightenment (Schouls 1989). A bettering of material
conditions would improw human liberty. Heidegger provides us with a sketch of this
worldview: "Everything depends on our manipUlating technology in the proper manner as a
means. We will, as we say. 'get technology spiritually in hand.' We will master it. The will to
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mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human
control" (Heldegger 1977b: 289). We can see, perhaps even more clearly than Heidegger the
environmental damage that Instrumental rationality has brought. We are at a crisis point In
terms of the condition of the environment. The devastation of the environment which stems
from the explosion of instrumental rationality, challenges the notion of "success" in this
paradigm of rationality. The possible truth is that we may have lost control of technology.
Heidegger stresses throughout his writings that the instrumental manner of
understanding technology is contingent and by no means necessary: ''''echnology is a way of
revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm of technology will open up for us.
It Is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth" (Heidegger 1977b: 294). Heidegger sees technology,
and by extension instrumental rationality, merely as one way human beings can Iiw and
understand the world. The interpretative framework of instrumental rationality grounds our
interpretation of Being. In order to extend the manner in which we understand the world, we
must. and can, transcend the limitations of Instrumental rationality. we can choose another
path within this horizon. Thus we do not step 0 utside of history. We can think outside of the
existing interpretative horizon.
Instead of relying on scientific, instrumental rationality. Heidegger advocates the use of
other paradigms as well. In his essay, ''''he Origin of a Work of Art,II Heldegger advocates that
art should be taken seriously as a mode of rationality. Gadamer also for this position
(Gadamer 1975: 5-152). Art. like different historical periods, frames reality from different
perspectives. Relativism is not implied in this for two reasons: (1) the existence of a common
object namely reality (Being). and 2) the means of understanding (second level patterns of
narrative construction) this common object exists transhistorically and transculturally. Peter
Winch, on the other hand, does not have an overriding concept such as Being which could
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unite all of the different aspects of Interpretation. Winch runs into commensurability problems
because he provides no evaluatiw basis within which different narratiws can be compared.
Essentially, Being functions as a metanarratiw which links various narratives together for
Heidegger.
The notion of Being as a metanarratlve can be Integrated into political philosophy.
Heidegger states that instrumental, scientific rationality is the historical horizon wherein we are
presently interpreting Being. He is engaged In the quintessential activity of liberalism- he Is
thinking outside ofthe dominant Interpretative horizon ofInstruments/ rationality. He Is
attempting to change the Interpretative horizon of our age through his philosophy. At this
point. I wish to turn directly to liberalism and demonstrate that the antinomies of the
Enlightenment can be dealt with in the domain of human studies.
One can readily discern the manner in which the Enlightenment ideals were translated
into moral terms. Kant is undoubtedly a major figure In the thought of the modern
Enlightenment. A consideration of his general position would supplement the earlier analysis
of Kymlicka who I take to be a Kantian liberal. It would be fruitful to examine the manner in
which his thought grapples with the dialectical tensions of the two poles of Enlightenment.
There is a profound paradox (namely the paradox of Enlightenment) at the heart of the
Kantian enterprise: on the one hand he uses causation to justify a sort of epistemological
determinism (i.e. knOWledge is causally prodUced) as in the first Critique: the domain of pure
reason, whereas in the second Critique, that of practical reason, I'everything ... is connected
with free willil (Kant 1969: 455). Kant develops his conception of the will in Foundations ofthe
Metaphysics ofMors/s. l'The will is thought of as a faculty of determining itself to action in
accordance with the conception of certain laws. Such a faculty can be found only in rational
beings" (Kant 1949a: 85). While on the one hand he dismisses transcendental arguments
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(among which he Includes arguments about free Will) because they cannot be verified with
empirical evidence, he also needs the notion of freedom (which is according to his
terminology based on a transcendental argument) for his whole ethical system.
Kant's projed also contains within itself the poslti'Je pole of the Enlightenment. This Is
especially the case in the first Critique. Scientific methodology relies heavily on the notion of
causation which In tum grounds s prioriknowledge. Kant writes: "All changes take place
according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect" (Kant 1969: 148). Kant writes that
"he principle of causality instruds us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a
determinate empirical conception" (Kant 1969: 212). Kant equates the "maxims of freedomH
with "laws Of nature" (Kant 1949b: 116). Kant links the notions of freedom. rationality and will:
"It is a rule characterized by an 'ought' which expresses the objecti'Je necessitation of the act
and Indicates that, if reason completely determined the will, the action would without
exception take place according to that rule" (Kant 1969b: 131). Kant imports the notion of
necessity Into his conception of s priori"
Now, in the first place, if we have a proposlion which contains the idea of necessity in its very
conception, it is a jUdgment a priori, if, moreover, it is not derived from any other proposition,
unless from one equally invoMng the idea of necessity, it is absolutely II priori (Kant 1969: 27).
Kant stresses the universal and objective manner in which we understand reality: "For
this conception demands that something, A. should be of such a nature, that something else,
B, should follow from It necessarily and according to absolutely universal law" (Kant 1969:
90). The central role given to causation demonstrates the impad that the natural sciences had
upon the human sciences. Objective constraints are put on to the object domain of the
natural sciences. The methodology of the natural sciences stressed the importance of
necessity which in turn implies the notion of causation. The categorical imperative was a
necesssryproduct of universal reason. Universal moral laws existed outside of history and
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were not bound by the contingencies of any historical community. The methodology of Kant
could be characterized as detached and disengaged because the self was not situated.
Kant and Descartes advocate a liberation from the dNdgery of the past (I have already
outlined this in the case of Descartes earlier in the chapter). In "What is Enlightenment?,n Kant
uses the metaphor in a similar manner to Descartes: "ENUGHTENMENT Is man's release
from his self-incurred tutelage.II (Kant 1949c: 286). He adds:
For there will always be some independent thinkers, even among the established guardians of
the great masses, who, after throwing off the yoke of tutelage from their own shoulders, will
disseminate the spirit of the rational appreciation of both their own worth and every man's
vocation for thinking (Kant 19490: 287).
In general, the process of Enlightenment allows one to be free from the limitations of the
past. Enlightenment moves humanity from childhood to adulthood:
... we have clear indications that the field has now been opened wherein men may freely deal
with these things and that the obstacles to general enlightenment or the release from self-
imposed tutelage are gradually being reduced (Kant 19490: 292).
Kant's work documents the impact that the emerging natural sciences had upon moral
philosophy. Furthermore, his work is an attempt to solve the paradox of Enlightenment.
Kant. like Descartes, stresses the pivotal role of consciousness: liThe I think must
accompany all my representations ... the representation would either be Impossible, or at
least be, in relation to me. nothing" (Kant 1969: 94). In another passage Kant writes: II••• the
proposition I think ... contains the form of every jUdgment in general. and is the constant
accompaniment of all the categories ... 11 (Kant 1969: 237). There is no external justification of
truth. Rather lithe world is a sum of phenomena ...11 (Kant 1969: 401).
The mind processes information. according to Kant, by proceeding from sensation to
the understanding. and to Reason (the highest level of abstraction. which contrasts with a
more embodied account of experience). One type of transcendental argument is not sound.
because it is not based on empirical data: II... they do not proceed upon empirical principles"
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(Kant 1969: 358). Kant writes that ''the senses represent objects as theyappeaf and ''the
undemanding as they Bril' (Kant 1969: 190). Both are limited tothe framework of a sUbject
and there is no objective and extemal justification for either. He adds: "Understanding
accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same enlarging Its own field" (Kant 1969: 205).
The Understanding's only "occupation is the connection of experiences ...... (Kant 1969: 374).
Uke the sophists, Kant moved arguments away from cosmological arguments (Kant 1969:
260-281, 342-372) to themes of coherence or intersubjedive concern.
Kant writes: "Philosophy must therefore assume that no true contradidion will be found
between freedom and natural necessity in the same human adions, for it cannot give up the
concept of nature any more than that of freedom" (Kant 1949b: 110). Kant stresses the
paradox between the notions of freedom and necessity:
Obviously ... the separation of his causality (his wiD) from all natural laws of the world of sense
in one and the same subject is a contradiction, but this disappears when they reconsider and
confess, as is reasonable, that behind the appearances things-in-themselves must stand as
their hidden ground and that we cannot eXPect the laws of the activity of these grounds to be
the same as those under which their appearances stand (Kant 1949b: 113).
Kant demarcates On an anticipation of hermeneutics) the distinction between the natural
and human sciences. The object of nature corresponds to the positive pole of Enlightenment,
whereas, the object of freedom corresponds to the negative pole of Enlightenment:
The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects- Nature and Freedom, and
thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also those of ethics, at first in two separate
systems, which, finally, merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The
philosophy of Nature relates to that which is, that of Ethics to that which ought to be (Kant
1;69: 475).
Both of these notions require the notion of necessity. For Kant. the natural world has a
predetermined order. Furthermore. while the human construction of moral laws and practices
might be incomplete. There is a duty [PDich4 in determining the correct moral ideals.
In Foundations of/he Metaphysics ofMorals. Kant articulates a universalistic
understanding of moral laws (he applies the same criteria to the epistemological process of
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causation). Kant's stress on causation points to the degree to which the human sciences had
been influenced by the project of the natural sciences. The categorical Imperative imports the
notion of universal reason and necessity into the framework of the human sciences. While
there are certainly differences between the two object domains, nonetheless there are second
level principles common to both which bind them together. Contrary to the above, the object
domains of nature and freedom seem to be interconnected in Kant's system. The categorical
imperative is a reworking of the ageless golden rule: "Act only according to that maxim by
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 1949a: 80).
A sense of necessity pervades moral laws. I share'"with Kant the appeal to universal reason (I
use the tenn metanarrative). The major difference is that I stress thick experience, whereas,
he stresses thin experience. In the Critique ofPrsctical Resson. Kant writes: "Act by a maxim
which inwlves its own universal validity for every rational being" (Kant 1949b: 95). He adds:
"But since moral laws should hold for every rational being as SUCh, the principles must be
derived from the universal concept of a rational being generally" (Kant 1949a: 71).
I wish now to turn again to Rawls because of his prominence in contemporary political
philosophic literature. Rawls' embodies some of the same dialectical tensions of
Enlightenment as Kant. I discussed Rawls at length in the second chapter, but I think it is
important to place him directly in relation to third chapter themes as well. Rawls, like Kant.
has a mountain-top ideal of rationality which emphasizes the universalistic ideal of
Enlightenment. He asserts that we can survey history by detaching ourselves from history
through abstraction (similar to Taylor's "disengaged perspedive". In RaWls, the abstraction
occurs behind the veil of ignorance. Rawls writes: liThe concept of the original position, as I
shall refer to it, is that of the most philosophically fawured interpretation of this initial choice
situation for the purposes of a theory of justice" (Rawls 1971: 18). The position is considered
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to be the most favoured position because the subjects behind the veil of Ignorance do not
bring any interests with them. They are detached and can observe matters from an ·objective
perspective.II The aim of the original position is chiefly to detach people from their interests
and prejudices; this aim requires a commensurability between interpretative frameworks.
The task of the SUbjects behind the veil of Ignorance. in the original position, is to
"objectively interpretll the ideal conditions of justice. Rawls writes: l'The aim is to rule out
those principles that it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little chance of
success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justicell
(Rawls 1971: 18). The principles of justice that Rawls articulates are principles which exist
independently of pSl1lculsrhuman communities. Through the reflective eqUilibrium, we can
IIdiscove",1the 1'0bjective" principles of justice.
Rawls continues: liTo represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in
which everyone is deprived of this sort of information. One excludes the knowledge of those
contingencies which set men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudiceS-
(Rawls 1971: 19). But it is this engagement and lived experience which makes political life
possible. These contingencies ground our existence in historical communities. We do not
understand reality from an objective viewpoint. but rather we understand reality from the
perspective of our interpretative horizon. Rawls writes: I'Somehow we must nUllify the effects
of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural
circumstances to their own advantages" (Rawls 1971: 136). Within this context. Rawls, in his
book, A Theory ofJustice, rests upon a strong theory! practice dichotomy. While he
articulates a theory of justice, he seemingly ignores the manner in which liberal justice has
been practiced in liberal democracies in Western Europe and North America.
Georgia Warnke is careful to note the change in Rawls' thinking after 1980. Warnke
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observes that the later Rawls "nterprets his own A Theory ofJustice so that the conception of
Justice he articulates there can encompass communltarian concems with history and political
participation" (Wamke 1990: 155). In The Theory ofJustice. Rawls Is making a somENVhat
Kantian.unlversalistlc claim about morality. Warnke rightly argues that Rawls should take Into
account the thickness of our experience in constructing a political ontology. Unfortunately,
Rawls ultimately concedes far too much to the communltarian camp. While Rawls rightly
assumes that there is content and thickness to our experience. his argument becomes
circular because he "justifies" liberalism merely by saying that it is the dominant contemporary
discourse. Rawls was arguing essentially that our pradice of liberal culture need not be
defended by metaphysical positions, but rather it needs to be defined only in terms of social
practice. Warnke attacks the foundationalism of the earlier Rawls:
From a hermeneutic point of view. the attempt to find some unconditioned '~rchimeclean point"
for assessing the norms and principles of a given society fails to account for the limb of its
own historical perspective (Warnke 1990: 137).
My position Incorporates elements from both the 1971 Rawls and the post-1980 Rawls.
I hold that there are transhistorical truths, or metanarratives. but at the same time I hold that
the only way we can know them is by beginning with embodied experience. But I add the
following stipulation: embodied experience must be put to critical examination. Also. I hold
that there can be a theoretical foundation for liberalism. Liberalism can be viewed as arising
from a prioristructures of human understanding. These a priori strudures. however. will
generate different variations and configurations. I have tried to use henneneutics to
foundationally ground liberalism. I will talk later about Habennas' important conception of
llcommunicative discoursell which allows individuals using different narratives to communicate
with each other. In such a way. the possibilities of human discourse become enlarged, while
still relying on a strong sense of commensurability between different narratives.
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Taylor's argument for instrumental rationality reduces the possibility of a mutually
enriching communication between members of different interpretative communities. The
Azande pradice of examining intestines for ''Witch substance" creates a straw man for Taylor
to attack. The example of Azande witchcraft, which has been trotted out In the literature, is
misleading and simplistic. I would like to use the philosophy of the Indian people to generate
a more useful example. The environmental ethic of Indian People is one of attunement with
nature. I will retum to Indian philosophy shortly. For the present time, I would like to register
the point that we cannot merely seek an instrumental domination of nature, but we must
instead seek to live in harmony with nature. We must not seek to use technology to harness
the resources merely because we have the ability. Ethical considerations must take into
account the earth and conceptions of the Good must move beyond mere intersubjectlw
interests.
Taylor is right to say that all contemporary discourse must come to terms with science.
But it does not follow, as Taylor would have it, in his essay "Rationality,1I that instrumental
rationality is an improvement over other modes of rationality. The environmental crisis
presents itself as a powerful counter-example to Taylor'S and Descartes' instrumental
conception of rationality. The results of applying Enlightenment ideal of progress haw
severely undermined the validity of talking about technological"successes."ls modern
science IIsuccessfulli when the physical and material existence of the earth is threatened?
Taylor's criteria of rationality could also be used as material for political debate. Let us
consider the example of the proposed hydro "development" project in Quebec. A member of
the Quebec government could attempt to cite Taylor and Descartes to support the view that
western instrumental philosophy is superior to the attunement philosophy of the Cree. I do
not think that we have to choose between the two perspectives. Rather, I think we can
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engage In communicative discourse and take the best from both life-worlds.
Aboriginal peopie, like people of all cultures, have every reason to engage in a
hermeneutics of suspicion (I.e. a critical hermeneutical interpretation). Because of the
disastrous effects that instrumental, scientific rationality has had upon their lives, aboriginal
people are well-positioned to critically examine the practice of Enlightenment ideals. The
exploitation of land by "advanced" civilizations has often meant their displacement. They are
forced to think outside of the dominant narrative, and can point to conceptual holes and
contradidions in the system. Aboriginal people, who are living in squalor throughout this
country, see Enlightenment ideals as mere illusions. Take freedom. for example. How can
one be free in poverty? Indians have real reasons to doubt the "progress of Reason" and the
instrumental approach to rationality. This mode of rationality has been used to SUbjugate
Indian nations. For aboriginal people. lIequalitY· is also an illusion. How can one be "equal"
when one's culture. language, religion have been systematically attacked? These experiences
allow them to think outside of the system of scientific. instrumental rationality.
Douglas Cardinal attempts to resolve the conflicts in the confrontation between the two
interpretative horizons. Cardinal sees the same sort of totalizing effed upon rationality that
technology has in the same way as Heidegger. He speaks of the dominant society as being
"enslaved by its technology' (cardinal 1977: 44). Technology is ·'transforming everythingl' and
"destroying everything" (Cardinal 1977: 44). There is a neglect of the Iisubtle balances of
nature" (cardinal 1977: 44). He adds: l'This system destroys individual sensitivity because in
the dominating technological society. one loses sight of the natural wholel' (cardinal 1977:
76).
The same instrumental rationality was used to SUbjugate Indians:
Their crimes against our people make it necessary for them to degrade us, to program their
society to believe that we are ignorant savages thereby rationaHzing and perpetuating their
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abuse. Since we are less than men in their eyes, their conscience Is eased and they feel
exonerated In their past and present treatment of our people (Cardinal 1977: 45).
Melnyk writes:
It Is the dialectical irony of history that the people of the land, who under white domination
have become the wretched of the earth, should in preserving their ancient culture lay the basis
for a new relationship with this land which far surpasses that of the white conquerors (Melnyk
1977: 11).
The sUbjugation of Indians and the subjugation of the earth itself point to the inner
contradictions of the Enlightenment. Cardinal writes: "Our being erodes the foundation of the
dominant society's materialist and capitalist values, so it has made every effort to destroy us·
(Cardinal 1977: 68). Because Europeans believe they have the true narrative, this legitimates
(to some extent) their oppression and domination of aboriginal people. Their assumption of
superiority fuses the theoretical aspirations of science and Enlightenment, namely objectivity
and neutrality, with the historical practice of these ideals.
Melnyk characterizes the philosophy of instrumentality In the following manner: "The
world of objects is a world out-there. It is a world built on separation and the proliferation of
things" (Melnyk 1977: 13). There are two parts of this. First, there Is a separation between
human beings and the rest of existence. cardinal writes: "Technological civilization tries to
impose the mind or ego on everything around" (cardinal 1977: 25).
Melnyk writes:
In such a universe, a man-made universe, where primacy in fife belongs to man, man becomes
an object, a thing out-there and life becomes a thing out there to be manipulated. Being
disappears and is replaced by the life-less thing. Ultimately life becomes a man-dependent
thing (Melnyk 1gn: 13).
Melnyk adds: "Man operates as creator more than life" (Melnyk 1977; 13).
Second, Cardinal writes that the "system of technology is a monument to the 'I' .1
(Cardinal 1977: 114). Here Cardinal is talking about the context of modernity of which he Is
also a part. He writes: "Technological civilization tries to impose the mind or the ego on
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everything around" (Cardinal 1977: 25). Melnyk writes: "Cardinal calls this society the society
of the ego-man. The ego-man is the man of the conquering intellect or whiteman's knowing.'
This knowing Is not holistic" (Melnyk 1977: 13).
There is an attempt to divide up the world. Melynk adds: "Its main attribute is
domination through division. When cardinal calls this the 'dominant society.' he is not only
referring to the oppression of Indian culture, he calls attention to the main mode of being of
this society which is mastery" (Melnyk 1977: 13). Melnyk also writes: liThe goal of this
immigrant culture is power over nature" (Melnyk 19n: 13). Mastery occurs both in socio-
economic terms and also in the alienation from the earth. Both move against the classical
liberal ideal of equality.
Instrumental philosophy is alienating:
When Cardinal talks about the immigrant culture imposed here as "alien", he is not only stating
a sociological fact but is stating that the essence of the present society is "alienation.II This
accusation is fundamental to the Indian critique of civilization in general and technological
society in particular (Melnyk 19n: 14).
The essence of Indian philosophy affords the possibility of restoring the relationship
between entities. Also, it creates the grounds of a radical philosophy for democracy and
equality between people and the earth:
The Indian vision offers this society relationships it does not have. It offers it the possibility of
de-alienating itself, of no longer being in an immigrant culture. It offers a unity with the land
impossible in our society. It offers an end to the ideology of domination and a radical new
democracy (Melnyk 1977: 20).
Melnyk adds: lilt comes from a philosophy of radical human equality with life, a world without
hierarchyll (Melnyk 19n: 15). We must rethink the exclusively human focus of instrumental
rationality and traditional liberalism. While it may be difficult to conceive of equality between
human beings and the earth, we must at the very least take the well-being of the earth into
account when we construct conceptual schemes which articulate an interpretation of the
155
Good.
cardinal's philosophy sets forth an open-ended conception of rationality which links
technology with traditional Indian philosophy. This may be illustrated with a discussion of a
building he was designing: "Only openness in the planning and development of the College
will ensure the breath of community spirit in it. The plan will centre on concepts of freedom to
grow, on concepts of evolution rather than an inflexible. dictatorial plan difficult to modify"
(Cardinal 1977: 36). He adds: ''The form is alive, a living plant-like growth" (C8rdinal1977: 36).
cardinal expands this by saying that "it will branch out living spaces which will follow the
natural terrain so that the human community and the natural environment grow with one
another" (Cardinal 1977: 37). He characterizes this mode of philosophy by the following
assertion: ''The design cries out for growth, expansion, innovation and change. It breathes
freedom. Like a plant it needs only nourishment to thrive and develop" (Cardinal 19n: 38).
cardinal, furthermore, contrasts this with other modes of architecture: 'The Renaissance-
conceived temples of today in which each facade has been 'balanced' in a system of
aesthetics of which the Greeks would be proud offer stubborn resistance to modification"
(Cardinal 1977: 36).
cardinal's Indian philosophy is holistic and in many ways close to that of Heidegger:
lilt is a vision that is more about 'being' than 'making' .. (Melnyk 1977: 14). Technological
knowledge in and of itself does not jUstify the narratiw of instrumental rationality. I raise
similar objedions to instrumental rationality as I did to Rorty's liberalism. The existence of a
pradice does not in itself give it normatiw validity. Rather, the only way in which to establish
the normative validity of a narrative is to critically examine it and compare it to other
narratives. Indian philosophy proposes a more integrated understanding between the self and
the earth. Melnyk notes: "For Cardinal, the Indian sense of reality is a dramatic consciousness
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of the organic" (Melnyk 1977: 10). cardinal's position also has importance for environmental
ethics: "Knowledge was acquired through harmony and balance with our natural environment"
(Cardinal 1977: 123). In another passage Cardinal writes: IIKnowiedge for Indian culture is
union with all being" (cardinal 1977: 123). A Indian understanding of reality does not
necessarily oppose all form of technological "advancement." Rather, the purpose of the
critique of Indian philosophy is to provide constraint and reevaluation of the narrative of
instrumental rationanty.
cardinal's philosophy of architecture sees the architecture of our age as
demonstrating the principles of instrumental rationality (It Is an objectification of mind, to use
Diltheys tenn):
Our urban centres are physical manifestations of how we think; compartmentalized cubes
separating us, dMding us, marching in rows of vertically containerized cubes. These containers
are drab, lifeless pitiful substitutes for the fathomless stimuli of the earth and universe (Cardinal
19n: 125).
Like feminists such as Bordo, Cardinal sees the alienating, intellectualized effect of scientific
rationality:
The result is compartmentalized minds that forces our natural faculties, our feelings, organs,
senses into limiting cubes which are mere containers on an assembly line labelled for roles in
the pyramid (Cardinal 19n: 125).
cardinal is categorically against the mechanistic philosophy of the Enlightenment. In "The
Human Organism and the Mechanical Grid," cardinal contrasts the more holistic philosophy
of Indians with the more mechanistic philosophy of the Enlightenment. Environmental
degradation can be understood as a product of instrumental rationality. The mechanical grid
is similar to Descartes' geometrical system. The manner in which we comport to technology is
an aesthetic expression. OUr aesthetic expressions can be seen as asking great questions
about the age in which we live. The effects of technology, such as clear-cutting, can be seen
as reflections of the Zeitgeist which demonstrates a totalization of consciousness (Adorno and
157
Horkenhelmer's term).
cardinal refers to his bUilding as being part of the ·organism" of the surrounding
environment: liThe growth pattern of a community should be influenced by the natural terrain.
trees. foliage. water and the right of each member of the community to share in the natural
beauty of a place" (Cardinal 1977: 34). If the earth could be seen in a similar way. that Is as
an animate entity. we then. perhaps. would have a different attitude towards it. Melnyk writes:
"In the culture of the native people ... the land stops being a thing. an object. a produd of
man the way it Is In our culture" (Melnyk 1977: 11). Like Heldegger. Cardlnal's Indian
philosophy sees a totality and holism in reality: liThe Indian sense of the land Is not only
dynamic; it is also a vision of oneness and totality" (Melnyk 1977: 12). Cardinal writes: "Our
basic philosophy emphasizes the oneness of alillYing beings. Our rewrence for life causes
us to be deeply concemed about life and our lifeglvers. Their destruction means the physical
and spiritual destrudlon of ourselves" (Cardinal 19!7: 44).
The twentieth century has witnessed the rapid urbanization of popUlations throughout
the world. Indian philosophy must. undoubtedly. endeavour to make itself relevant to people
living in urban as well as In rural areas. It must be acknowledged that peopie who live In
cities. and who wish. in good will. to engage in a hermeneutical conwrsation with Indian
philosophy. are perhaps somewhat limited in their options to practice the philosophy. There
are few open spaces in the urban landscape. Despite this. one could engage with Indian
philosophy through actions such as: 1) recy-cling. 2) supporting environmental causes. and 3)
coming to terms. in their own way. with the fragmentation of understanding which permeates
modemity. In turn. one could use the conceptual schemes of Indian philosophy to reconstrud
their own world view.
C,rdinal. like Heidegger. laments the fragmentation of our understanding of reality
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(Being): "The oneness of Indian culture finds its symbolic expression in the circle, the native
people's ultimate metaphor for totality" (Melnyk 1977: 12). The symbol of the circle is also
found in Heidegger's ontology of the difference between Being and being. The symbol of the
circle Is also suggested in my notion of conceptual hole (there is always a difference between
narrative and reality). Because of the finitude of our understanding and experience, we always
move transcend it. The process is not a linear one, but would be better charaderized as a
circular process (namely the dialectical pUll between different narratives and the relationship
between these narratives and reality itself). Ultimately, if we see a revised version of Rawls'
original position as a useful heuristic device, then we also use the symbol of the circle to
denote the hermeneutical conversation that people would have in the original position.
Cardinal writes in the introdudion to his book, Ofthe Spirit, that there does not have
to be an essential difference between the interpretative frameworks of instrumental rationality
and that of Indian philosophy:
I am convinced that the Indian sense of reality does not have to be in conflict with that of the
dominant society. An inward look would reveal to us that we all, as members of the human
famny, aspire to the same values (Cardinal 1977: 8)
Cardinal asserts the notion of commensurability between different interpretative horizons.
As suggested above, Cardinal's philosophy of architedure and his ontology bear
remarkable comparison to Heidegger's philosophy of Being, in partiCUlar, his philosophy as
found in "Building Dwelling Thinking" (Heidegger 1977d). Unlike the instrumental mode of
rationality which stresses domination, Cardinal stresses attunement: liOn the plains, the rivers,
trees, hills, valleys and varied terrain are beauty. To land developers and the urban
developers they are wasted real estate" (cardinal 1977: 31-32). He stresses that the present
architedural orientation to the "grid" alienates: liAs time passes the whole organism increases
in size and the grid-like pattern of arteries becomes more and more inefficient" (Cardinal
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19n: 32). Once again, cardinal understands the city in metaphorical terms, viewing It as a
physical embodiment.
cardinal writes of what Indian philosophy has to offer the world:
... we still feel the oneness of all living beings, the oneness of all lie. We have a tremendous
amount of knowledge to offer our people and our future generations. We have a tremendous
amount of knowledge to offer mankind. We must teach the industrial societies the meaning of
fife (Cardinal 1977: 46).
cardinal writes: 'When aboriginal peoples can come to understand technological society as
the thing It Is. they can make a great contribution to mankind" (Cardinal 1977: 102).
Annie L. Booth and Harvey M. Jacobs in their thoughtful article "Ties That Bind: Native
American Beliefs as a Foundation for Environmental Consciousness," write: "In particular,
ecofeminism equates the suppression and domination of nature with the domination of
women, and for similar reasons. Each was, and is, perceiwd as dangerous and in need of
control" (Booth and Jacobs 1990: 29). While Booth and Jacobs make many insightful points,
they tend to romanticize Indian philosophy, and In the process create a rather simplistic and
narrow conception of It. Cardinal rightly points out the manner in which the Indian has been
characterized. There are also dialectical tensions in the dominant narrative of Indian people. I
haw already alluded to them in chapter two. In Cree culture, women haw been seen as
Other and haw been degraded. The ideological subordination of women in the Cree life-
world is inconsistent with the claim of the Indian narratlw of holism. This Is an example where
the aboriginal narratiw can be enriched by the European narratlw of liberalism.
Indian people must also be critically aware of the manner in which they have adopted
tenets of instrumental rationality. They need to point out the contradictions in our own thinking
(between the theory and pradice of Indian philosophy). An example of this is the Meadow
Lake Tribal Council's decision to store uranium waste. Another conflict is the Federation of
Saskatchewan Indians's tacit endorsement of uranium mining. Indians haw produced a
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theory/ practice difference within their own life-world which creates hierarchies within a
society. Habermas writes:
... the danger of an exclusively technical civilization, which is devoid of the interconnection
between theory and practice, can be clearly grasped; It Is threatened by the splitting of its
consciousness, and by the splitting of human beings into two classes- the social engineers
and the inmates of closed institutions (Habermas 1Q73: 282).
This has occurred in the cases of Indians of both genders and also in the case of women.
The resolution of the paradox of Enlightenment ultimately will help voices which have been
marginalized to have a stronger voice.
Habermas SPeaks of a dualism between lithe natural and cultural sciences" (Habermas
1988: 1) which demonstrates the paradox of Enlightenment. Habermas stresses the limitations
of hermeneutics and argues for a "empering of its claims" (Habermas 1988: 59). He
continues: "No choice between comPeting interpretations can be achieved through Verstehen
itself' (Habermas 1988: 59). Habermas wants to break out of the hermeneutical circle by
appealing to the normativity of science.
In the first Chapter, I mentioned that I was inspired to create my dlaledic of
Enlightenment in a general manner by the work of Horkenheimer and Adorno. Habermas
discusses their book Dialectic ofEnlightenment liOn their analysis, it is no longer possible to
place hope in the liberating fo rce of enlightenmentll (Habermas 1987: 106). Like Heidegger,
they tend to stress the dark side of the Enlightenment (which in this chapter I have mentioned
as being instrumental rationality- but this is only one pole of the dialedic of Enlightenment).
The projed of Horkenheimer and Adorno undermined the objedive pretensions of the natural
sciences. I think that Horkenheimer and Adorno are right to delimit and attack the objective
and normative claims of Enlightenment. Habermas charaderizes what they were trying to
deconstrud: II••• it lays claim to it only in the form of a purposive-rational mastery of nature
and instind- precisely as instrumental reason" (Habermas 1987: 111).
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While there is much constructive discussion to be generated by Adorno and
Horkenheimer's critical analysis of modernity, lived experience must be justified as well as
constrained. Science constrains narratives in the same manner that universal reason does.
While Habermas does belong to the hermeneutical camp, he also diverges significantly from
the henneneutical methodology of, for example, Gadamer. However, Habennas does not view
science merely as a societal construction. Usually, Verstehen is strictly limited to
intersubjective understanding. Undoubtedly, this is partly caused by the fact that
hermeneutics is in many ways a neo-Kantian movement. Habennas writes that meaning is not
private but rather has "intersubjedive validity" (Habermas 1982: 155). In another passage,
Habermas attacks the intersubjedive limitations of reason: liThe historian will not be able to
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limit himself in his explanations to a logic of action that incorporates the hermeneutic
understanding of meaning, for the historic context is not exhausted by the mutual intentions of
human beings" (Habermas 1988: 35). In other words, narratives are constrained by external
circumstances.
Habermas writes: "In this ahistorical civilization, the nomological sciences, the
methodology of which excludes a connection to history, take over the 'direction of action and
knowledge' II (Habermas 1988: 19). In the section on Rawls, I analyzed the manner in which
Rawls uses notions of objectivity. The Rawlsian conception of the self is excessively thin.
There is no sense of embodiment nor thickness. We need history to have this. Habermas
cites H. Schlesky to round out this point:
Modern society obeys the laws of the reconstruction of the world through natural and social
sciences that have become technologiss. The stabOity and autonomy of modern industrial and
scientific civilization remove the effective possibility of a personality gUided by ideas, as they
remove the necessity to understand political and social activity in historical terms (Schelsky
1983: 280. ct. Habermas 1988: 19).
In Descartes especially, but also in other Enlightenment thinkers, there was a stress on
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autonomy and freedom. This freedom was premised on the desire to smash history and the
existing narrative (part of the dialed of Enlightenment). The above quotation from Schlesky
reflects the ahistorical pretensions of science.
Habennas wants to acknowledge the importance that history has for narrative
construction. thereby undermining the objective pretensions of the natural sciences:
... social action exists only with reference to the system of traditional cultural patterns in which
the self-understanding of social groups is articulated. The methodology of the sciences of
action cannot avoid the problem of understanding the meaning of hermeneutically
appropriating cultural tradition (Habermas 1088: 58).
At some level. Habennas might be seen as espousing a closure of interpretative horizons. He
might also be viewed as advocating social detennlnism O.e. that we have socially prescribed
roles for us) like Sandel. Taylor and Macintyre- a sort of determinism. Rather. Habermas. like
Kymlicka. understands social narratives merely as the context in which decisions occur. The
self is understood to be embedded within interpretatiw matrices.
No this point. I want to outline Habermas' attack on positivism. He attacks the extreme
positivism which I have outlined earlier. Habermas notes that the ahistorical pretensions of
scientific rationality can be used to jUstify the status quo: "Given such a scientifically
legitimated suppression of history. the objective illusion may arise that with the help of the
nomological sciences life-praxis can be relegated exclusively to the fundional sphere of
instrumental adion" (Habermas 1988: 19). Instrumental adion is somewhat similar to
instrumental rationality. Habermas calls the objective pretensions of the natural sciences an
"appearance" (Habermas 1988: 20) which "conceals the complex of interests that
unreflectively determines the diredion of technological progress" (Habermas 1988: 20).
Habermas' task of attempting to bridge the gap between the poles of Enlightenment is
related closely to the central task of this thesis. We all are certainly members of interpretative
communities. Habermas writes:
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The specific characteristic of this Unguistically structured community is that Indlvidusttld
ptJfSOns communicsts In II. On the foundations of intersubjectlvity they accord in something
general in such a way that they identify with one another and reciprocally know as wen as
acknoWledge one another as homogeneous subjects. At the same time, however, in
communication inclMduals can keep a distance from one another and assert against each
other the Inalienable identity of their egos (Habermas 1981: 157)
Habermas speaks of the relationship between the self and the community. This compares
favourably to my notion of liberalism. as it also does to Kymlicka's distind but related version.
The brand of hermeneutics that I have been asserting is essential in bridging the poles
of Enlightenment. It mediates between the two poles, reminding us that participants on both
sides of the Enlightenment dialectic are embedded within frameworks and have
preunderstandings:
Hermeneutic knowledge is always mediated through this preunderslanding, which is derived
from the interpreter's initial situation. The world of traditional meaning discloses itself to the
interpreter only to the extent that his own world becomes clarified at the same time. The
subject of understanding establishes communication between both worlds. He comprehends
the substantive content of applying tradition to himself and his situation (Habermas 1981:
310).
Habermas' discursive ethics provide a foundation for a thick theory of liberalism. Unlike
Rawls' and Kant's ethical philosophy. people come to the table full of interpretative content.
The possibility of a communicative discursive ethic enables different people and groups of
people to arrive at mutual understandings and to come together to form a metanarrative. The
conversation has content because embodied and lived experience is acknowledged. Where I
differ from communitarians, is that I hold that lived and embodied experience can be
transcended. Habermas writes:
However, only in an emancipated society, whose members' autonomy and responsibility had
been realized, would communication have developed into the non-authoritarian and universally
practiced dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego identity and our
idea of true consensus are always implicitly desired (Habermas 1981: 314).
This is Habermas' attempt at resolving the paradox of Enlightenment. At the same time. he
quite clearly advocates an open-ended conception of rationality.
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The Impending environmental crisis forces the Issue of instrumental rationality. While
the adwnt of technology and science haw undoubtedly improved the liws of humans in
many ways, we are also approaching the limits of progress. The environmental crisis puts
objective constraints on narrative construdion. It challenges the traditional human focused
limitations of liberalism by urging humankind to factor the "interestsU of the earth into political
decisions. Unlike the traditional liberal conception of neutrality about the Good, the fact is that
we cannot be neutral. We have to become involved and see the earth as a limiting force on
our mode of understanding reality. We have to think of new ways and of new concems in the
original position. Rawls himself saw the original position as being capable of changing
through time. And in this way, to some extent Rawls has an open-ended conception of
rationality: "But this eqUilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is liable to be upset by further
examination of the conditions which should be imposed on the contradual situation and by
particular cases which may lead us to revise our judgments" (Rawls 1971: 21).
OUr moral vocabularies are constantly shifting and changing. Habermas encourages a
fluid notion of ethics. Habermas holds that It is only through "communicative ethiC!! that we
can evaluate the validity and claims of moral narratiws. (Habermas 1975: 89). Instead of
being fixed, communicative ethics should be an ongoing, hermeneutical conwrsation.
Habermas continues on this line:
That is, generality is guaranteed in that the only norms that may claim generality are those on
which everyone affected agrees (or would agree) without constraint if they enter into (or were
to enter into) a process of discursive will formation (Habermas 1975: 89).
An attempt to resolw the crisis of legitimacy was mentioned in chapter two. There Is,
however, a fundamental difference between Rawls and Habermas as they advocate different
forms of Kantian universalism. Rawls does this by arguing for a thin notion of experience,
while Habermas opts for a thicker notion of experience.
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Different cultures and groups contain a wide variety of views and elements. It Is
highly simplistic to assume that societal narratives exist as monolithic "conceptual
frameworks" which cannot be amended or supplemented. A more hermeneutical
understanding of societal narratives replaces the· peJorative "relatlvismU term with the more
positive term of "pluralism." Different narratives can fuse into one another and exchange
elements of contents.
Every horizon. in itself, is both finite in scope and is limited. The field of objects is not
captured only from one perspective. Gadamer writes: "Every finite present has its limitations.
We define the concept of 'situation' by saYing that it represents a standpoint that has
possibility of a situation" (Gadamer 1975: 269). This is the limitation of any interpretative
horizon. Other horizons can reorientate the conceptual holes generated by any given horizon.
In this way, a more holistic interpretation can be reached. The holes can. as it were. be filled.
Wamke described this idea from a Gadamerian perspedive:
Our initial expectations and assumptions are changed by the encounter with other perspectives
even If we have finally to reject them for ourselves. In rejecting them, we affirm our own
perspective in a new way, a way more differentiated and aware of its own partiality and
potential deficiencies (VVarnke 19;0: 154).
By drawing upon different interpretative frameworks, conceptual holes Rcan be filled." There is
a constant dialectic for truth between different interpretative frameworks. Warnke adds:
"Traditions of interpretation remain vital because they are continually developed, affinned, and
reworked in line with the insights achieved in interpretative encounters with alien traditions
and, indeed. with different aspects of themselveS-' (Warnke 1990: 155). In this way, Indian
philosophy can be incorporated into the Rcommunicative discourse" (Habermas' tenn) of
modemity.
Using Indian philosophy. we can rethink the Rawlsian original position. Instead of
considering of ourselves as excessively thin. our notions of self are thick which will allow us to
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construd a very different model of the original position. Warnke adds: "The idea here is not to
pick between interpretations of our political traditions, but rather to achieve a differentiated
synthesis in which the merits and differences of altemative interpretations can be recognized
and preserved" (Warnke 1990: 156). Warnke adds: "Hence an essential part of the concept of
the situation is the concept of 'horizon.' The horizon is the range of the vision that includes
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point" (Warnke 1990: 156). Every
vantage point has its advantages and disadvantages. For example, instrumental rationality has
allowed us to manipUlate the material world in such a way that our lives have been improved.
Many people today do not live in the miserable conditions in which their ancestors did. But
the horizon of instrumental rationality has also limited us and threatened the very survival of
our planet.
Habermas writes of Gadamer's use of the image of horizon:
Gadamer uses the image of the horizon to capture the fundamental hermeneutical character of
every concrete language: it is so far from having a closed boundary that it can in principle
incorporate everything that is IinguisticaUy foreign and at first unintelligible. Each of the partners
between whom communication must be estabUshed, however, lives with a horizon. Thus
Gadamer represents the hermeneutic process of coming to an understanding with the image of
a fusion of horizons. This is true both for the vertical plane. on which we overcome a historical
distance through understanding on a horizontal plane, which mediates a linguistic distance that
is geographical or cultural. The appropriation of tradition through understanding follows the
model of translation: the horizon of the present is not extingUished but rather fused with the
horizon from which the tradition stems... (Habermas 1988: 151).
All understanding for Gadamer occurs in a historical context. Gadamer writes: liThe historical
movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to anyone
standpoint, and hence can never have a trUly closed horizon" (Gadamer 1975: 271). Wamke
writes: ·We are, in Gadamer's view, thoroughly historical and this means that our history
penetrates even those critical designs or procedures through which we try to provide for a
critical distance from our own beliefs and political tradition"· (Warnke 1990: 137). The
communicative discourse is thus ongoing.
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I do. however, have a quarrel with Gadamer's overly thick conception of experience:
.•. he wants also to situate our expectations in history: they are n%urs alone but those of the
culture and tradition to which we belong. central here is Gadamer's notion of effective-history:
the idea that who we are and what we think is the product not of setf-determinatlon and
reason, as the Enlightenment might have us think, but rather of our past (Warnke 1990: 152).
By this model we seem to be restrictively bound to our traditions; as such the possibility of a
Habermaslan communicative discourse seems to be exceedingly difficult. Gadamer does,
however. see horizons gradually changing over time:
The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons
change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all humans live
and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion (Gadamer 1975: 271).
The tradition of the Enlightenment has changed throughout its history. And, as such, there is
the possibility that through positive changes, the horizon will continue to shift in new
directions. Throughout the course of this thesis, I have tried to sketch out the ramifications of
what this could mean.
I hold a position similar to Habermas:
Gadamer's prejudice in favour of the legitimacy of prejudices (or prejudgments) validated by
tradition is in conflict with the power of reflection, which proves itself in its ability to reject the
claim of traditions ... Certainly, knOWledge Is rooted in actual tradition; it remains bound to
contingent conditions (Habermas 1988: 170).
The limits of reason can be expanded through a fusion of horizons. to use Gadamer's term.
Contra Winch, this requires a strong notion of commensurability. The different narratives can
fuse into each other, offering each other new possibilities, and in turn, offering the
metanarrative of Reason new possibilities. By rethinking the limits of rationality, as found in
both liberalism and instrumental rationallty, we can also move towards a new environmental
ethic. The earth can be seen as an end and not merely as a means. By understanding the
earth as an end in itself, we can move towards a new Enlightenment. We can. thus. move
beyond the present limits of reason which stress primarily intersubjective interests.
Liberalism can be expanded to include a concern for the world and a notion of
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environmental protection. But. this notion must also be applied to liberalism Itself in a
reflective manner: liberalism advocates that traditional narratiws be open to change. and in
the same manner liberalism Itself must be open to change. liberalism must accomplish this
through history. and new historical experiences. including the environmental crisis. will
constantly shift it. This is what I mean by an open-ended conception of rationality.
I would like to end the chapter with the following quotation: 'We struggle against
history not by ignoring the limits it imposes on either who we are or the political positions we
can take; we struggle against history rather by acknowledging the multiple meanings it can
haw for us and learning from their confrontation with one anothe...' (Wamke 1990: 157). By
engaging in a meaningful hermeneutical conwrsation. different citizens of a modem liberal
state can see the possibilities that they haw to offer one another in a peacefUl and
construdiw manner.
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Conclusion:
Throughout this thesis, I have used hermeneutics to construct a foundation for
liberalism. I wish to be careful in my clarification of the manner In which I define "oundatlons.u
In a certain sense, the term "oundationsu if applied to hermeneutics, would be misleading.
Foundatlonalism implies that there Is an Archimedean point to reasoning which avoids an
infinite regression. From a foundation, one can ground knowledge claims on a solid base.
With foundationalism. there is. however, a closure of interpretative horizon. Diltheyequated
such a closure of interpretative horizons with metaphysics.
The search for foundations involves the rethinking of existing discourse. I think
immediately of Descartes' search for true methods and the complete rethinking of medieval
Christianity (the older narrative). He used architectural metaphors to illustrate the manner in
which the former narrative had to be rebuilt. Instead of the narratives providing elements for
every narrative to draw upon, one narrative is given precedence over other narratives.
Richard Rorty, a prominent antifoundationalistlc thinker, takes an extreme position on this
matter. In his position, narratives radically displace each other.
Foundationalism entails a conceptual stasis. Heidegger attacked the notion of thinking
of the totality of reality as a 'whatness" (quiditas), and instead. preferred to think of the totality
of reality (Being) as a process. Dilthey. like Heidegger. challenged the dogmatic stasis of
interpretative discourse. While he attacked the idea of dogmas and fixed interpretative
horizons, he still had a measure of constancy throughout his notion of Verstehen
(Understanding). With Dilthey's hermeneutical model. our understanding of reality becomes a
historical process. and SUbsequently we begin to understand historical. phenomenological
objects through time. Vers/ehen is a universal phenomenon and allows commensurability
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between different interpretative horizons. The process of universal conversation, namely
hermeneutics. provides a foundation for liberalism.
I haw used a hermeneutical perspedive to substantiate the need for a rethinking of
liberalism. A hermeneutical perspedive attempts to see our understanding of reality as always
shifting and always changing. The key notion of commensurability. furthermore. allows
different narratives to be grafted on to each other. Elements can be exchanged from one
narrative to another. On the same note. by using a hermeneutical model. we can think of the
liberal projed in terms of a hermeneutical conversation. Individuals from different interpretative
horizons would share with one another. including their conceptions of the Good.
There is an important difference between my project and that of Rawls' work. The
Rawls of 1971 had a strong foundationalistic position. Rawls envisioned a conversation
between different individuals which would detennine the principles of justice through a
process of refledive eqUilibrium. Olce this process has occurred it is. however, not open to
further amendments. In this way. we can speak of it as being a model of closed rationality.
One of the problems with Rawls' vlevv is that in it the self is excessively thin. Employing my
hermeneutical understanding of liberalism, it becomes obvious how difficult it is to determine
how one can have a discussion of the principles of justice without having anything to talk
about. The Rawlsian self arrives at the hermeneutical conversation, thUS. empty. and is
supposed to leave with a full conception of justice.
In chapter two. I stress the importance of acknowledging the thickness of our
experience. I hold that in order to have a meaningful conversation about political principles,
we have to present ourselves with experience and a certain vantage point. It is only through
an ongoing liberal conversation with others that we can amend our viewpoints of the world.
Modern communitarians stress lived or thick experience and often cite Aristotle as a sort of
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authority figure to help Justify their positions. In the first chapter, I attempted to place Aristotle
in a historical context by emphasizing his place in the dialectic of Enlightenment. By doing so,
I have showed some of the limitations of the Aristotelian position. Since communitarian views
substantially 0 n Aristotle, this process does something to resurrect the liberal project of the
Greek sophists. While attempting to acknowledge the Importance of the thickness or starting
point of our experience, I hold that ultimately we can also move beyond it. One of the ways In
which we can do this is through conwrsation with others.
The thickness of any interpretative horizon does not remain constant. We can always
transcend the interpretative horizon we find ourselws in. What remains common is not a
dogma nor the contents of a particular narrative, but rather the process of the hermeneutical
conversation between various parties. By transcending the finitude of our existence and
experience, we mow towards a fonn of uniwrsalism. A universalistic approach provides
constraints on local narratives and allows individuals to think outside of interpretative
horizons. In chapter two, I argued against Rorty's view that narratives are not constrained. I
argue in this thesis, in fact, that there are two ways in which narratives are constrained: 1)
through the process of a uniwrsal hermeneutical conversation, and 2) through the limits of
material reality imposed by science and also by the impending environmental crisis.
The process of universal hermeneutical conversation constrains narratives. Conceptual
holes emerge within existing narratives when they are compared to other narratives (e.g. the
status of Cree women within their own communities when confronted with more gender
egalitarian narratives). The older narrative can be rearranged by using newer elements from
other narratives. All narratives form a "common pool" (or objective mind} which creates a
theoretical pool of possibilities for various narratives to draw upon. The ability to draw upon
other narratives affords the possibility of being improved upon and puts constraints upon the
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communltarlan projed. In other words, the thickness of the interpretative horizon we find
ourselves in can be "thinned out."lnstead of merely appealing to some arcane notion as "his
is what we do here," participants of a particular narrative have to Justify Its existence.
Collective rights or recognition of nationhood help in the just alteration of narratives. They
protect minorities within nation states from being coerced by the majority culture, while
individual rights proted individuals within national minorities.
Universal reason must put constraints on the intersubjedive construdions of
knowledge. Traditionally, liberalism has seen the construdion of concepts of the Good life as
primarily an intersubjective phenomenon and for intersubjective interests. Chapter one
addressed the direction in which narratives shifted during the Greek Enlightenment. The
Greek Enlightenment, however, did not shift the manner in which we could instrumentally
manipulate the physical universe. Chapter two dealt with the reality of the existence of many
national minorities within a nation state. There was an assertion that It was possible for
different nations of people to dwell together peacefUlly within the borders of one nation state.
The granting of minority rights and the recognition of an asymmetrical federalism would put
constraints on political hermeneutical conversation. Through the protection afforded by legal
rights, members of the minority culture or nation could not be coerced into changing their
narratives.
Narratives, I argued in the third chapter, must change in response to the materiality of
reality. I also argue that while narratives should not be coerced into changing, the findings
and the success of modern science have forced older narratiws to reassess their traditional
beliefs systems. In the context of modern Europe, the traditional belief structure was orthodox
Christianity. In chapter two, I argued that Indian nations have to be able to determine their
political and cultural destinies. Nonetheless, at the same time, the narratives of Indian nations
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have to be constrained externally by other narratives and by transhistorical standards. Indian
narratives must take into account the successes of modem science. While some aspects of
Indian metaphysics may be ultimately undennined by the narrative of modern science, there
is merit in Indian philosophy which can be added to the metanarrative of human beings.
Indian philosophy, in a manner similar to feminism. challenges the extreme elements of
instrumental rationality.
Throughout this thesis. I have stressed the relationship between theory and pradice. I
have argued that thick experience must be considered if a theory is to adequately deal with
phenomena presented to us. In the second chapter. I argued that John Rawls' original
position fails to take into account the lived and thick experience of individuals. While being
generally sympathetic to Rawls' liberal project. I also think that the lived experience of Indian
people in Canada challenges central liberal assumptions of universal citizenship. (Ferninist
scholarship also demonstrates the paradoxes within narratives by. for example. showing the
difference between theory and practice). In this thesis. I have tried not only to rethink
hermeneutics but also liberalism: 1) with hermeneutics I have placed emphasis on the need
for extemal justification of narratives and 2) for liberalism I have tried to import the notion of
lived experience into liberal discussions. In the end. I have ultimately argued for an open-
ended conception of rationality. It is not the contents of our conversations that necessarily
remain constant, but rather the process of conversation itself. Our age. especially given the
environmental crisis and tension between different ethnic groups within nation states, needs a
constructive universal dialogue.
The modem Enlightenment brought about a radical change in modes of produdion:
both ideological and material. Throughout history. groups of human beings have struggled
with one another for power. Modern science has afforded human beings more possibility to
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dominate each other. but also to dominate the earth. It would be a mistake. and perhaps an
oversimplmcation of history. to vle\N science itself as the problem. Heidegger and Bordo claim
that science has destroyed positive qualities of human nature and reshaped it into something
radically new. By attacking the objective pretensions of science. important limitations of
science are demarcated. Instrumental rationality. one way ofInterpreting the resJlty ofscience.
has often led to the creation of hierarchies.
Mass societies make the possibility of conversation difficult because of the sheer
number of participants which would be involved in the conversation. "Totalized
consciousness" (Horkenheimer and Adomo's term) arises. and finds expression in totalized
regimes. DUring the first half of the twentieth century. totalitarian regimes attempted to deal
with the problem of communication between participants. The solution was to limit and end
an open-ended discussion. The conversation was extremely limited because of the
propaganda of the state.
Douglas Cardinal confronts modernity with a hermeneutics of suspicion. but at the
same time derives elements from it to formulate a revamped Indian philosophy. Earlier in their
history. Cree people would sit around in circles to discuss political and other issues. The
"circle" can be thought of as a heuristic device wherein we can all come to understand the
notion of hermeneutical conversation. Technology led to the concentration of political power
in nation states which also led to the formation of totalitarian states. While the dark
possibilities of Enlightenment have manifested themselves in this century. there are also great
possibilities in the traditional Enlightenment ideals. It is currently fashionable in universities to
talk about deconstructing Enlightenment ideals including pretensions of objectivity. The
theoretical foundation for these critiques is rooted in the Diltheyean stress on lived and
embodied experience. Modernity. however. affords us possibilities of opening up a
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multilayered and rich conversation of human beings through such technological advances as
the internet. The paradigm of conversation of Indian people. the "talking circle." can be
similarly revamped through the utilization of modern technologies. While it is important to
engage in a hermeneutics of suspicion. we must also not be paralyzed by fear. We must,
after noting and coming to terms with the dark side of Enlightenment. seek to benefit from its
great possibilities.
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